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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Although law teachers generally have salutary educational goals and
some individual law teachers have intuited and developed insightful
experimental instruction, law school instruction as a whole, remains
locked in an instructional methodology of dubious merit.' That method,
1. The author agrees with Professor Duncan Kennedy's assenion that Jaw !>ehoob
teach lawyering skills in a way that "almost completely mystifies them for almost all law
students." Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and tlze Reproduction of Hier<lrchy, 32 J.
LEGALEouc. 591,596 (1982); see also Alan A. Stone, Legal Education ontlze Couch, 85
HAR.v. L. REv. 392 (1971); AndrewS. Watson, Tlze Quest for Professiomzl Competence:
Psyclwlogical Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 9 I, I35-36 () 968 ).
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characterized here as the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model, has
persisted since Christopher Columbus Langdell's tenure at Harvard Law
2
School in the 1870s. It has persisted even in the face of the explosive
evolution of learning theory throughout the twentieth century and the
rise, in the second half of the century, of the field of instructional design,
1
a field devoted to the systematic and reflective creation of instruction.
As nearly all law professors know, nine years ago, the Macerate
Report4 spawned a national discussion of the skills and values law school
5
graduates should possess. Although this discussion of what law students
should learn is necessary, it addresses, at most, one-half of the equation.
Good learning goals mean nothing if the instruction does not succeed in
producing learners who have achieved those goals. In other words, what
is missing is an educationally sound body of law school andragogyb
scholarship, a body of scholarship that applies twentieth century
developments in the fields of learning theory and instructional design to
the design of law school instruction.
This Article examines the law school Vicarious Learning/SelfTeaching Model in light of learning theory and instructional design.
7
Further, it identifies both the good intuitions and the many deficiencies
This Article does not address clinical legal education, externship experiences, legal
writing, and other professional skills courses. Such experiences and courses have not and
cannot adopt the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model and, therefore, are beyond the
scope of this Article. The author perceives that such courses may be educationally
superior but has neither considered nor evaluated the courses in connection with this
Article.
2. See also Watson, supra note 1, at 116; ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE J850S TO THE 1980s ( 1983 ).
3. See infra Parts III-IV.
4. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS & PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT).
5. See, e.g., Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Socratic Method-Problem Method
Dichotomy: The Debate over Teaching Method Continues, BYU EDUC. & L.J., Spring
1998, at I; Alan M. Lerner, Law & Lawyering in the Workplace: Building Better Lawyers
by Teaching Students to Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solvers, 32
AKRON L. REv. 107 (1999); William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of
Professional Legal Training and a Proposal for Its Revitalization in Professional Law
Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 201 (1996).
6. The proper term for instruction directed at adults is andragogy, which refers to
teaching adults, and not pedagogy, which refers to teaching children. The "ped-" prefix
refers to children, whereas the "andra-" prefix refers to adults. Linda Morton et a!., Not
Quite Grown Up: The Difficulty of Applying an Adult Education Model to Legal Extems,
5 CLINICALL. REV. 469 (1999).
7. The author agrees with Jan Heck, a professional instructional designer affiliated
with Coastline Community College, that good teachers intuit many effective instructional
techniques. The problem with such intuitions is that they are neither reflective, in the
sense that the professors do not understand why what they are doing works, nor
comprehensive, in the sense that they seldom span entire courses, much less the entire
curriculum.

350

[VOL 38: 347, 2001]

Teaching Law by Design
SAN DIEGO L,\W REVIEW

in how law professors develop and present instruction.
More
importantly, this Article offers a dramatically different approach to law
school instruction, an approach more likely than current law teaching
methodologies to produce effective, efficient, and appealingx law school
instruction.
A. The Law School Vicarious Leaming/Self-Teaclzing Model

While other characterizations of law teaching are possible, two aspects
of law teaching epitomize how law professors teach law. First, law
teaching requires students to learn vicariously. Second, law teaching
requires law students to teach themselves. This Article classifies the
approach as vicarious because law professors structure classroom
interactions as one-on-one, professor-on-student dialogues. Professors
expect that the other students in the classes will learn by watching these
interactions. Regardless of whether a law professor classifies herself as a
"case-method"9 instructor or as a "problem-method" 10 instructor, most, if
not all, classroom instruction involves such one-on-one dialogues.
Vicarious instruction assumes some sort of rebound learning effect;
somehow the professor's comments, questions, and corrections of the
selected student not only will help the selected student, but will rub off
on all the students in the class. This method also presupposes that the
nonselected students know to play along, answering the queries in their
heads and learning to think like lawyers by experiencing vicariously what
the speaking student actually experiences. 11
8. See PA1RICIA L. SMITII & TILLMAN J. RAGAN, lNSTRl'CTIONAL DESIGN 8 12d cd.
1999) (asserting that effectiveness, efficiency, and appeal "arc considered indi~o'ator:. for
success" in instructional settings).
9. This Article uses the tenn "case-method" to refer to an instructional approach in
which the students read and brief cases. Most classroom instruction focu~ on
understanding the cases, deriving the precedential effect of the cases, and identifying and
discussing underlying policies and counterpolicies. See Jay M. Feinman. Tile Fumre
History of Legal Education, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 475,476 (1998); Mark Spiegel, Tllt'OT)"cmtl
Practice in Legal Education: An Essay 011 Cli11ical Educario11, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577.
581-83 (1987).
10. This Article uses the tenn "problem-method" to refer to an in~tructional
approach in which students prepare answers to problems. Furthennorc, the Mudentlt must
derive the meaning of assigned cases and the preccdential effect of those ~. See
Hawkins-LeOn, supra note 5.
11. The author has serious doubts as to whether law students, particularly new law
students, actually play along. He suspects many focus either on their relief at not bl!ing
called on or their fear of being called on next. He bases his suspicion on the fact that,
when he switches from selected students to one of the watching students at a time the
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This Article classifies law school instruction as self-teaching because,
for the most part, law professors expect students to figure out on their
own what the students need to know and what they need to be able to do
to succeed in the class. During classroom instruction, law professors
hope the combination of their classroom comments and their critiques of
students' comments will enhance students' legal reasoning, case analysis,
issue spotting, drafting, and policy analysis skills, will open the students'
minds to legal theory, will allow the students to understand the doctrine
under study, and will encourage students to develop desired values. Law
teachers, however, usually fail to identify for their students (and,
sometimes, even for themselves) which goals they are teaching at any
given moment. This approach requires the students not only to sort the
insightful student comments from the comments lacking insight, but also
to figure out, from the professor's comments and questions, both the
professor's instructional goals and the relationships between those goals
and the instruction presented.
Moreover, while most professors critique the selected students'
classroom attempts to perform legal analysis, law professors fail to state
explicitly what students need to know, or to explain how to spot legal
12
issues or to perform legal analysis.
In fact, law professors devote
considerable classroom time to critiquing students' case reading and case
evaluation skills even though, ironically (or, perhaps, perversely), law
professors seldom test case reading skills explicitly. Of course, many
law professors do require or encourage students to apply and distinguish
cases in their examination answers, but requiring and encouraging the use
of cases already studied and discussed in class does not test whether
students have developed the skills of reading and analyzing new court
opm10ns. The classroom discussions certainly cannot be considered
adequate tests of these skills. Such discussions are not really tests at all
and, even if they were, they would be unsound from a testing
perspective 13 for a couple of reasons. First, some students use canned
briefs to prepare for class. Second, some students, particularly students
who are shy or whose cultural backgrounds cause them to eschew
conflict with an authority figure, may be unable to demonstrate their
skills in an oral interaction with their instructor in front of sixty to eighty
of their peers.
Law professors do not expect students to figure out everything on their
own; professors encourage students to form study groups to enhance the
watching students do not expect him to do so, the response he most frequently hears is,
"What was the question?"
12. See Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis": A Systematic
Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409, 425 n.l6 (1986).
13. See infra notes 264-79 and accompanying text.
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4

students' self-teaching! Likewise, law professors acknowledge that
resources such as hornbooks, commercial outlines, nutshells, and guides
to legal reasoning techniques exist to help students learn what they need
to learn. Many professors, however, portray those resources either as too
detailed and too long to be useful (hornbooks), or as too misleading or
too oversimplified to be useful (commercial outlines, nutshells, and
guides to legal reasoning). In any event, law professors never assign
reading from these resources and never discuss specifics about the
content of these resources in class. Ultimately, students must teach each
other and themselves.
Law teaching methodologies, of course, are not uniform. Individual
instructors have tinkered with the traditional methodology by creating
experimental courses and by experimenting with different teaching
methods in their classrooms. These professors report improved learning
outcomes!5 In addition, law faculties have engaged in curricular refonns,
increasing law schools' emphasis on the skills and knowledge needed by
16
practicing lawyers.
Moreover, legal writing and other professional
skills courses, clinical experiences, and externship programs likely avoid
many of the problems associated with the Vicarious Learning/SelfTeaching Model.
Nevertheless, as Jay Feinman and Marc Feldman asserted in 1985, on
the whole, law teachers are "anti-intellectual" about their teaching,•' and
law school teaching methodologies have remained mired in a Langdellian
18
tar since the 1870s.
While these deficiencies run across the entire
14. Law professors, however, do not teach students how to opcmte effective ~tutly
groups, how to learn from study groups, or even what they shoultl tlo in their ~tudy
groups. Because new law students are novices in lawyering skills, the best stutly group~
tend to focus solely on what their prior educational experiences taught them they ncctlcd
to focus on: acquiring knowledge. Each student is left to develop on his or her own the
skills necessary to succeed in law school.
15. See, e.g., Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagog_\' a11d Po/irks. 73 GEO. LJ.
875, 875, 900-25 (1985) (describing their "Contorts" class and usc of mastery learning
principles); Edith R. Warkentine, Ki11gsjield Does11'1 Teach My Commcrs C/11ss: Usi11g
Contracts to Teach Comracrs, 50 J. LEGALEDl'C. 112 (2000).
16. See, e.g., John B. Mitchell et al., A11d The11 Sudde11/y Seaule Ulli,·ersi~· Wczs 011
Its Way to a Parallel, lntegratil'e Curriculum, 2 CUNICAL L. REv. 1 09951: Gregory S.
Munro, lntegratillg Theory a11d Practice i11 a Competeru:y-Based Currimlum: :kadt•mk
Plarming at the University of Momana Sclrool of !All'. 52 MONT. L. REv. 345 I 19911.
17. Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 875.
18. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15; Duncan Kennedy, How the Lt.m·
Sc/wol Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REv. L. & Soc. AcnoN 71 ( 1970); Karl N. Llewellyn.
The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL Eocc. 211 (19-lSI [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Curre11t Crisis]; K. N. Llewellyn, 011 \VIrat is \Yrong ll'itlr So-Called Lt•gal
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spectrum of American law schools and law students, the deficiencies are
19
particularly problematic for all but the very best law students. In other
words, for better students, their legal education is irrelevant. These
20
students possess the skills and have developed the learning strategies
with which to develop the legal reasoning skills they need as lawyers no
matter how they are taught in law school. 21 On the other hand, students
who enter law school with lesser skills and less developed learning
strategies depend on their instruction to succeed in law school, on the bar
exam, and in practice. What they get is the Vicarious Learning/SelfTeaching Model of instruction.
To understand the problem with this method, try to imagine using the
Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model to teach a skill entirely
22
unrelated to law school, like swimming. Assume the learner has above
average but not extraordinary athletic skills but never has seen anyone
23
swim. Make sure the teacher for the class possesses both extraordinary
natural athletic ability and learning strategies so that learning gross motor
24
skills comes easily. Do not teach the teacher anything about teaching or
25
designing a class. Put the learner in a class with sixty other prospective
swimmers, all of whom enter the class with varying but generally similar
athletic skill and experience. Adopt the following teaching approach:
Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1935) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On What is Wrong];
Stone, supra note 1; Wangerin, supra note 12; Watson, supra note I; see also GRANT
GILMORE, The DEATII OF CONTRACT 13-15 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995)
(describing Langdell's first Contracts casebook as having "nothing whatever to do with
getting students to think for themselves" and asserting that the method was
"indoctrination through brainwashing").
19. Law professors frequently complain about their students' bluebook
performances. See, e.g., Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 881-82 (reporting the
authors' disappointment when they read students' examination answers and asserting that
many students in law school simply do not learn). At the time Professors Feinman and
Feldman authored Pedagogy and Politics, they were teaching at Rutgers Camden, a
school commonly classified as a middle tier American law school.
20. A learning strategy is a technique for maximizing learning from instruction.
See Paul T. Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law Students, 52 ALBANY L. REV. 47 I.
472-73 (identifying teacher study, time management, efficient reading, note taking,
review, and problem solving as studying and learning strategies); see also, ADAM
ROBINSON, WHAT SMART STUDENTS KNOW: MAXIMUM GRADES, OPTIMUM LEARNING,
MINIMUM TIME (1993 ).
21. See generally Kennedy, supra note I.
22. Professor Wangerin notes that law professors sometimes see themselves as
"coaches." Wangerin, supra note 12, at 477-82.
23. Many beginning law students at nonelite schools could be similarly classified as
having above average intellectual capacity. Many of these students do not have relatives
who are lawyers and, in fact, some have no relatives who even graduated from college,
much less graduated from law school.
24. Law professors, even at lower tier schools, tend to have attended more elite law
schools and to be among the highest achievers.
25. Law professors receive little or no instruction in teaching, and no instruction at
all in designing instruction for others.
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have the learners watch swimmers swim, some of whom are excellent
swimmers and some of whom are not particularly good swimmers,=<:. and
then have fifty-nine of the students watch as one of their number is
forced to demonstrate the swimming skills she developed by watching.
Over the course of a fourteen-week semester, give each learner, at best,
two opportunities to practice what she has learned, but only in front of
her peers. Administer, at most, one graded midtermn and one final, at
which time the students must demonstrate their swimming skills or risk
never being allowed to swim on their own. 28
Assume, that to evaluate this hypothetical swim school, we were to
adopt the standard that instruction should be effective, efficient, and
29
appealing. Assume further that we chose to measure effectiveness by
Benjamin Bloom's well-known mastery learning standard,tj which
asserts that teaching is effective only if eighty percent of the learners
learn eighty percent of the material.~' The swim school's teaching
methods appear to fail on all three counts. First, some of the learners will
learn to swim because they possess the ability to self-teach or to learn
from varied instructional approaches so they are able to learn in this
environment. Most of the learners, however, will learn much less than
eighty percent. Second, for those who do not learn, the instruction will
have been a waste of their time. Moreover, given that swim schools
generally manage to teach virtually all of their students to swim in much
less than fourteen weeks, the approach must be deemed inefficient for all
of the learners. Finally, it seems that few students will find the method
appealing because they spend most of the time uninvolved in their own
learning; one would predict such students to experience great frustration
26. The reference to having some of the swimming demonstrators b.: "not
particularly good swimmers" refers to the fact that some of the opinions included in
casebooks are not particularly well reasoned. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAwso;.; ET AL,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 261-64 (7th ed. 1998) (including cases in which the
reasoning is very superficial, such as East Pro1•idence Credit Union ''· Geremitz, 239 A.2d
725 (R.I. 1968)). In Geremia, the court analyzed the three elements of promissory
estoppel with the following one line: "After a study of the facts in this case. our reply to
each of the above inquiries [each element of promissory estoppel stated as a que~tion I is a
definite 'yes."' 239 A.2d at 728.
27. Many law instructors do not administer a midterm.
28. This methodology description intentionally parallels the above discussion of the
vicarious and self-teaching characteristics of Jaw teaching. See supm notes 9-14 and
accompanying text
29. See generally supra note 8 and accompanying text
30. Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 896 & n.48.
31. /d.
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and dissatisfaction.
In fact, although many people have learned to survive in the water by
watching and imitating others, most people who have developed formal
swimming skills learned to swim through one-on-one or small group
instruction. Swim instructors emphasize key skills, such as small, fast
kicks and breathing to both sides. They teach learning strategies, such as
remembering and repeating "one, two, three, bubble out, breath" while
swimming so that students can recall the proper sequence of the freestyle
stroke. They also provide repeated practice opportunities and give
feedback to help develop skills, reinforce appropriate body movements,
and correct erroneous body movements. Some swimmers, even those
who later became strong swimmers, also needed explanations as to why
the suggested methods work. Additionally, most students needed to
practice the head, leg, and arm movements in isolation before they could
combine the skills.
This second approach is not only a matter of common sense; it is what
a professional instructional designer would prescribe. Instructional
design, which has existed as a field of endeavor since the 1960s,n "refers
to the systematic and reflective process of translating principles of
learning and instruction into plans for instructional materials, activities,
Instructional designers
information resources, and evaluation."33
presuppose that there are core methodologies for teaching all subjects
well. 34 Those methodologies, the product of thousands of educational
studies performed across all instructionallevels, 35 allow the instructional
designer to tailor instruction to the learning characteristics of the learners,
the needs of the instructional system, and the nature of the learning task.
This Article applies learning theory and the theories and principles of
instructional design to the law school Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching
Model.
It further considers the extent to which law professors
32. See WALTER DICK & LOU CAREY, THE SYSTEMATIC DESIGN OF INSTRUCTION 5
(4th ed. 1996) (noting that their approach is "an outgrowth of more than twenty-five years
of research into the learning process").
33. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 2.
34. See id. at v.
35. See generally id. In the appendixes to each of the twenty chapters in their text,
Smith and Ragan cite an average of slightly more than fifty articles and books. See also
DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 5. Other major works in the fields of learning theory
and instructional design include: ROBERT M. GAGNE, THE CONDITIONS OF LEARNING AND
THEORY OF INSTRUCTION 3 (1985); ROBERT f. MAGER, PREPARING INSTRUCTIONAL
OBJECTIVES (2d ed. 1975); I.P. PAVLOV, CONDITIONED REFLEXES: AN INVESTIGATION OF
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY OF THE CEREBRAL CORTEX (G.V. Anrep ed. & trans., Dover
Publications 1960) ( 1927); B.F. SKINNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF ORGANISMS: AN
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS (1938); CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF
INSTRUCTION: A CONVERSATION (Thomas M. Duffy & David H. Jonassen eds., 1992);
Bloom, supra note 30. In addition to the foregoing authors, other influential writers in the
fields include: Jean Piaget, Lev Semionovich Vygotsky, and Jerome Bruner.
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systematically and reflectively design their instruction. This Article
assumes that the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model is sufficient to
teach most law students the basic legal-analytical reasoning skills and
that many law school professors intuit on their own some effective and
efficient teaching methodologies. Nevertheless, law school instruction,
on the whole, is not particularly effective, efficient, or appealing.
Persuasive evidence of the deficiencies in current law school
instructional approaches already exists. In recent years, literature
criticizing law school teaching methodologies have become the norm.'~
Moreover, the author is not aware of any law teachers who believe that
eighty percent of their students learn eighty percent of the material. Most
regard bluebook reading as a painful experience, which teachers enter
with a mixture of fear and hope and leave feeling either that they are
inadequate as teachers or that their students are inadequate as students."
Finally, while some schools' bar pass rates justify a conclusion that the
students are at least receiving instruction minimally sufficient to meet the
students' goal of becoming lawyers, bar pass rates among all takers have
plunged below fifty percent in recent years.;~ Thus, law school teaching
is not particularly effective.
Moreover, law teachers frequently complain that they have coverage
problems, either objecting to being forced to cover some aspect of the
substantive law or being given inadequate time to cover the material the
36.

See, e.g., K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:

ON OUR

LAW Al'IID ITS Sn:DY

(1930); Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15; Kennedy, supra note 18; Llewellyn. Current
Crisis, supra note 18; Llewellyn, On What is Wrong, supra note IS; Stone. suprcz note 1;
Wangerin, supra note 12; Watson, supra note l.
37. For a similar point, see Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 881-8:!.
38. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Success Rate Slips to 40 Percellt, LA. DAILY J., May
31, 2000, at 1 (noting that the overall pass rate for all takers of the most recent California
Bar Examination was forty percent). Having recently studied California's Bar exam in
great depth as part of his law school's intensive bar pass program, the author is convinced
that the bar tests students on the most superficial of analytical skills and tests knowledge
more than anything else. The issues never require a discussion of policy and M:ldom
require more than quite rudimentary analysis.
For example, students' scores on a February, 1997, remedies law question <quc;,tion
three of the essay section of the exam) turned in large part on students' simple recall of a
relatively obscure point of contempt law, the Collateral Bar Rule. If the students recalled
the rule, they passed one-fourth of the exam. Likewise, a July, 1998, evidence bar exam
question (question six of the essay portion of the exam) required students to di!>CU!>S, in
one hour, over fifteen potential evidentiary objections, some of which had ~cveral
subissues. Obviously, only knowledge of the rules and the most superficial form of
analysis is being tested on the bar exam. Of course. the fact that bar exam que~tion!>
require such superficial skills makes a low bar pass rate particularly damning.

357

professors want to cover. Likewise, students frequently complain about
professors who choose to complete their course coverage through an endof-semester rush through material. Thus, either law teachers try to teach
too much or they do not teach the material in a way that minimizes
wasted effort and maximizes students' educational resources. Thus, law
teaching is not efficient.
Finally, commentators have criticized law school instruction for being
frustrating, for fostering student feelings of inadequacy and for lacking
39
clarity and coherence; this commentary indicates that law school
instruction is not appealing.
Given that law teaching is neither effective, efficient, nor appealing, it
can greatly benefit from change. The goal of this Article is to offer a
different, more systematic, and more reflective approach to creating law
school instruction, and to suggest ways by which law school instruction
can be made to work. In doing so, this Article offers a harsh critique of
law school instruction from two well-established and relevant
perspectives, the perspectives offered by learning theory and by
instructional design theory and practice. This Article, therefore, aims
broadly, seeking to serve as a resource to professors and schools
interested in improving law school instruction.
Part II of this Article identifies and explores three factors that have
caused law school teaching to remain stagnant: (I) the multiple pressures
on law teachers to conform to the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching
Model and the lack of incentives to change; (2) the legal academy's
discomfort with the idea that not all law students should be taught in the
same way; and (3) the large extent to which law professors are familiar
and comfortable with the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model and
can easily defend and readily use it.
Part III of this Article explores learning theory, focusing on the three
major schools of learning theory-behaviorism, cognitivism, and
constructivism-and on the aspects of these theories most relevant to
designing law school instruction. This Part demonstrates why instructors
at all levels should be familiar with all three schools and suggests the
implications of each for law school instructional design.
In Part IV of this Article, the author compares current law school
approaches to designing and implementing instruction with the
"instructional design" approach. This Part first explains each of the
39. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 18; Eugene F. Mooney, The Media is the
Message, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507 (1967); RobertS. Redmount, Law Leaming, TeacherStudent Relations, and the Legal Profession, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 853 ( 1981 ); Thomas L.
Shaffer & Robert S. Redmount, Legal Education: The Classroom Experience, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 190, 190 (1976); Watson, supra note I, at 121-22, 135-36; Lawrence Silver,
Comment, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 120 I.
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phases in the instructional design process and then, for each phase.
compares what law professors do with what instructional designers do.
Instructional designers engage in a systematic, reflective process in
which they consider learner, contextual and learning goal factors,
tailoring their choices of methodologies to the interplay of these factors.
In contrast, law professors tailor their instruction to the textbooks they
have selected, to their theories of law (realist, law and economics, critical
race theory, etc.) or to their own personal theories of what makes
instruction effective.
To make the discussions concrete, this Article considers the
implications of both learning theory and instructional design for a firstyear Contracts course, focusing principally on a single topic, illusory
promise.40 The discussion focuses on illusory promise because this
subject is one with which first-year law students struggle greatly."
Part V of this Article is a detailed lesson plan integrating the principles
discussed in the Article. The author has annotated the lesson plan to
make it clear how each instructional choice reflects a careful adaptation
of learning theory and instructional design theory and principles. This
model lesson plan demonstrates concretely how law professors can
improve their instruction by applying the principles discussed in this
Article.
Finally, Part VI of this Article explains the processes involved in
evaluating instruction, a crucial, integral design step that the law teaching
community has seldom considered.
This Article demonstrates that learning theory and the field of
instructional design offer significant promise for making law school
40. For those who do not teach Contracts and are far removed from the1r law ~hool
study of the subject, a refresher on illusory promise may be helpful. "An [l]llul>ory
[P]romise is an expression cloaked in promissory terms, but which. on do!>cr
examination, reveals that the promisor is not committed to any act or forbearance." Jum;
D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 203 (4th ec.l. 1998J. A
frequently cited example of an illusory promise comes from a nineteenth century ~.~c. in
which the promisor convinced a wife to guarantee the note of her husband by l>aying. "1
will hold it [the husband's note] until such time as I want my money ...." Strong v.
Sheffield, 39 N.E. 330, 331 (1895). The Strong court deemed the promi~e illu~ory
because the use of the word "want" left the promisor free to demand repayment
immediately and, therefore, it was illusory. ld.
41. There is, of course, some risk that the choice to emphasize illusory promi~e
may cause readers of this Article to assume the principles discussed in this Article are
only effective for teaching doctrine or legal reasoning skills. Such a perception would be
wrong. The techniques and theory discussed in this Article are relevant to the creation of
all instruction, including instruction addressing legal theory and values.
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instruction effective, efficient, and appealing. Because law school
instruction mostly occurs according to the Vicarious Learning/SelfTeaching Model, this Article proposes a radical overhaul of law school
textbooks and instruction, a project currently in an early stage of
development at the author's law school.
II. WHY LAW SCHOOL TEACHING HAS STAGNATED
Three factors explain why law school teaching has changed little in the
past 130 years. First, in effect, the legal academy encourages law schools
and law professors to conform to the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching
Model and discourages attempts at instructional innovation. Second, law
professors and law schools prefer a unitary model of law school
instruction and are uncomfortable with the notion that law school
instruction should be tailored to the needs and characteristics of the
learners. Third, law professors are familiar and comfortable with the
model, can easily justify it, and readily use it.

A. The Pressure to Conform to the Vicarious Learning/
Self-Teaching Model
The legal academy's policies regarding law school hiring, promotion,
and tenure practices, law school textbooks, law school accreditation
practices, and law school economics have created an environment in
which change is very unlikely to occur.
The criteria by which law schools hire new law teachers and measure
law teachers' performances for tenure purposes discourage innovation.
Most law schools hire law teachers based on their record or potential for
42
creating scholarship.
Publication is heavily weighted in tenure
43
decisions.
This emphasis on scholarship derives from law schools'
aspirations for upward mobility within the law school hierarchy. Law
schools enhance their prestige based, in significant part, on faculty
publications; teaching skill or effectiveness is not considered in the
44
rankings. Thus, law professors, like most academics, have an incentive
42. See Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and
Scholarship, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 389-99 (1990). Of course, a new hire's potential to
be effective in the classroom and to be a good colleague also greatly influences hiring
decisions, but, all other things being equal, a candidate with a strong publication record
will generate significantly more interest from law schools than a candidate without such a
record.
43. The author is aware of no law school in which either innovation in teaching or u
professor's success in having their students successfully achieve learning objectives arc
criteria for promotion or tenure.
44. See How U.S. News Ranks Graduate Programs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Apr. 10, 2000, at 59. Law professors will, of course, base their assessments of reputation
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to be minimally competent teachers and excellent scholars.
Moreover, textbook selection limits the spectrum of what is possible in
instruction. Substantive law textbooks differ only in quite superficial
ways. A set of textbooks in a given area of law may differ in terms of the
selection of cases, theoretical orientation, organization, inclusion of
introductory and explanatory material, subject matter emphasis, and ratio
of questions and problems to cases. However, nearly all law textbooks
consist mostly of past court decisions organized by subject matter, age, or
theory. The cases, not any included explanatory materials, provide "the
law" students will need to know and use on their examinations.
Moreover, even though student performance on the LSAT varies greatly
and law schools apply vastly different admissions criteria, no law
textbook asserts its special application to any category of learners. Thus,
law teachers must either conform their teaching to the texts they have
chosen or develop their own teaching materials, which, as noted above,
they have little incentive to do.
In any event, law school economics make innovation difficult to
implement.45 Law schools traditionally do well economically'"~ in large
part because, unlike most graduate school classes, law school classesparticularly first-year substantive law subjects and Bar-tested classesrange in size from 50 to 120 students ..a7 Large class sizes allow law
schools to admit large numbers of students while retaining the ability to
cover all their course offerings. As a result, most students receive
classroom feedback once or twice per semester and only very infrequent
grading, usually through midterms and finals. Of course, students who
have failed to learn the material, as reflected in their final grade, have the
on the infonnation to which they have access. As law professors have no acce!:>s to
infonnation about the teaching at other schools, it is very unlikely they consider teaching
skill at all. It seems likely, in contrast, that professors do consider the publications and
other scholarly activities, such as conference presentations; this assumption is buttressed
by the fact that law schools regularly send out mailings touting the !>Cholarly
achievements of their faculty, and never send out anything about the teaching
accomplishments of their faculty.
45. The author wishes to credit Professor Susan Keller for this idea.
46. Randall T. Shepard, From Studems to La11:\·ers: Joillf Venll/rt's in Legal
Learning for the Academy, Bench, and Bar, 31 IND. L. REv. 445, 448-49 1199SJ
(discussing two specific universities and how profitable their law school!. were).
47. See, e.g., Lea B. Vaughn, lmegraturg Altemati\'e Displlte Resolution tADRJ
into the Curriculwn at the University of Washington School of Lall': :\ Rt'port and
Reflections, 50 FLA. L. REv. 679, 682 (1998) (noting that, at the Uni\'Cf!.ity of
Washington School of Law, most first-year classes have sections as large 3!> 75 to 100
students and two "small" sections of25 to 30 students).
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opportunity to review their professors' comments on their bluebooks.
This voluntary opportunity, however, usually occurs, if at all, months
after the examination and often requires the student to suffer an
intimidating meeting with the instructor. Office hours are only barely
more availing. Even faculty members inclined to meet with their
students regularly during office hours secretly must pray that most of
their students never come to office hours, because, if all 120 students
came for help even only on a once-per-week basis and only stayed for 15
minutes apiece, the faculty member would need to hold 30 office hours
48
per week .
The process by which law schools obtain and retain ABA approval
reinforces all the foregoing factors. The ABA inspection process
encourages law teachers to conform their teaching methodologies to the
expectations of the ABA inspection team members. New law schools are
most likely to receive approval if their professors' teaching approaches
are similar to what the inspectors have seen in other ABA law school
classrooms. Because ABA approval determines the success or failure of
new law schools, the incentive to conform is likely to overwhelm
innovation.
While the influence and prevalence of each of these factors can be
debated, together they communicate a meta-message favoring the status
quo and discouraging innovation. Law professors not only have no
incentive to change their teaching methods, but they also have no
incentive to change period.
B. Law Teachers' Disinclination to Tailor Instruction to Their
Learners' Aptitudes, Skills, Self-Images, Cultural
Backgrounds, and Experiences

Looking at law school andragogy scholarship and at law school
textbooks, it appears law professors are wed to the notion that all law
49
For this reason, the
students should be taught in the same way .
assertion in this Article that law teachers should tailor instruction to their
students' needs and backgrounds may seem radical.
Instructional
designers, however, have long regarded consideration of the
0
In fact, a
characteristics of the learners in designing instruction. '
fundamental precept of instructional design is the idea that the selection

48. It is the author's perception that most law professors hold between three and six
office hours per week.
49. Aside from academic support scholarship, the author was not able to locate a
single law review article or text that claims its special relevance to any particular clas~ of
learners.
50. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
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of instructional strategies depends, in significant part, on the entering
skills of the learners.51
Law school learners vary greatly in their ability. entering skills,
motivation, background, self-image, and experience. Yet law review
articles, textbooks, and teachers' manuals uniformly eschew considering
the possibility that instruction should be tailored to the characteristics of
52
the learners.
However intuitive the idea may be, the idea seems
troubling to law professors.
While it is impossible to be certain why law professors have been
unwilling to consider this idea in print, it is worthwhile to raise and
explore a few of the possible explanations. First, because the notion that
one class of students is inferior to another class of students is a false one
in some respects, law professors simply may be hesitant to endorse the
view at all. Not all students attending nonelite schools possess le~sor
analytical skills upon entry. Some students may have selected nonelite
schools for economic reasons, for geographic reasons. or for other
convenience-based reasons. Moreover, the LSAT is an imperfect test;
students' personal or cultural issues may have caused their undergraduate
grades and LSAT scores inaccurately to predict their aptitude for law
study. Indeed, even the binary system referenced in the previous
sentences, elite and nonelite schools, is an oversimplification of the wide
spectrum of law schools and law students.
Second, law professors may accurately perceive that acknowledging
student differences leads to preferences of a narrow set of lawyering
skills. While LSAT scores and undergraduate grades may predict
students' ability to perform the lawyering skill at which law professors
excel (that is, legal analysis), neither the LSAT nor students'
undergraduate grades have been shown to correlate with other crucial
lawyering skills, such as sensitivity to human differences, ethics,
listening and empathy skills, or even speaking skills.
Thus.
acknowledging differences among learners' capacities for developing
legal analysis skills risks overemphasizing a small subset of the skills
needed by practicing lawyers. Further, it undervalues the overall skill
sets of students attending nonelite law schools.
Third, the hierarchical nature of the American law school system
makes disclosure of differences detrimental both to the speaker's
51. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
52. The author was unable to locate a single Jaw review article.
manual considering this possibility.

!C.'(!,

or teacher'.,
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personal upward movement within the law school hierarchy and to the
53
law school's upward movement within the hierarchy. Law professors
and law school administrators may fear acknowledging that their law
schools admit students who possess lower LSAT scores and
undergraduate grade point averages.
They may worry that the
acknowledgment may cause the listener to associate the speaker or the
law school with weaker students. This would lead to a self-perpetuating
cycle of applications only from students who have lower LSAT scores
and lower undergraduate grade point averages, admissions of only such
students, and lower bar pass statistics.
Fourth, the pressures on law professors to conform their instructional
techniques to the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model 54 constrain
exploration of the obvious differences among learners. Any suggestion
of difference may necessitate the development of teaching models that
conflict with law school economics or with the established faculty hiring
and tenure procedures. Indeed, though most new ABA schools have
entered the field at the lowest tier, a law school that openly acknowledges
that it has adopted a unique approach to instruction because of its
students' lower LSAT scores and undergraduate grades, may decrease its
chances of obtaining full ABA approval.
Fifth, it is possible that law professors teaching at nonelite law schools
may themselves have doubts as to the appropriateness of admitting
students with lower LSAT scores and undergraduate grades. Therefore,
they may be uncomfortable acknowledging their students' weaknesses to
their colleagues teaching at elite law schools.
Sixth, traditional liberal political views held by many law faculty and
administrators may cause them to feel uncomfortable acknowledging
differences among students, particularly if any of the women or the
minority admittees happen to possess lower LSAT scores and
undergraduate grade point averages.
C. Law Teachers' Familiarity and Comfort with the Vicarious

Learning/Self-Teaching Model and the Ease of
Defending the Model

Finally and perhaps most significantly, law professors are familiar with
the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model. They learned law quite
well from it, and the model is intellectually defensible and easy to use.
Because, as noted earlier, law professors receive very little instruction

53.
54.
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in designing instruction or in teaching/~ law professors are likely to use
the methodologies by which they learned law. Most law professors know
little, if any, learning theory and nothing about instructional design. All
they know is that they did well in law school and enjoyed it, and that they
learned through the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model.
Moreover, they can justify the use of the model. The model does
encourage learners to be self-teachers, a critical skill for practicing
lawyers. It encourages critical thinking skills, by giving learners
incentives to think critically and logically about court opinions and the
students' own views and thereby avoid embarrassment in class. The
model allows many learners to be taught at the same time. The law
professor, as well as thousands of other law students, managed to learn
by this model; thus, the professor can rationalize that students who fail to
learn by the model and therefore are academically dismissed by their law
schools would not have made good lawyers anyway.!·~ The model
requires little teacher training and relatively little class preparation time
and it is enjoyable to use.

ill.

BACKGROUND OF LEARNING THEORY

This section describes the three major learning theories: behaviorism,
cognitivism, and constructivism. It also explores the implications of
these theories for designing law school instruction. For the most part,
instructional designers tend to be eclectic in their views of learning
theory; to the extent that a theory is explanatory with respect to a
particular aspect of learning or offers a particularly effective approach to
an instructional problem, they use that theory in creating instruction.n
Instructional designers strive to engage in "cherry-picking," not selecting
which theory is "right," but, rather, selecting the best approach under the
8
particular design circumstances.~
55. See supra note 25 and accompanying texL
56. While the author does not agree with these views, they reflect common view!>
held by law professors and law students. It seems unlikely that the narrow skill set
preferenced by Jaw school exams defines what makes for effective lawyers. Thus.
although Jaw school exams do not test cooperative skills, listening skills. spl:aking ilills.
and sensitivity to others' needs, such skills are crucial to many lawyers' practices. Many
of these skills are just as likely to be possessed by dismissed students as by the students
who do very well in law school. Professor Dennis Honabach suggested this latter point.
57. See PATIUCIA l. SMrrn & TILLMAN J. RAGAN, INSlRL'CTIONAL DESIGN viii (1st
ed. 1993).
58. Peggy A. Ertmer & Timothy J. Newby, Behm·iorism, Cogniti,•ism.
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Three concepts are at the crux of learning theory and, therefore, require
elucidation at the outset. The three concepts are learning, instruction,
and transfer. First, "Learning is a change in human disposition or
capability, which persists over a period of time, and which is not simply
ascribable to processes of growth."59 For learning to have occurred,
therefore, "(I) the duration of the change is long-term rather than shortterm; (2) the locus of the change is the content and structure of
knowledge in memory or the behavior of the learner; [and] (3) the cause
of the change is the learner's experience in the environment."(>() Thus, a
Contracts student has learned the concept of illusory promise when she
has developed an ability to identify both those promises that are illusory
and those that are not.
Second, instruction is "the deliberate arrangement of learning
conditions to promote the attainment of some intended goal."~ What is
missing from this definition is particularly significant; instruction does
not necessarily equate with classroom teaching. In fact, "one of the
primary tenets of instructional design is that a live teacher is not essential
to all instruction."62 Rather, instruction includes textbook reading,
computerized tests, on-line directed discussions, and any other form of
mediated delivery of learning conditions. Thus, a law professor who
61
requires her contracts students to take a CALI illusory promise exercise
is providing instruction.
Third, a core goal of all instruction is transfer, which learning theorists
define as "the application of learned knowledge in new ways or
64
situations." In other words, transfer occurs if the learner can apply what
was learned outside the context in which it was learned. To a contracts
law professor teaching illusory promise law, transfer has occurred if the
students can apply learned principles of illusory promise law to a
previously unseen examination hypothetical or when they can identify a
potentially illusory promise in a draft contract and can revise the promise
to make it nonillusory (while honoring, of course, the client's objectives
1

Constructivism: Comparing Critical Feawres from an Instructional Design Perspective,
6 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT Q., 1993, at 50, 70; see also SMITH & RAGAN, supra note
57, at viii.
59. GAGNE, supra note 35, at 3.
60. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 1040 (Harold E. Mitzel et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1982).
61. MARCY PERKINS DRISCOLL, PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING FOR INSTRUCTION 332
( 1994 ); see also SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 2.
62. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 3.
63. The term CALI refers to Computer-Assisted Legal lnstmction, a set of
computerized exercises created by the Center for Computer-Assisted Legal In~truetion,
available at http://www.cali.org (last visited Mar. 24, 200 I).
64. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 55-56.
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for the contract).65

A. Behaviorism
1. Explanation of Behavioral Theory
Although behaviorism has its roots in Aristotle's empiricist views:" it
had its greatest prominence in the first half of the twentieth century with
the well-known works of Pavlov regarding classical conditioning.'' B.F.
Skinner applied Pavlov's reinforcement ideas to teach humans to respond
voluntarily to stimuli in his mid-twentieth century work on operant
conditioning.63 The core behaviorist belief is that learning occurs when
the learner exhibits the proper response to a specific environmental
stimulus.69 In addition, behaviorists believe that the goal of instruction is
to develop and strengthen the connection between the stimulus and
response70 by providing reinforcement for proper responses to the
stimulus and punishmene• for improper responses to the stimulus.·; For
example, a behaviorist would say that a learner has learned to choose
healthy foods if, when given a choice between healthy and unhealthy
foods, the learner selects a healthy food. Instruction should focus on
65. Similarly, this Article demonstrates transfer of the idea of tran!>fcr b.:~:au!>C the
author applies the concept in the sentences that precede this footnote to a situation. legal
education, he did not encounter in an instructional design class or article.
66. See Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 54.
67. PAVLOV, supra note 35. Pavlov, of course, is best known for his ~livating dog
experiments, in which a dog who hears a bell every time before eating. lemn.o; to !>alivate
every time the bell rings. ld.
68. SKINNER, supra note 35; see also ANITA E. WOOLFOLK. EDl'CATIQ:>;AL
PsYCHOLOGY 202-10 (6th ed. 1995) (arguing that Skinner's ideas changed the way we
think about learning and explaining that Skinner's theory was based on the idea that the
learning process involves how people learn, through conditioning. to operate in their
environment to produce certain consequences).
69. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 19; Ertmer & Newby. s11pm note 51.<. at
55.
70. See Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 57.
71. Reinforcement can be either positive <giving the learner something. ~uch ~ a
compliment, because she responded properly to the stimulus) or negative !laking away an
aversive from the learner, such as allowing the student to skip having to do homework.
because she responded properly to the stimulus). Punishment al!.o can be either po~lli\·c
or negative, depending upon whether the consequence for the improper respun!>C to the
stimulus involves introducing an aversive (e.g., extra homework) or remo\'ing a b.:nctit
(e.g., taking away a scholarship). See DRISCOLL. supra note 61. at 32-38. Thu~. it i~
clear that what most people call "negative reinforcement"-providing an avc.-,iveshould actually be classified as positive punishment.
72. See id.
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strengthening the connection between the stimulus-the choice of
foods-and the response-the selection of healthy foods.
While behaviorist views seem out of date, behaviorist ideas and
approaches continue to greatly influence educators and instructional
designers. Even today, instructional designers and educators would say
that a law student has learned to perform legal analysis when, in response
to a fact pattern (the stimulus), the student identifies legal issues,
articulates and evaluates the likely arguments attorneys for the parties
would make, and predicts how a court would resolve those issues.
Moreover, across all levels of education, teachers assess learning
according to the behavioral model by requiring the learners to produce an
observable response (an answer) to a stimulus (the exam question).n
2. Implications of Behavioral Theory for the Development
of Law School Instruction

Behaviorists developed many of the approaches to instruction still in
prominent use today. These approaches also have relevance for the
design of law school instruction. First, behaviorists developed the idea of
assessing learners to determine the point at which instruction should
74
begin. The idea of mastery learning and the attendant 80-80 test of
75
effectiveness discussed above came from a behaviorist, Dr. Benjamin
76
Bloom.
Second, behaviorists developed the idea that instruction should be
sequenced so that students can master early steps and easier problems
early in instruction. Only later should students progress to more difficult
and complex steps and problems. 77 Law professors have ignored this idea
entirely; casebooks for first-year law students often start with incredibly
78
difficult cases. Thus, many Torts books start with the difficult opinion
9
in the Vosburg v. Putne/ case. Likewise, many Contracts texts start
with the ideas of expectation, reliance, and restitution; 80 many Civil
73. See Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 56; see also DRISCOLL, supra note 61,
at 63.
74. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 56.
75. See supra note 30-31 and accompanying text.
76. See also Bloom, supra note 30.
77. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 56.
78. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 4 (6th cd.
1995); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 14 (5th ed. 1999); see also
JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 30 (9th ed. 1994) (discussing Vosburg in notes after short introduction to battery).
79. 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
80. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 72 (1995)
(discussing expectation, reliance, and restitution interests after a brief introduction to
contract law); DAWSON ET AL., supra note 26, at I; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
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Procedure texts81 begin personal jurisdiction with Pemzoyer l'. Neff/: and
many Criminal Law texts begin with cases addressing complex
constitutional law issues.83 Moreover, the difficulty of law school
examinations remains constant throughout students' law school careers.
Student confidence and development of skills, however, would be
enhanced by sequencing classroom discussion of hypothetical questions
and topics both within substantive law classes and throughout the
curriculum. In fact, law professors could even choose to sequence
students' study of specific subtopics, such as illusory promises.
Third, behaviorists also developed the idea that learning can be
enhanced by developing nonhuman, nonclassroom instruction ....
Currently, nearly all law school instruction occurs in the classroom. In
fact, the ABA specifically mandates that students receive large amounts
of classroom instruction.85 Increased use of nonhuman mediated
instruction nevertheless has particularly exciting ramifications for law
teaching. If more law school instruction occurred outside the classroom,
in-class instruction time could focus on those subjects that require
instructor mediation, such as instruction addressing legal analysis skills
and providing instructional feedback regarding students' practice
efforts.86 In fact, resources already exist that allow law instructors to
41 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing expectation, reliance, and restitution interests after a brief
introduction to contract law); ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS 0~
CONTRACTS 1 (2d ed. 1992).
81. See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COWNS PERDUE. CtVtL PROCEDURE:
CASES, :MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 27 (2d ed. 1997); STEPHEN C. YEAZEU. ET AL, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 62 (3d ed. 1992).
82. 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877).
83. See, e.g., JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL L-\W 14-26 (4th ed.
1999) (including, as the third and fourth cases in the text, two very difficult and complex
Supreme Court opinions addressing Constitutional law issues, Griswold ''· Connt·cticlll,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); JOH!': KAPL<\11: ET
AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 96 (3d ed. 1996) (including as the first case
in the text a difficult Supreme Court opinion addressing the Eighth Amendment and
proportionality requirements).
84. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 19.
85. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 43 ( 1999)
(stating in Standard 304 that graduation may only be granted when the 56.000 minute~ of
instructional classroom time have been fulfilled).
86. This point does not change even if one of the prof~or·~ m~trucuonal
objectives is teaching case reading skills. Teaching basic doctrine outside the classroom
does not prevent the instructor from teaching case reading skills in the cl~mom. Thi!>
approach allows greater focus and isolation of the case reading skills. At the !>arne ume. it
is worth noting that, while many law professors devote considerable cl~rt.lom time to
reviewing cases, few identify for students the skills involved in ca!>e reading or teach
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move instruction outside the classroom. Law professors already have
access to CALI exercises in most bar-tested subjects. Most law schools
also possess computer labs, and many law professors have found that
they can use listservs and course web pages to enhance students'
87
educational experiences.
Fourth, behaviorists were the first to emphasize the importance of
requiring student practice and of responding to such practice by
89
providing structured feedback, cues and fading of cues, 88 and shaping.
Behaviorists see such practice and feedback as necessary to ensure that
learners provide the desired response to the environmental stimulus.90 As
discussed above, law school instruction only provides law students with
91
vicarious practice and feedback.
Indeed, given the size of most substantive law classes, the burden on
faculty of providing student practice and feedback poses difficult hurdles.
But those hurdles are not insurmountable. CALI exercises offer some
opportunities for practice and feedback, and computer programs allow
faculty to administer short answer and multiple-choice assessments to
their students on-line, ensuring that students receive immediate feedback.
In addition, faculty could develop model answers or checklists and use
teaching assistants to review student work and provide feedback.
Finally, faculty could provide model answers or checklists to students
and use self-, peer-, and small group-grading to provide students with the
those skills or assess students' case reading skills on examinations, such as by requiring
students to brief or explain a previously unseen opinion on an examination.
87. See Michael A. Geist, Where Can You Go Today?: The Computerization of
Legal Education from Workbooks to the Web, II HARV. J.L. & TECH. 141 (1997).
88. Cues are prompts or hints from the instructor or instructional materials directing
the learner's practice efforts. See DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 44. Fading refers to the
gradual withdrawal of cues. !d. Thus, a Jaw professor working with a student who is
analyzing an illusory promise problem might prompt the student to consider the
possibility of implying a duty of "good faith" or a duty of "reasonable efforts" to
determine if what appears to be a promise that does not restrict the promisor's future
action can be made to restrict the promisor's future action. See generally CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 40, § 4.12, at 203-04. See also Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
118 N.E. 214, 214-15 (N.Y. 1917) (finding that the implied duty of reasonable efforts
makes plaintiffs promise nonillusory); U.C.C. § 2-306 (1989) (stating that requirements
contracts and output contracts are not illusory because of the implied duty of good faith
requirements or outputs).
89. "Shaping refers to the reinforcement of successive approximations to a goal
behavior." DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 40. In other words, the instructor provides
encouragement to students regarding the correct aspects of their performances to
gradually assist them in altering their performance to the desired form. A law professor
teaching illusory promise would shape a student's responses to hypothetical questions by
providing feedback to the student. Additionally, the professor can shape a student's
understanding of the area by having the student continue to rewrite incorrect portions of
the practice efforts until the student produces an appropriate analysis.
90. See Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 56.
91. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
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necessary opportunities for practice and feedback.Y:
Finally, behaviorists have emphasized the importance of evaluating
and revising instructional materials by empirically testing the effects of
the materials on student performance and student satisfaction:' Law
professors do alter their approaches as they become more experienced
teachers, but this revision is neither systematic nor empirically based.
Law school instruction could and should be evaluated empirically. Most
law schools already require students to evaluate their instructors. These
crude measures could be expanded to require students to evaluate the
Instructional
appeal of the various forms of instruction used.
effectiveness could also be measured by determining whether the
students have achieved mastery learning-whether eighty percent of the
students have learned at least eighty percent of the material.\>4
As the foregoing discussion reveals, while behaviorist views offer
great insight into learning and instruction, behaviorism has its limitations.
"[I]t is generally agreed that behavioral principles cannot adequately
explain the acquisition of higher level skills or those that require a greater
depth of processing (e.g., language development, problem solving,
inference generating, critical thinking)."95 Thus, while behaviorism is
important to law school instruction because law students must acquire
knowledge of the relevant doctrine and policy, the most important law
school skills-legal reasoning, factual analysis. and client problemsolving-require consideration of cognitivist and constructivist learning
theories.
B. Cognitivism
1. Explanation of Cognitivist Theory

In the late 1950s, learning theory began to move away from the use of
behavioral models to the now dominant models rooted in cognitivist
thinking.95 The cognitivist models use a set of theories, called
"information processing theories," which explain how the brain processes

92. Self-, peer- or group-grading should be "spot-checked" to ensure that ~tudcnt!.
are devoting the requisite effort to the practice and the evaluation.
93. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 19.
94. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
95. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 56.
96. !d. at 57-58; SMI1H & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 20 ("Cognitive leanung thcorie~
are the dominant theoretical influence on instructional design practice.").
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and retains Iearning. 97 Cognitivists equate learning with the learner's
active storage of that learning in an organized, meaningful, and useable
manner .m I ong-term memory. •
In a sense, cognitivism addresses a different aspect of learning than
behaviorism; cognitivism describes and focuses on what occurs in the
99
brain between the stimulus and response. Cognitivism also focuses on
deeper forms of learning than behaviorism.
Cognitivist theories
emphasize the learning of intellectual skills, such as how to apply
principles and use learned procedures, how to reason, and how to
combine learned principles and procedures in new ways to solve complex
problems. 100 Like behaviorism, cognitivism has ancient theoretical roots;
cognitivism seems to have derived, in part, from Plato's rationalist views
that knowledge arises through the mind. 101
According to cognitivists, learning involves a mental process posited to
occur in the very rough and sometimes iterative sequence described
below. The implicit metaphor for cognitive processing theories is the
103
computer. 102 Hundreds of pieces of information reach the senses every
moment. The information registers in the brain (the "sensory register")
for a brief moment. 1<» One attends, however, to only a few of these
sensory inputs ("selective attention"). 105 The information to which one
attends passes into short-term memory, also known as "working
memory." 106 Only small amounts of information can be retained in
working memory and only for a limited time. Introductory psychology
textbooks note the fact that telephone numbers consist of seven digits
97. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 20; see also DALE H. SCHUNK, LEARNING
THEORIES: AN EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 144 (2d ed. 1996) ("Information processing
theories focus on how people attend to environmental events, encode information to be
learned and relate it to knowledge in memory. store new knowledge in memory, and
retrieve it as needed.").
98. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 20; Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at
59.
99. See Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 59.
100. See id.
10 I. See id. at 62.
102. See DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 68.
103. The term "information" can be misleading. It does not simply refer to what
might be called rote knowledge, such as being able to state rules of law. Rather, as noted
above, the term also refers to learning at all intellectual levels.
104. See DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 72-73; SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 20.
105. DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 73. For example, as the author writes this Article,
his brain receives sensory inputs from the sounds of passing cars, backing trucks, and
barking dogs, from the feel of the computer keys against his fingers and of the hard chair
on which he is sitting, from what he sees as he reads his notes and the articles and books
he is considering in writing this section of the Article, and from the taste of the coffee he
is sipping as he works. No person possibly could attend to all of these inputs and write
anything. Instead, the author selectively attended to each input as he wrote about it.
I 06. DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 81.
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precisely because studies of short-term memory show that seven bits of
information (plus or minus two bits) is the maximum capacity of short107
term memory. Most of us have noted that we usually can remember a
new phone number for only ten to twenty seconds.
By encoding103 information in a meaningful way, the information
becomes stored in long-term memory. The more deeply information is
processed, the more likely one will remember it.
In fact, if one
"overlearns" and, therefore, develops "automaticity"110 with respect to
what is learned, one can recall learning with minimal attention and,
therefore, focus greater attention on using the recalled material to
perform higher-level intellectual skills. 111
Cognitivists believe prior learning plays a crucial role in allowing the
storage of information. 112 Cognitivists also believe the brain does not
merely store information; the brain organizes it in data structures called
"schemata."113 These structures contain slots, theoretically organized like
a card catalog, for each of a countless number of specific situations....
Thus, the author of this Article, like most Contracts professors, can
recall information regarding illusory promise by considering illusory
promises as a part of consideration law, as a part of a large set of
Contracts problems dealing with the interpretation of language used by
contracting parties (a set that includes mutual assent issues, contract
t(¥)

See, e.g., WOOLFOLK, supra note 68, at 246-48.
Encoding refers to how we store the infonnation in long-tenn memory. SMilH
& RAGAN, supra note 8, at 21. As a law professor, when the author cannot recall the
name of a student in his class, he often finds himself able to ree<~ll the length of the
student's name, the degree to which the student's name is a common one, or the first
letter of the student's name. This recall suggests how the author store!. his student's
names in long-tenn memory, by the length, commonness, or first letter of the name.
109. /d.
110. "Overlearning" refers to learning activities in which the goal is to learn material
so well that its recall requires little mental energy. DRISCOLL, supra note 61. at 75. If our
recall of material is so easy that it does, in fact, require little mental energy. we have
reached the level of "automaticity." /d. For example, most adults have overlearned how
to read so that they are able to read and process the meaning of sentence!. and paragraphs
without focusing on "sounding out" the words used or the meaning of unfamiliar words.
Most adults, therefore, can be said to have developed automaticity with rcsp<!.;t to
reading. /d.
111. DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 76. Thus, law professors, who recommend that
their students not memorize doctrine or cases. encourage their students to do the exact
opposite of what they should be doing.
112. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 60-61; SMilH & RAGAN. supra note 8. at
20.
113. Sl\U1H & RAGAN, supra note 8. at 21.
114. /d.
107.
108.
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interpretation issues, express conditions issues, and parol evidence rule
issues), as a part of the body of situations in which courts imply promises
(because courts imply promises of duties of "good faith" and "fair
dealing" when handling illusory promise issues), or as part of conditions
law (because many illusory promise issues involve conditions over which
the promisor has control, such as promises to perform conditioned on the
promisor's satisfaction with the other party's performance). The
foregoing discussion suggests Contracts professors have encoded illusory
promise in at least four meaningful ways and, therefore, are extremely
likely to be able to recall illusory promise principles when they need to
do so. Theorists believe such deep processing either strengthens the
memory trace to allow easier recall or creates more paths of recall to
115
allow easier recall.
Schemata do not only store information. Schemata are more like
computer programs because the organized material includes structures
that reflect procedures and subprocedures, and schemata are like theories
116
because they allow one to make predictions and to draw inferences.
Thus, a professor's understanding of how to perform legal reasoning,
how to develop case holdings from court opinions, how to draw
inferences from facts, and how to apply and distinguish cases all are
stored in schemata.
To use prior learning to analyze a problem, the learninR must be
7
recalled from long-term memory into short-term memory.'
In this
sense, short-term memory and long-term memory are seen as engaging in
a continuous exchange program in which learning passes back and forth
118
Finally, the retrieved information passes through a
between them.
response generator which sends an approgriate message to the parts of
the body that need to act or communicate.'
Because it is the learner who must ultimately store and retrieve the
learning, the crucial factor in learning is the "active" involvement of the
learner. Each learner brings a unique set of schemata to the learning
experience; for this reason, cognitivist instruction models emphasize
making the learning meaningful to the learner to enhance encoding.120
This idea has led cognitivists to assert that "[t]he real focus of the
cognitive approach is on changing the learner by encouraging him/her to
121
use appropriate learning strategies." Thus, the idea of "active learning"
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
I 20.
I 21.
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/d.
DRISCOLL,

supra note 61, at 144-46.

!d. at 94.
supra note 8, at 21.
/d. at 22.
Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 60.
/d. at 59 (emphasis omitted).
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is of cognitivist origin. 122
2. Implications of Cognitivist Theory for the Design of
Law School Instruction
Cognitivists subscribe to many of the instructional principles
developed under behaviorism, but only because those principles allow
the instructor to facilitate the learners' appropriate encoding of the
123
learning. Cognitivists also share behaviorists' belief in the importance
of instructional objectives, of assessing learners, of providing students
demonstrations, practice and corrective feedback, and of assessing the
. t24
.
e ffiectJveness
o f I earmng.
Cognitivists' emphasis on the central role of learners and of cognitive
information processing, however, has produced five additional principles
relevant to the design of law school instruction. First, cognitivists
recommend creating learning experiences that allow and encourage
students to make connections between previously learned material and
125
For example, a textbook introducing the concept of
new material.
illusory promise might begin by reviewing previously studied materials
dealing \vith the basic concept of consideration, the implied duty of good
faith, and the recurring specialized consideration issues, such as the preexisting duty rule, and past and moral consideration. This review would
allow the students to access the schemata the students developed when
they learned these materials so that they can connect what they are
learning about illusory promise to what they already know.
Second, cognitivists emphasize "structuring, or~anizing, and
sequencing information to facilitate optimal processing." :t> Thus, legal
instructional materials could provide structure and organization by
including and frequently referring to course outlines or charts showing
the hierarchies in the materials being studied. Moreover, legal texts can
sequence the instruction so that students learn prerequisite knowledge
first, such as learning the good faith concept before learning illusory
promise, or learning the underlying skills and knowledge necessary to
perform legal analysis of complex problems before the students begin
learning how to analyze such problems.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

/d.; SMrm & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 22.
Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 60.
/d.
/d. at 61.

/d. at 60.
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Third, cognitivists insist that instructors should integrate into their
teaching materials instruction that allows students to learn to become
active participants in their own learning. 127 Cognitivists believe learners
should be taught, as a regular part of course instruction, to be expert at
metacognition. 128 The term metacognition refers to the set of learning and
study skills which encourage learners to be introspective, conscious, and
vigilant about their own learning. 129 General metacognition skills include
the following: "knowing when or what one knows or does not know;
predicting the correctness or outcome of one's performance; planning
ahead and efficiently apportioning one's cognitive resources and one's
time; and checking and monitoring the outcomes of one's solution or
attempt to learn." 130 In short, metacognition involves thinking about
one's own thinking.
Thus, as a regular part of the students' course work, substantive law
texts and law professors should teach law students how to be active
learners. 131 Students should not only be taught that they need to monitor
their learning of legal concepts and legal reasoning techniques but also
how to do the monitoring. 132 Students should be taught how to derive
133
meaning from cases by briefing them, not simply criticized for not
doing so. Students should even be taught how to manage their time and
effod 34 and how to create effective cooperative learning groups so the
students can increase their opportunities for practice and feedback. m
Students should be taught explicitly how to spot issues, and this
instruction should include teaching students to brainstorm the recurring
136
factual patterns that might give rise to each of the legal issues studied.
127. !d.; DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 103.
128. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 60.
129. DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 103; Wangerin, supra note 20, at 474-77.
130. Robert M. Gagne & Robert Glaser, Foundations in Learning Research, in
INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY: FOUNDATIONS 49, 75 (Robert M. Gagne ed., 1987).
131. Dr. Marcy Driscoll asserts the importance of integrating instruction in domainspecific learning strategies (such as case briefing and issue spotting) into the courses in
which students must use the strategies; she argues that, otherwise, such instruction is
virtually useless. DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 103. Driscoll's analysis suggests that
many law school academic support summer preparatory programs may be of little value
to students, a point far beyond the scope of this Article.
132. Wangerin, supra note 20, at 476-77.
133. !d. at 522-24.
134. !d. at478.
135. !d. at487-89.
136. In other words, after students studying illusory promise have seen a sufficient
number of cases and hypotheticals raising illusory promise issues, the professor can
require the students to brainstorm the types of regularly recurring facts that give rise to
illusory promise issues. See infra note 238. Students, however, must understand the
tentative nature of such a list, because human interactions can always produce new
categories of problems beyond the scope of any such list. The act of developing such u
list can be a helpful learning and studying tool.
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Students should also be taught what skillful legal analysis looks like and
how to self-check their own work to make sure they are performing it. 1"
Finally, students should be taught both the importance of encoding their
learning and the many techniques available to facilitate their encoding
efforts, such as preparing deeply structured course outlines that show the
hierarchical relations among the legal concepts being studied, 113
developing concept maps that visually express the relationships among
3
the ideas under study! creating flow charts that depict logical flows in
140
the analytical process, and using the four different types of mnemonic
devices. 141
For example, a unit on illusory promise might include instruction in
developing mnemonic devices, outlines, and flow charts. The instruction
then would require students to demonstrate their understanding of all
three techniques by developing a mnemonic device to remember the rules
of law relating to illusory promise, by outlining illusory promise doctrine
(or, better yet, outlining all of consideration law) to help encode the
details of the doctrine and the cases, and by creating a flow chart to
depict the flow of illusory promise analysis. 14l The professor, of course,
137. This point directly derives from the suggestion to the same effect in the quoted
excerpt from Gagne and Glaser. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. For
example, students who have applied a rule to a set of facts could learn to check their
analysis by making sure that, after they identified the issue and the holding, they have
stated a relevant fact and then explained how the fact tends to prove or disprove, or
supply or not supply what the rule requires.
138. Wangerin, supra note 20, at 502.
139. !d. at 502-{)9.
140. This suggestion comes from the author of this Anicle.
141. SMTIH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 168-69. The first technique is the familiar
"single-use coding" method, in which the learner uses the first letter in a set of words to
remember a list !d. at 168. Second is the "pegword" method, in which the learner
arbitrarily associates with rhyme each item in a list with a sequence of numbers. For
example, students can remember the elements of promissocy estoppel by remembering:
one is for run, because the promisor must expect the promisee to run out and do
something; two is for do, because the promisee must actually do something; and three is
for be, because enforcement of the promise must be necessacy to avoid injustice. /J. at
169. The third technique is the "method of loci," in which the learner imagines a familiar
room and while scanning the room mentally noting the decorations, the learner creates an
association between the decoration and each item on the list /d. The final method is the
''keyword technique," in which the learner, trying to learn a series of matched items,
associates keywords from each matched set with bizarre images. For example. students
can remember "waiver" as an excuse of condition and its definition, "an intentional
relinquishment of a known right," by associating waiver with an ocean wave and
relinquishment with roller blading and then imagining roller blading on an ocean wave).
Id.
142. Such a flow might be organized in five steps:
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would provide evaluative feedback as to the accuracy of what the
students produce. Later instruction could require or allow students to
select one from among the encoding techniques learned and apply that
technique to new material, thus allowing the students to begin to develop
143
a feel for which techniques work best for them.
Fourth, the cognitivist view suggests the importance of performing a
task analysis, a process in which the instructional designer identifies not
only the observable behaviors that interest behaviorists, but also the
144
internal, mental processing necessary to perform the observable tasks.
For example, a Contracts professor, intending to teach the internal mental
process involved in analyzing contract law issues, might point out that a
Contracts examination cannot raise one of the many contract law issues
requiring interpretation of language (including mutual assent, the parol
(I) Identify the existence of language of promise. If there is no language
of promise, there can be no illusory promise issue.
(2) Analyze whether the promise is such that it appears that the promisor
has the freedom to perform or withdraw with unrestricted discretion. In other
words, consider whether the promisor can both perform and not perform
without breaching the promise. If there is some restriction on the promisor's
discretion, even in the form of a fortuitous event, the promise is not illusory, so
stop the analysis here. If the promisor has not restricted her future action, the
promise may be illusory and, therefore, continue the analysis.
(3) Analyze whether implying a duty of good faith places a restriction on
the promisor's discretion. In other words, analyze whether the promisor still
can choose to perform or not to perform in good faith without breaking the
promise either way. If implying a duty of good faith would restrict the
promisor's future action, the promise is not illusory so stop the analysis here. If
implying a duty of good faith still does not restrict the promisor's discretion,
the promise may be illusory and, therefore, continue the analysis.
(4) Analyze whether implying a duty of reasonable efforts places a
restriction on the promisor's discretion. In other words, analyze whether the
promisor can choose to perform or not to perform without breaking the promise
if the court requires her to make reasonable efforts. If implying a duty of
reasonable efforts would restrict the promisor's future action, the promise is not
illusory so stop the analysis here. If implying a duty of reasonable efforts still
does not restrict the promisor's discretion, the promise would be illusory in
most states. Nevertheless, continue the analysis.
(5) Noting that not all courts would go so far, analyze whether implying a
duty of "notice" of termination of the contract and a duty of reasonable notice
of termination places a restriction on the promisor's discretion. In other words,
analyze whether the promisor can still choose to perform or not to perform
without breaking the promise if the court requires her to give reasonable notice
of termination. If the answer is still yes, the promise is illusory in all states. If
the answer is no, the promise is not illusory in some states but is illusory in
most states.
143. The downside of allowing the students to choose is that different techniques
work better depending on the nature of the learning. For example, flow charts are great at
depicting sequence, but they often must sacrifice detail. On the other hand, outlines can
provide complete detail and even sequencing information, but do not always allow the
Ieamer to see an entire sequence on one page.
144. SMITII & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 22.
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evidence rule, contract interpretation, express conditions, and third party
beneficiaries) without either giving the students the operative documents,
such as the parties' contracts or the documents the parties exchanged
during the course of negotiations, or placing the language to be
interpreted in quotation marks. ~ Likewise, the suggestion discussed
above that law professors teach students to brainstorm the recurring fact
patterns in which illusory promise issues arise "~ stems from a belief that
the observable activity of stating issues on a law school examination
involves an internal mental process of scanning a fact pattern for
recognizable or familiar patterns of fact.
Fifth, "instruction should present or encourage multiple representations
147
of material to be leamed." Thus, as many law professors already know,
students learn new material better when it is presented graphically, by
way of hierarchy and flow charts. 148 Moreover, to help students learn
abstract concepts, instructors should generate multiple examples so that
students learn to identify and emphasize key features and thereby avoid
149
confusion.
14

1

C. Constructivism
1. Basic Tenallts of Constructivism

The rise of constructivism parallels the rise of postmodem thought
throughout Western philosophy. Behaviorism and cognitivism have at
their cores strong underlying determinist views about the world;
according to both views, the world is real, external to the learner, and full
of discoverable truths. 150 Constructivists, like other postmodemists, view
learning and knowledge as being constructed by each individual from her

145. Quotation marks used in a Contracts examination question should signal to the
students a possibility that they may have to interpret language and, therefore, follow what
is a fairly uniform pattern of analysis. The analysis might include identifying the key
word(s) within the quoted language, brainstorming alternative and conflicting
interpretations of that language, and then using principles and standards specific to the
area to predict how a court would resolve the conflict Teaching students both this pattern
of reasoning and the fact that quotation marks trigger its possible use allows students to
perform the mental tasks necessary to analyze language interpretation issues.
146. See supra note 136 and accompanying text
147. DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 99.
148. ld. at 100.
149. ld. at 100, 103.
150. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 62.
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experience. 151 They view what appear to behaviorists and cognitivists to
be "absolute truths," such as the idea that the sun is a star, as "truths for
2
now," negotiated and agreed upon by experts in the field.''
Constructivism, like behaviorism and cognitivism, has old roots; its roots
are in the rationalist philosophy of early twentieth century philosophers
53
like Jean Piaget.' Constructivists also share the cognitivists' belief that
learning is a mental activity and the behaviorists' belief in direct
154
experiences with the environment.
Constructivism differs from both prior views, however, because it
focuses on the relationship between the mind and the environment.
Constructivists do not believe instructors transmit knowledge of "the real
world"; rather, they believe each learner continually constructs and
reconstructs her own images of what the world is "like" from
her experiences and her interpretations of those experiences.'~'
Constructivists also believe meaning is socially negotiated from
156
Most significantly,
multiple perspectives working in collaboration.
constructivists emphasize the need for learners to be situated in real
world settings in which they encounter the complex, multilayered, ill157
structured, and ill-defined problems that arise in real life.
Thus, for
constructivists, three factors are crucial to learning: practice in real
settings (experience), the opportunity to develop personal interpretations
of experiences (construction of meaning by the learner), and the
opportunity to negotiate meaning (collaboration).
2. Implications of Constructivist Theory for the Design of
Law School Instruction
Constructivist thinking has several very important implications for the
design of law school instruction. Constructivism obligates instructors to
158
In a law school setting, this
place learners in real world settings.
principle suggests the importance of clinical and extemship experiences.
In fact, scholars in the clinical legal studies movement already have made
159
this point. More particularly, the constructivist view suggests the need
151.
62.
152.
153.

SMITH

& RAGAN, supra note 8, at 14-15; Ertmer & Newby. supra note 58, ut

SMITH & RAGAN,

supra note 8, at 15-16.

!d. at 14-15.

SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 15; Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, ut 62.
155. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 62.
156. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 15.
157. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 64-65.
158. !d. at 64.
159. Christopher T. Cunniffe, The Case for the Alternative Third-Year Program, 61
ALB. L. REv. 85 (1997); Gary S. Laser, Educating for Professional Competence in tire
Twenty-First Century: Educational Reform at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 68 CHI.154.
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for clinical experiences in which the learners do not simply perform
basic, rote legal tasks, but handle (with coaching from an expert)
difficult, real world matters. This view additionally suggests a need to
overhaul basic required skills classes so that the courses involve real
world experiences.
As for substantive law classes, constructivists would advocate not only
that Contracts students should work with real contracts, 11.f.' but also that
they also should work on real problems raised by real clients with respect
161
This approach, of course, does not exist in legal
to real contracts.
education and, aside from less far-reaching proposals to include
simulations in substantive law courses, such as Professor Warkentine's
recommendation that contracts be used to teach contracts!b1 this aspect of
the constructivist approach seems unlikely ever to be adopted in
substantive law courses.
Constructivist principles also suggest that instructors should allow and
encourage learners "to construct their own understandings and then to
validate, through social negotiation (with other learners), these new
perspectives." 163 Such collaboration "enables insights and solutions to
arise synergistically that otherwise would not come about."u" It also
challenges learners to think beyond themselves, and share cultural
knowledge! 65 It further allows learners both to refine their own ideas and
66
to measure the quality of those ideas!
These ideas seem much easier and, therefore, are more likely to
influence the teaching of substantive law courses. For example, law
KENTL. REv. 243 (1992); Trail & Underwood, supra note 5, at234.
160. See Warkentine, supra note 15, at 118-20. Professor Warkentine ~rts that
her students enjoy the study of contracts more and learn better when their learning is
anchored in real contracts. /d. at 119.
161. See generally DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 366-68. The rarity with which real
clients experience many commonly studied and commonly bar-tested contract law i~ues,
including illusory promise, as well as the likelihood that. in any given semester. law
students will only encounter a few issues, suggests a need for abandoning coverage goals
in contracts instruction. Nevertheless, the author does not believe such an approach is
desirable. Moreover, this suggestion directly conflicts with a stated goal of thb Article,
to ensure that learners develop the skills and knowledge they need to achieve their
personal objectives, passing the Bar and becoming licensed to practice law. These
practical considerations, however, have much less relevance to Professor Warkentine·~
proposal to use contracts to teach contracts.
162. Warkentine, supra note 15, at 118-20.
163. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 65.
164. DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 368 (citation omitted).
165. /d. at 368--69.
166. /d. at 369.
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professors intending to teach case synthesis skills should encourage
students to construct their own reconciliations of lines of cases and then
to meet with fellow students to negotiate as to the possible
reconciliations. Likewise, law professors teaching case reading and case
analysis skills should require students to do, with guided supervision,
what most law professors currently merely encourage students to do:
develop their own interpretations and discuss and compare their personal
interpretations with their fellow students. These approaches seem
particularly well-suited to teaching students the skills of manipulating
case holdings and recognizing the possibility for conflicting
interpretations of case authority. In fact, given the novice lawyers'
extreme difficulty in seeing, much less developing, legal arguments
contrary to their initial interpretations, requiring students to socially
negotiate their analysis of even hypothetical disputes seems likely to
enhance student skills. 167
Finally, to avoid oversimplification and to represent the complexity of
the real world, constructivists recommend multiple representations of
reality .168 Constructivists recommend "revisiting content at different
times, in rearranged contexts, for different purposes, and from different
conceptual perspectives." 169 This idea also has important implications for
design of law school instruction. In a Contracts course, for example, this
idea suggests that the course syllabus should be structured so that, after
the students study all doctrinal categories in which the interpretation of
language plays a role (for example, formation, contract interpretation,
third party beneficiaries, and conditions), the instructor can require
students to reconsider those topics as a unified subject dealing with the
interpretation of language. Likewise, after students have studied all
contract doctrine wherein boilerplate clauses have been developed (for
example, merger clauses, no oral modification clauses, liquidated
damages clauses, and warranty disclaimers), the instructor could require
students to reconsider those topics as a unit. In fact, many law professors
already strive to develop multiple arguments with respect to legal issues
and have found that the process seems to enhance students'
understanding of the materials.
Thus, although complete adoption of constructivist methodologies in
substantive law classes may be unlikely given law schools' continued
interest in teaching students the substantive doctrine and theory,
constructivism offers intriguing possibilities for enhancing that instruction.
167. Social negotiation of meaning is a particularly important strategy for new law
students because new Jaw students often struggle to develop counter-arguments to their
initial assessments.
168. DRISCOLL, supra note 61, at 369.
169. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 65.
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D. Final Comments Regarding the Theory Discussion
Having traced learning theory from its origins to current theories, it is
important to reconsider the ideas with which this section started. The
objective of any learning theory is to explain how we learn so that
instruction can be refmed accordingly. All three learning theories
discussed-behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism-are relevant
to law school instruction, yet, for the most part, the legal academy has
ignored these theories. Together, the theories suggest that instruction
should cause students both to build their skills from base levels to the
highest levels, and to move from simple knowledge of information to the
creative problem-solving contemplated by the constructivist model. In
the next two sections, these ideas take the form of concrete
recommendations as to how law professors can create effective, efficient
and appealing instruction.

IV. INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN THEORY AND PRACTICE
This section describes the processes involved in instructional design,
comparing how law professors design instruction with how professional
instructional designers practice in their field. The recommendations in
this section are the outgrowth of literally thousands of studies, articles.
170
and books. By necessity, therefore, this section attempts to confine an
enormous field to those principles, approaches, and ideas most relevant
to law instruction.

A. Overview of the Instructional Design Process
Instructional design is a reflective, systematic, and comprehensive
approach to creating instruction. The design expert analyzes the learning
context, the learners, and the learning task, writes test items, determines
instructional strategies, writes instruction, and then evaluates the
instruction and uses what the designer learned from the evaluation to
In other words, the designer develops
revise the instruction. 171
information regarding the parameters of the project (known as the
"analysis phase"), creates instruction tailored to the particular
170. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32 (citing hundreds of books, articles. and other
sources); SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8 (citing an estimated one thousand books, articles,
and other sources).
171. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 5-7; SMITH & RAGAN, supra n01e 8. at 7.
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characteristics of the project (the "strategy phase"), and then assesses the
instruction to determine whether it is succeeding (the "evaluation stage").
Throughout the process, the designer strives for congruence among the
instructional goals, the test items, and the selected instructional
strategies.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the process is as much iterative as it is
sequential. Designers revisit each phase of the process based on their
evaluations. In other words, while the approach contemplates the three
initial phases described above, instructional designers recognize that
design decisions are, at best, only intelligent predictions about what
approaches seem most likely to produce learning. Because designers
make their predictions based on a reflective, systematic, and
comprehensive process, as well as on thousands of educational studies,
many of those predictions prove accurate. Others, for any number of
reasons, prove inaccurate. In such cases, the designer must revise the
instruction, re-evaluate it, and revise it again if necessary. The focus,
therefore, is student centered. Instructional designers discard instruction
that fails to produce learning and retain instruction that produces
learning.

B. The Analysis Phase
The analysis phase consists of four crucial activities: an analysis of the
learning context, an analysis of the learners, an analysis of the learning
tasks, and the development of assessment items.

I. Assessment of the Learning Context
Assessment of the context actually involves two steps: ( 1)
demonstration of a need for instruction and for the revision of instruction,
and (2) identification of the salient factors of the learning environment. 172
The first step involves conducting a needs assessment. The designer
identifies the goals of the instructional system; determines the extent to
which the goals are being met as efficiently, effectively, and appealingly
as possible; prioritizes any gaps between what should be happening and
what actually is happening; and determines the extent to which the
identified, high priority gaps reflect instructional issues or issues
stemming from problems with the learners' lack of ability or
motivation, 173 problems with the instructional facility, or problems with
172. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 31; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at
13-16; Andrew J. Pirie, Objectives in Legal Education: The Case for Systematic
Instructional Design, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 576, 590-91 (1987).
173. Smith and Ragan assert that motivation can be taught and assign an entire
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peer interactions.
Thus, in the law school setting, an instructional designer would
consider the goals of the law school with respect to a particular class, the
extent to which those goals are being met, and the cause(s) of any
failures to achieve the stated goals. The goals of any law school include
producing graduates who will become licensed to practice law and who
will practice law competently, creatively, thoughtfully, sensitively, and
174
ethically. As this Article explains in the introduction, law schools are
failing to achieve these goals as effectively, efficiently, and appealingly
as possible. 175 Of course, it is possible to blame such failures on the
students, concluding that the students who do not perfonn well are so
lacking in ability that they either deserved the poor results they obtained
or should not have been admitted to law school at all. As discussed in
176
Part II, this conclusion is unwarranted.
Moreover. the absence of
significant changes to the law school Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching
Model over the past one hundred years or more make any suggestion that
whole categories of law students are unworthy to attend law school
unwarranted, at least at this time. The problems with legal education,
therefore, appear to be instructional in nature. 177
Instructional designers identify the salient factors in the learning
environment so that they can be sure the instruction they design will be
technologically and procedurally possible in the particular learning
system. 178 hnportant environmental factors include the following: the
characteristics of the instructors-their comfort and experience with
media-based instruction, their experience level, philosophical
orientations, and role perceptions-and the educational philosophies
behind the larger curriculum into which the instruction must fit. as well
as the mission of the institution involved, and the relationship of the
instruction to that mission. Other important factors are the availability of
various media of instruction, the characteristics of the facilities available,
the number of students who will be taking the class, and the learning
chapter to designing instruction for attitude change, motivation, and interest. SMmt &
RAGAN, supra note 8, ch. 14, at 249.
174. See MACCRA1E REPORT, supra note 4, 233-36.
175. See supra Part I.
176. See supra Part II.
177. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 875, 897 {criticizing law prafe~ors
as being "anti-intellectual" about their teaching and as failing to provide students with "an
educational environment that provides students with the resources and the situatioru. with
which they can best learn").
178. Sl\UTII & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 36-38.
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climate, including the learners' experience and comfort with mediated
179
instruction, active learning approaches, and group experiences.
It is relatively easy to apply these considerations to legal education at
most American law schools. Most, but certainly not all, law school
instructors have little experience or comfort with media-based
instruction, and they perceive instruction as a classroom-only exercise.
Consequently, it may require both persuasion and training to make law
professors effective users of nonclassroom instructional methodologies.
Most law schools emphasize developing students' skills, theory, and
knowledge so they will be able to practice law competently and ethically.
Although many law schools emphasize particular areas of law, such as
environmental law or entertainment law, these programs are unlikely to
come in conflict with an approach to education that seeks to enhance
students' knowledge and skills. Most law schools provide faculty with
access to computers, student computer workstations, and e-mail capacity,
educational and testing software, CALI software, Web pages for courses,
and overhead projectors, so the availability of such materials, at least at
180
the outset, is not an issue.
Law school facilities generally include
classrooms that allow instruction to occur in both large and small subgroups. Law school class sizes, however, are a significant consideration.
First-year substantive law courses as well as upper division bar-tested
subjects have I 00 or more students in many law schools. 181 Student
comfort with mediated and group-based instruction varies greatly among
law students; while continuing law students as a whole are quite
182
accustomed to the rigor and expectations of active learning, not all new
law students have had active learning or mediated learning experiences.
2. Assessment of the Learners

Careful consideration of the characteristics of the learners allows
instructional designers to create instruction that is both effective for and
appealing to the learners. 183 One of the easiest errors to make as an
instructor or designer is egocentrism, which, in the instructional design
context, involves assuming that the learners are like the instructor.
I 79. !d. Smith and Ragan also recommend considering the philosophy and taboos of
the local community. !d. at 38.
180. Were a law school to overhaul its instruction in accordance with the
recommendations of this Article, the demand for such media may tax the school's
resources and necessitate additional acquisitions.
181. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
I 82. See supra notes 9-2 I and accompanying text.
183. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 89-90; SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 46.
Feinman and Feldman do not appear to have performed any analysis of the learners they
were teaching. See generally Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15.
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Ethnocentrism often results in explanations closely tailored to how the
instructor likes things explained, in examples with which the instructor is
familiar and comfortable, and in instructional techniques that work well
184
This risk is particularly high for law professors
for the instructor.
because law professors tend to teach at schools where the students likely
are either equal to or inferior to the professor in aptitude for legal
analysis, entering legal analysis skills, and self-concept. Moreover, law
professors, in order to get tenure, quickly develop a very high level of
expertise in their fields, thereby distancing themselves from the novices
they teach.
Smith and Ragan provide assistance for this process by breaking down
learner characteristics into four discrete categories: cognitive
characteristics, physiological characteristics, affective characteristics, and
social characteristics. Together, these characteristics, as explained
below, influence the designer's selection of instructional strategies.
The most significant cognitive characteristics for law instructors are
the students' aptitudes, level of visual literacy (that is, the students'
ability to gain information from graphical materials), possession of
learning strategy/ 85 and general and specific knowledge!~'' These
cognitive characteristics influence the designer's decisions with respect
to the following issues: the speed of presentation; the amount of structure
and organization needed; the media of instruction; the level of
concreteness or abstraction; the size of instructional chunks; the response
mode (oral or written); the number, sequencing and difficulty of
184. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 46.
185. See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text lexplaining the idea of
metacognition and identifying some of the cognitive and learning strategies rdevant to
law study).
186. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 46-55; see also DICK & CAREY. supm note
32, at 91 (describing specific knowledge as "entry behaviors"). Other Ieamer cognitive
factors not relevant to legal instruction but considered by designers in connection with K
through twelve design projects include: developmental levels, language development
levels, and reading levels. One factor Smith and Ragan explicitly have excluded is
learning style. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 50. According to Smith and Ragan.
while learning style information (information as to whether students learn best visually or
auditorially, for example) is very important information to learners in regulating their
own learning, "typically this information is not sufficiently prescripti\'c to aid
instructional designers in making design decisions." !d.
While learning style information is not prescriptive, the knowledge that a group of
students' learning styles are likely to vary greatly should suggest to the designer that a
multimodel approach to presenting any particular subject area would be most effective.
In other words, instructors should strive to present information in varying foml.!>: outlines.
graphic organizers, verbally, in text form. and with real world e.xantples.
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examples; the level of learner control; and the amount and type of
gm'dance, cues, an d prompts necessary. 187
The only "physiological" characteristic that may be of significance to
188
the design of law school instruction is student age. At law schools that
have significant part-time programs structured to allow students to
continue working while they are in law school, student age tends to vary
more and be higher. 189 Age factors influence design decisions about
techniques for gaining and focusing attention, media selection, grouping
of students, level of learner control, context of examples and practice
190
items, and the amount of time allotted for instruction.
Affective learner characteristics also influence design decisions.
Affective characteristics relevant to law school instruction include
learners' motivation levels, attitudes toward the subject matter, attitudes
toward learning, perceptions of and experiences with various forms of
91
mediated instruction, academic self-concepts: anxiety levels, beliefs,
192
and attributions of success or failure (also known as the loci of control).
These characteristics influence instructional designers' decisions with
respect to the number of successful experiences learners should have in
practice, the types of statements to convince the learners of the relevancy
of the instruction, the amount of structure and organization, the media of

187. See id. at 56. Smith and Ragan do not purport to suggest the specific links
between the learner characteristics and the authors' list of implications of learner
characteristics. The suggested links between the learner characteristics and a list of
implications provided by Smith and Ragan were developed by the author of this Article as
part of his participation in an instructional design class.
188. !d. at 55. Smith and Ragan also identify sensory perception and general health
as factors for general design projects. /d. Those factors do not vary between law schools
enough to justify their analysis here.
189. See At a Glance: Fact Page, W. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, at http://www.
wsulaw.edu/glance/facts.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2000) (stating that the median age is
thirty-four); see also JD Admissions: Admissions Details, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF
LAW, at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/admiss/profile.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2000) (stating that the median age is twenty-four for full time students and twenty-seven
for part-time students entering in Fall 1998); Law School Profile, MERCER UNIV. ScH.
OF LAW, at http://www.law.mercer.edu/prospectivestudents/AicProfile.cfm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2000) (stating that the median age of students is twenty-six years old):
Admission Information, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, at http://www.virginia.edu/-registl
97gradrec/chapterl0/gchapl0-2.l.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2000) (finding that the
average age of the entering class for 1996 was twenty-five).
190. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 56.
191. Academic self-concept refers to the extent to which learners regard themselves
as capable of learning. !d. at 51.
192. See id. at 46-55. A student's attribution of success or failure, also known as the
locus of control, refers to how the student perceives the causes of success or failure in
life. /d. at 50. A person has an internal locus of control if the person attributes success or
failure to factors within (her perseverance, efforts, actions). A person has an external
locus of control if she attributes successes and failures to external factors (luck, the
professors or employers, other students). !d.
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instruction, the number and difficulty of examples and practice, the type
of feedback given after practice items, the amount and types of
reinforcement, and the amount and types of learning guidance, cues. and
prompts provided. 193
Social learner characteristics relevant to law school instructional
design include the learners' relationship with peers, tendencies toward
cooperation or competition, and socio-economic, ethnic and racial
194
backgrounds and affiliation. These social characteristics influence
instructional designers' decisions with respect to the following issues: the
selection of techniques for gaining and focusing attention, the contexts
for examples and practice items, and the grouping of students.•'"

a. Law Instruction Practices with Respect to Leamer Characteristics
Given the potential for variance among law students with respect to all
of these factors, it is striking that law school textbooks never purport to
be designed for particular groups or classes of students.'"" Moreover.
with the exception of academic support scholarship;''' law review
andragogy scholarship does not ever purport to consider learner
See id. at 56.
/d. at 55. Smith and Ragan identify three additional consideration~ relevant to
other instructional design projects: role models, moral development, and feeling~ toward
authority; all of which would seem to have more relevance to design projcc~ at lower
educational levels. /d.
195. See id. at 56.
196. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCO!'.IPANY PRINCIPLES
OF CONTRACT LAW (1995); JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL, TEACHER'S MA.NUAL TO
ACCOMPANY CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1989); JOHN P. DMVSO:>; ET
AL., TEACHER'S MANuAL, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENTS 8-9 17th 1.'tl. 1998);
EowARD J. MURPHY, STUDIES IN CONTRACTS LAW TEACHING NOTES 15th ed. 19971.
197. See generally Robin Boyle & Rita Dunn, Teaclli11g Law Swdellfs ThrrJugh
Individual Learning Styles, 62 ALB. L. REv. 213 (1998) (discussing how a learner may
fail under one particular teaching methodology and succeed under an alternative
methodology); Pamela Edwards, Tire Culwre of Success: lmprO\'illg the .4cademk
Success Opportunities for Multicultural Swdems i11 Law School, 31 NE\V E.'\G. L. REV.
739 (1997) (discussing multicultural learners and how they learn); Lani Guinier et al.,
Becoming Gelltlemen: Women's Experie11ces at 011e /1')' League WI\' Sehoul, 143 U. P.\.
L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing gender based differences in learning anu law o,chool
interaction); Paula Lustbader, From Dreams to Reality: Tire Emergi11g Role of Ltm·
School Academic Support Programs, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 839 ()9971 tdi!>CU!>'>ing how
learning and cognitive theory form the basis of academic support anu the '>Ucc~~ of
different learners); Ruta K. Stropus, Me11d It, Be11d It. a11d Exte11d It: The Fatt• of
Traditional Law Sc/wol Methodology i11 tire 21st Cemur)', 27 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 449
(1996) (suggesting improvement of the Langdellian method and using academic '>Uppurt
programs for those who do not easily adapt to the Langdellian methodology).
193.
194.
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characteristics. 198 Rather, in deciding which text to select, law professors
make their selections based on factors such as the professor's past
experiences with the text, the reputation of the text among their
colleagues, the theoretical orientation of the text, and other factors that
fail to account for their students' particular characteristics. They place
little, if any, emphasis on the degree of difficulty of the text. While it is
undoubtedly true that professors consider their students' strengths and
weaknesses in planning their lectures, the consideration is neither
systematic nor complete. Finally, the factors that confine most law
199
school instruction to the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model
make adjustments to account for learner differences unlikely and
difficult.
This Article demonstrates below the benefits of conducting a learner
analysis and evaluating the design implications of that analysis.
b. Analysis of Western State Law Students

The author has not conducted a formal learning assessment of the
students in his Contracts class. According to Smith and Ragan, however,
where the designer is also the instructor, a more formal investigation is
unnecessary. 200 This section describes the application of the foregoing
learner assessment principles and their resultant design implications.
Students participating in the class are second semester law students
whose LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point averages generally
place them in the twenty-fifth to fiftieth percentile among those taking
the LSAT. They range significantly in their writing and reasoning skills,
their level of visual literacy, and their possession of general learning
strategies, but most, as would be expected based on their LSAT scores
and undergraduate grade point averages, possess less than the average
levels of these skills as compared to all new law students. As a whole,
most possess some, but not all of the general world knowledge they need,
but they vary greatly in their possession of specific knowledge based on
198. See, e.g., Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 875 (noting that legal
educators disregard learning theory and ignore learner characteristics); Christopher T.
Matthews, Sketches for a New Law School, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1097 (1989) (noting
that Jaw school breaks students of original thought and operates as if there were only one
way to Jearn, thus ignoring learner characteristics); Stropus, supra note 197, 450-51
(asserting that the Langdellian methodology should be used in the twenty-first century);
Wangerin, supra note 12 (providing no mention of Ieamer differences); Wangerin, supra
note 20, at 472-74 (noting the absence of learning theory in legal education but
purporting to identify key learning strategies for all law students); Warkentine, supra note
15 (failing to address the implications of applying Warkentine's ideas to different types of
law students).
199. See supra Part II.
200. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 46, 56.

390

[VOL.

Teaching Lllw by Design

38: 347, 2001]

SAN DIEGO L\W REVIEW

their life experiences, reading interests, and undergraduate majors. Most
are still relatively early in their development of law school learning
strategies. The median student age is thirty-four, and students range in
age from twenty-one to fifty-five.
The author believes most of the students have high motivation for
becoming lawyers, although many have significantly greater interest in
becoming lawyers than studying law or learning generally. Students vary
in their interest in contracts law depending on their life and business
experiences and career aspirations. Some are comfortable and have
experience with nonhuman mediated instruction. Because nearly all have
received more critical feedback and lower grades in law school than they
have at any other time in their educational lives, the students tend to have
lower academic self-concepts. The students also tend to have an external
locus of control and experience extremely high anxiety, particularly
because the students know that, of those students who are academically
dismissed from law school, most are dismissed after their second
semester.
Because students have only been in law school together for one
semester, most peer relationships are cautious. Moreover, law students in
general are known to be competitive and not cooperative, particularly at
law schools where a significant percentage of students are academically
dismissed after their first year of law school. The law school has a very
large percentage of nonwhite students in comparison with other law
schools. In fact, the law school's fall 1999 entering class was fifty
percent nonwhite, making Western State one of the ten most diverse law
schools in the country.201 The students also are very diverse in terms of
socio-economic background, and, for a significant number of students,
English is not their first language.

c. Design Implications
Given the learners' low academic self-esteem, external loci of control,
and high anxiety, the learners would benefit greatly from a large number
of practice experiences, in which examples and practice are sequenced so
that the students experience significant early success. For the same
reasons, the students also would benefit from significant learning
guidance, cues, and prompts, from substantial structure and organization,
201. See generally AM. BAR Ass'N, OFFICIAL ABA GUIDE TO APPROVED L\W
SCHOOLS (Rick L. Morgan & Kurt Snyder eds., 2000).
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and from substantial, detailed, and balanced feedback and reinforcement.
Selection of context for examples and practice items will be crucial given
the diversity of the learners' socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds.
Response modes should be mixed to allow students who are more
comfortable with either oral or written response modes to get practice
and enjoy success. While group experiences are not impossible, they will
need to be carefully structured to teach students cooperative skills. Most
of the students will have significant motivation to study the course
material because of their fear of academic dismissal and their interest in
legal studies; therefore, great effort to convince them of the relevancy of
most of the instruction will be largely unnecessary. The instructor,
however, will have to explain fully the rationales behind instruction
directed at developing the students' learning strategies so that students
understand why the instructor is allocating their limited time to learning
strategy. Nearly all students have had some experience with mediated
instruction, at least in the form of participation in listservs in prior classes
and in using computer word processing software; while they may lack
familiarity with on-line testing software, the ease of using such software
should offset any student discomfort.
As the foregoing discussion reveals, a learner analysis reveals
information crucial to the planning and implementation of law school
instruction.
3. Assessment of the Learning Task
Having determined the characteristics of the learners, the next step
requires an assessment of the learning task. "[Instructional] Designers
expend a great deal of effort in obtaining as clear a description and as
thorough an analysis as possible of the learning task[s]." 202 According to
Smith and Ragan, this step involves five sub-steps: (1) writing all the
learning goals; (2) determining for each learning goal the types of
learning involved in that goal; (3) conducting an analysis of the mental
steps involved in achieving that goal (performing an "informationprocessing analysis"); (4) determining the prerequisite skills and
knowledge underlying each step identified in the information-processing
analysis (performing a "prerequisite analysis") and identifying, for each
identified prerequisite, the type of learning involved; and (5) writing
learning objectives for the learning goal for each step and for each of the
• •
203
prereqmsttes.
202. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 63; see also, DICK & CAREY, supra note 32.
at 33; Pirie, supra note 172, at 591.
203. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 116-34; SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 63.
This process is another area in which Feinman and Feldman's admirable contorts

392

[VOL. 38: 347, 2001]

Teaching Law by Design
SAN DIEGO L-\W REVIEW

A principle danger of failing to conduct this analysis is that the
instructor may include "deadwood" in the instruction.='~~ Deadwood is
"information that is not essential or especially supportive in attaining a
learning goal."205 While it may be true that one instructor's deadwood is
another instructor's educational moment, it nevertheless appears that
many law school texts include deadwood. For example, many Contracts
texts include, under the guise of background information, information
about what happened to the poor plaintiff in the "hairy hand" case=·:-.. after
he won the appeal that is the subject of study:"' or how his family
discovered that his case has been included in most Contracts
203
casebooks. The authors of the casebooks include the case in their texts
to offer students a first glimpse into the nature of expectancy damages.=·"')
The fact that the plaintiff later went to the Mayo clinic for help with his
problem or that his family was intrigued by the idea that the plaintiff had
achieved the odd fame of frequent inclusion in casebooks is neither
essential to understanding expectancy damages nor even supportive of
the implicit learning goals that led the authors of these casebooks to
210
include the case.

experiment fell short of the ideal. While it is clear the authors developed learning
objectives, it is evident they conducted neither an information-processing analysis nor a
prerequisite analysis. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 898 (indicating that the
authors attempted to break down the learning into smaller teaching units but nowhere
suggesting that the authors conducted either an information-processing analy~il> or a
prerequisite analysis).
204. SMrrn & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 63. Another danger is the ri~ of faihng to
identify crucial prerequisite knowledge and information. /d. For example. Jaw l>tudenll>
need to understand the appellate process, court structures, standards for appellate r.wiew
of trial court decisions, the ideas of precedent and stare decisis. and legal terminology. to
be able to learn from cases.
205. Id.
206. Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
207. DAWSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 6-7.
208. LoN L. Ful.LER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT Lw: 214-15
(6thed. 1996).
209. DAWSON ET AL., supra note 196, at 8-9.
210. The inclusion of the facts about what happened to the plaintiffs hand or how
his palm grew hair could be justified. Memory experts agree that events that trigger
emotional responses are more likely to be remembered. DANIEL GOLE.'>tAN. E.'.tOTIONAL
lNIELLIGENCE 20-21(1995). Student's discomfort at imagining the physical condition of
Mr. Hawkins may increase the likelihood they will remember what they learned about
expectancy theory. On the other hand, the students may remember the hand and forget
the theory.

393

a. Identifying Learning Goals

A learning goal is an unambiguous statement of the purpose of the
lesson, unit, or course; in other words, a learning goal states what the
211
learner should be able to do after she has completed the instruction. All
instructors, at every level of education, base their instruction on
expressed or unexpressed learning goals. 212 Without at least implicit
goals, an instructor cannot make a decision as to what will occur in the
classroom. For example, a professor teaching mutual assent law is likely
to require her students to read and discuss cases raising mutual assent
issues, to discuss the policy implications of how the courts have treated
the issues, and to respond to mutual assent hypothetical questions. She
does so because, at the end of the instruction, she wants her students to
be able to identify mutual assent issues and analyze them. In the context
of illusory promise, an instructional designer probably would identify at
least the following six learning goals:
(1) Given a set of facts, the learner should be able to identify a promise that

appears, on its face, to be illusory.
(2) Given a set of facts that the learner has identified as involving a promise
that appears illusory, the learner should be able to explain, in writing, why
that promise appears illusory.
(3) Given a set of facts that the learner has identified as involving a promise
that appears illusory, the learner should be able to articulate the arguments
that reasonable lawyers representing each of the parties would be likely to
make with respect to whether the promises are illusory.
(4) Given a set of facts that the learner has identified as involving a promise
that appears illusory and the learner's articulation of the parties' arguments,
the learner can evaluate the arguments.
(5) Given a set of facts that the learner has identified as involving a promise
that appears illusory and the learner's articulation and evaluation of the
parties' arguments, the learner can predict what a court would decide as to
whether the promise is illusory or not.
(6) Given a set of facts that the learner has identified as involving a promise
that appears illusory and the learner's articulation and evaluation of the
parties' arguments, and the learner's prediction as to what a court would
decide, the learner can explain why a court would reach the conclusion it
has reached.

b. Determining the Types of Learning Involved in a
Learning Goal (or Sub goal)

This step is particularly crucial because instructional designers have
developed different types of instructional strategies and assessment

211.
212.
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DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at
SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at

17; SMITH &
64.
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mechanisms for the different types of learning.m Although other systems
214
for classifying learning goals exist, instructional designers most
commonly use Professor Robert Gagne's system. ~ The learning
outcomes are divided into five main "domains."216 The discussion below
considers the three domains most relevant to legal instruction.
The first domain is verbal information, which is also known as
declarative knowledge; this domain involves being able to recall or
217
understand something. It seems likely that one of many ooals (which
these materials will later identify as a "learning objective"):~ underlying
the six illusory promise goals listed above would be that the students will
know that an illusory promise is a statement, in promissory form, that
gives the promisor the freedom to choose, according to her whim,
whether to perform or not without incurring liability for breach of
contract either way.219 This objective is a prerequisite for most of the
above goals; it allows the students to identify potentially illusory
promises, to develop and evaluate illusory promise arguments, and to
predict what a court would decide.
In the intellectual skill domain, the second of Gagne's domains, there
are four learning outcomes that are relevant to legal instruction: defined
concepts, principles, procedures, and problem solving.:::·J Learning
21

213. See DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 34-35; SMITH & RAGA.''~. suprt~ note 8. a1
65.
214. See, e.g., INSTRUCfiONAL DESIGN THEORIES AND MODELS: AN OVERVIEW OF
THEIR CURRENT STATIJS 283 (Charles M. Reigeluth cd., 1983); TAXO~miY OF
EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: HANDBOOK 1, COGNmVE DOMAIN (Benjamin S. Bloom et al.
eds., 1956).
215. See generally ROBERT M. GAGNE, THE CONDmONS OF LEARNII'G Al'\0 THEORY
OFINSlRUCfiON (4th ed. 1985).
216. The five domains are verbal infonnation, intellectual skills, cognitive strategies,
attitudes, and psychomotor skills. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 65. The two
domains not addressed in this Article are psychomotor goals and attitude goals. The
fonner is not a subject of law school instruction. As to the latter, attitude objectives are
crucial in ethics classes. In fact, attitudes often are important objectives in substantive
law courses. For example, one evident goal of instruction in Kastley, Post. and Hom's
Contracts text is the development of a sensitivity to the explicit and subtle ways in which
law and legal rhetoric are different for women and minorities. See, e.g., AMY HILSMA.''>:
KAslLEY ET AL., CON1RACTING LAw 158-60 (1996) (including an excerpt fmm Patricia
Williams's 1987 article describing her experiences as a black woman seeking to rent an
apartment in New York). Nevertheless, the author of this Article has chosen, solely based
on space considerations, to eschew any discussion of attitude goals.
217. DICK& CAREY, supra note 32, at 36; SMITH& RAGAN, supra note 8. at66.
218. See infra notes 246-55 and accompanying text
219. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 40, at228.
220. See St.fiTH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 66-67. Two other intellectual ~kilb
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defined concepts requires the learner to classify items as examples or
nonexamples based on whether the item matches a definition or list of
characteristics. Thus, the first illusory promise learning goal above,
which requires the learner to be able to "spot" illusory promise issues,
would properly be categorized as a defined concept goal because the
learner must be able to match a given set of facts to the illusory promise
definition above.
The second intellectual skill is principle learning. A principle
describes a set of circumstances that predict or produce an outcome;
principles are often expressed as if-then statements. 221 Learners have
acquired a principle if they can go beyond stating it (declarative
knowledge) and use the principle to predict an outcome based on that
222
principle or use that principle to control the outcome. The rule that, if a
court deems a promise illusory, the promise cannot serve as consideration
for the other party's promise is a principle. The principle is acquired if
the learner can apply it to a previously unseen hypothetical and identify
the promise as being illusory and use it to decide to redraft the illusory
promise to make it nonillusory and, therefore, enforceable. The skills of
applying and distinguishing cases would seem to be principle skills.
The third intellectual skill is procedural learning. Procedures tell the
223
learner the steps the learner should follow in a particular circumstance.
224
For example, in very broad terms, one crucial part of the procedure by
which a practicing lawyer would evaluate a client's common law (nonUCC) contract dispute would involve the following: ( 1) determining
whether there are any issues with respect to whether the parties formed a
contract; (2) determining whether either party has a possible defense to
the enforcement of the contract (such as mistake, undue influence, or
fraud); (3) determining what express and implied terms are likely to be
deemed a part of the parties' agreement (parol evidence rule, implied
either do not apply to legal education or operate at too simplified a level to be relevant to
legal education: learning concrete concepts and discrimination. Learning concrete
concepts involves learning concepts defined in terms of their physical characteristics, and
learning discriminations involves simply being able to identify two things as different.
!d. Dick and Carey also use Gagne's classification system but do not distinguish
principles from procedures, instead classifying the two together as "rules." DICK &
CAREY, supra note 32, at 35.
221. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 67.
222. /d.
223. /d.
224. Law professors, including the author tend to forget that lawyers almost never
consider only the legal issues brought to them by clients. By way of example, in a
contract dispute, a practicing lawyer also would consider a client's need for cash, ability
and inclination to litigate, the client's relationship with the opposing party and any need
to preserve that relationship, and any factors outside the parties' relationship, such as an
impending public offering of stock. Once again, the author must thank his colleague,
Dennis Honabach, for suggesting this point.
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contract duties); (4) determining what a court is likely to conclude the
contract means (contract interpretation); (5) determining the likely order
of performance and the standards by which each performance likely will
be measured (express and constructive conditions); (6) determining who
a court is likely to conclude breached the contract (one party, neither
party, or both parties) and the likely significance of any breach (for
example, substantial performance and excuse of condition); and (7 l
determining what possible form(s) of relief and the extent of any such
relief the court likely will give to one or both parties (for example,
damages, specific performance, or restitution to a breaching party). Of
course, because expert lawyers have developed automaticity:!!-' in their
knowledge of contract law, some of the review may be mental,
particularly as to nonissues. Learners have acquired a procedure when
they can apply it to a previously unencountered situation.!:~ Thus, if a
learner can apply the above procedure to a new client's contract dispute,
that procedure has been acquired.
The last relevant intellectual skill is problem solving. Problem solving
is defined as "the ability to combine previously learned principles,
procedures, declarative knowledge, and cognitive strategies in a unique
way within a domain of content to solve previously unencountered
227
In other words, the skill of problem solving has been
problems."
acquired when the learner can perform as an expert in the field would
perform in response to a new problem.:!28 At first glance, it might appear
difficult to see how law school examinations involve problem solving.
The confusion lies in the fact that a crucial part of problem solving in the
legal field involves identifying and evaluating the analytical arguments
reasonable lawyers would make with respect to the particular set of legal
issues presented by a fact pattern and then predicting how a court would
assess those arguments and resolve each issue. In other words, the
problem the learner must "solve" is a problem requiring the learner to
identify, explain, and analyze a process of argumentation and reasoning,
not a problem for which "the correct solution" is the specified goal.""'
225. See supra note 110 and accompanying text
226. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 214.
227. !d. at 132.
228. See id.
229. See RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GElTING TO MAYBE :w ( 1999 I
(noting that students often get caught up in trying to write the correct answer when
professors are looking for the student to discuss the ambiguities and the issut.~ ~ they
relate to both sides of the argument).
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Thus, law school exams test problem-solving skills.
The last domain relevant to law school instruction is cognitive
strategies.230 As noted above, students use cognitive strategies to manage
their own learning, and experts use cognitive strategies to manage and
231
check their problem-solving efforts.
c. Conducting an Information-Processing Analysis

Instructional designers perform an information-processing analysis of a
goal to "decompose" the goal into the mental steps a person must go
through to perform it. 232 In other words, an information-processing
analysis seeks to identify and sequence all the mental steps involved in
achieving the learning goal. Although it is possible and it is considered
proper for an expert to conduct the analysis simply by mentally
reviewing the steps involved, 233 the risk of this approach is missing steps.
Experts, such as law professors, perform many mental steps in their field
of expertise automatically, and different experts properly can approach
the same problem in different ways. 2J.I Thus, ideally, a designer should
create a problem that tests a stated goal and administer the problem to
several experts in the field, asking them to explain, in painstaking detail,
each of their cognitive steps and the thinking underlying their selection
and application of the steps. The experts should identify the least
complex path for completing the task-noting what factors allow for this
simple path, what factors require a more complex path, and the decision
steps that lead to the more complex path. Finally, the designer should list
the steps and decision points and recheck the list with the experts with
whom the designer worked. 235
No such analysis exists anywhere in legal andragogy scholarship.216
Indeed, it is doubtful that most law professors ever consider the
possibility of breaking their instructional goals into cognitive steps. 217
Below is an excerpt from an information-processing analysis for
evaluating illusory promise problems. The author has chosen to limit this
230. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 67-68.
231. See supra notes 127-143 and accompanying text.
232. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 39-41; SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 69.
233. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 69.
234. See id. at 69-70.
235. See id. at 70-71; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 46-47.
236. Three works represent partial attempts: H. Russell Cort & Jack L. Sammons,
The Search for "Good Lawyering": A Concept and Model of Lawyering Competencies,
29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 397 (1980); H.F.M. Crombag et al., On Solving Legal Problems, 27
J. LEGAL Eouc. 168 (1975); Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15. None of the three
works represents even an attempt to identify all of the mental steps and processes
involved in analyzing legal problems within a single doctrinal area.
237. Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 898.
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analysis to one page to allow the reader to more readily consider the
information-processing analysis as a whole. Thus, the analysis begins
after the learner has identified, by analysis of the call of the question and
the pattern of the facts, that the question includes a formation issue. In
addition, the analysis omits most of the mental steps involved in
analyzing the arguments with respect to whether implying duties of good
faith and fair dealing would make an alleged illusory promise nonillusory
and in predicting how a court would decide the issue.
i.

A Partial Illusory Promise Information-Processing Analysis

(1) Recall the common fact patterns that give rise to illusory pramil.c i~l>UCl..:•,~

(2) Does the fact pattern involve an alleged promise that falls within any of the
foregoing categories?

If no, go to Step 3.
If yes and the fact pattern is analogous to Wood l'. Lm:y, Lady Dt{f/·
Gordon,239 the promise may be illusory. In writing, state the facts that arguably
reveal an absence of a promise and the similarities between those facts and the
facts in Wood v. Lucy; state the general rule that an illusory promise is a pr.:lmil>e
that gives the promisor full discretion to decide to perform or not to perform and,
regardless of the decision, avoid liability for breach of contract; and then explain
how it is that the particular facts arguably do not appear to state a promise by one
of the parties and, if possible, arguably do appear to state a promise by one of the
parties. Go to Step 5.
If yes, and the fact pattern involves a promise conditioned on a fortuitous
event, absent other facts giving rise to an illusory promise issue, the promise is
not illusory. In writing, state the general rule that an illusory promise is a
promise that gives the promisor full discretion to decide to perform or not to
perform and, regardless of the decision, avoid liability for breach of contract; and
then explain how the particular facts involve a promise conditioned on a
fortuitous event; how the promisor lacks control over the event, that, for this
reason, the condition does restrict the promisor's discretion; and that. therefore,
the promise is not illusory and suffices as consideration for the other party'!>
return promise and the contract is enforceable. Stop.

238. The common fact patterns in which illusory promise problems aril.C are:
promises that reference the promisor's desire or choice, "satisfaction conditio~ ...
conditions based on the occurrence of fortuitous events, loan contingencies, requirements
agreements, output agreements, termination clauses, and facts like those in Woad l'. Lucy.
Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (finding that the writing docs not indicate a
party has promised to do anything at all). All of the illusory promise easel. referenced in
the Second Restatement of Contracts and Calamari and Perillo's well-respected contracts
hornbook fall within one of these categories. REsTATEMENT (SECO!':D) OF CO!\'TRACTS §
77 (1979) (Illusory and Alternative Promises); CALAMARI & PERILLO, suprd note 40, § 412, at 228-35.
239. 118 N.E. 214.
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If yes, and the fact pattern involves facts arguably fitting in one of the
categories other than the Wood v. Lucy fact pattern or the promise conditioned on
a fortuitous event fact pattern, the promise may be illusory. In writing, state the
facts that give rise to an illusory promise issue; identify and explain the relevant
analogy and, where possible, distinguish the relevant analogy; state the general
rule that an illusory promise is a promise that gives the promisor full discretion
to decide to perform or not to perform and, regardless of the decision, avoid
liability for breach of contract; and then explain how it is that the particular
promise appears to confer such discretion on the promisor and, if possible, how
it is that the ~articular promise does not confer such discretion on the promisor.
Go to Step 7. 40
(3) Recall the basic test for what makes a promise illusory (see above and
below).
(4) Does either party's promise appear to give one party full discretion to
decide whether to perform or not and, regardless of the party's choice,
avoid liability for breach of contract?
If no, the promise is not illusory. Consider other possible legal issues.
If yes, the promise may be illusory. In writing, state the facts that give rise
to an illusory promise issue; state the general rule that an illusory promise is a
promise that gives the promisor full discretion to decide to perform or not to
perform and, regardless of the decision, avoid liability for breach of contract; and
then explain how it is that the particular promise appears to confer such
discretion on the promisor and, if possible, how it is that the particular promise
does not confer such discretion on the promisor. Go to Step 7.
(5) Recall the key ideas from Wood v. Lucy.
(6) Does the parties' agreement, on the whole, imply the existence of
obligations on both parties?
If no, the contract contains an illusory promise. In writing, explain that
courts are inclined to preserve contracts that appear to omit one of the parties'
promises if the agreement implies the existence of obligations on both parties;
explain why this contract does not do so; and then explain that, therefore, the
promise is illusory, the promise does not serve as consideration for the other
party's return promise, and that the other party's return promise is not
enforceable. Stop.
If yes, explain why this contract does imply obligations on both parties, that
the courts will therefore imply a duty of reasonable efforts to achieve any
unstated but implicit obligation; what the effect of implying a duty of reasonable
efforts would have; and then explain that, therefore, the promise is not illusory,
the promise does serve as consideration for that the other party's return promise
and that the other party's return promise is enforceable. Stop.
(7) Recall that courts attempt to preserve contracts by implying promises of
good faith or reasonable efforts.

240. It seems likely that, in teaching illusory promise, most law professors would
skip steps one through two because they engage in the process of analogizing fact patterns
to known key cases automatically.

400

[VOL. 38: 347, 2001]

Teaching Law by Design
SAl'l DIEGO L\W Rl:.VII::\V

(8) Recall the definitions of good faith and reasonable efforts.

A few points are worth noting about the above infonnation-processing
analysis. The author's intent is not to suggest an exclusive approach to
analyzing illusory promise problems; rather, this analysis describes the
physical actions (writing) and mental steps (thinking) the author would
take in analyzing an illusory promise problem. The analysis reveals a
few things about how at least one expert analyzes illusory promise
problems. First, despite the assertions made by many law professors,
knowing the rules and the cases from memory is critical. Second, most
law teaching omits instruction directed at many of these steps (that is,
instruction directed at helping the learners encode the rules of law and
cases and fails to assist learners in encoding the common fact patterns
that give rise to illusory promise problems). Third, the writing of legal
analysis is the end product of all the thinking that precedes it; if students
learn to think properly, they are more likely to write properly.

d. Peifonning a Prerequisite Analysis for Each Step Jdemijied
in the lnfonnation-Processing Analysis
A prerequisite analysis takes the process of decomposing the learning
goal one necessary step further; it seeks to identify what the learner needs
to know and to be able to do to perfonn each step identified in the
information-processing analysis. 241 Smith and Ragan describe the process
as "top-down" because designers start with the higher level task and
work their way down to and then through each prerequisite, seeking to
find the lowest level prerequisite tasks and knowledge involved.:t: This
analysis allows the designer to make sure that the overall instruction
includes specific instruction in everything the learner needs to be able to
do to perform each course goal.
Because law professors have not conducted information-processing
analyses of their goals, it is certain that no prerequisite analyses exist
either. Below is a prerequisite analysis for Step Four of the above
241. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 52-85 (referring to the analysh. as a
"subordinate skills analysis"); SMITII & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 78; see also Pirie, supra
note 172, at591-92.
242. SMrm & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 78. Dick and Carey recommend using a
''hierarchical approach." DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 54-59. They suggest that
designers ask themselves questions about common student errors and underlying ~kills
and knowledge. /d. They should then work both backwards from the lowest level skill to
the highest and forward from the highest level skill to the lowest. /d.
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information-processing analysis; the analysis is confined to Step Four for
the sake of brevity.
i. A Prerequisite Analysis for Peiforming Step Four of the Illusory
Promise Analysis
Understand the concept "promise."
Define promise.
Understand the concept "discretion."
Define discretion.
Understand the concept "perform a contractual obligation."
Define "perform."
Define "contract."
Define "contractual obligation."
Understand the concept "breach of contract."
Define "breach."
Understand the concept "impose liability."
Define "liability."
Define "impose."
Understand the concept "damages."
Define "damages."
Understand the concept "specific performance."
Define "specific performance."
Understand the principle that, even though a promise appears illusory, a court
may, through additional analysis, conclude the promise is not illusory.
Understand the concept "facts."
Define "facts."
Know and be able to state the rule as to what makes a promise appear illusory.
Understand and be able to apply the principle as to what makes a promise
appear illusory.
Understand and be able to perform legal analysis of language-based legal
issues.
Understand the concept "legal analysis."
Define "legal analysis."
Understand and be able to apply the procedure for identifying a word or a set
of words in a promise that make the promise appear illusory.
Understand and be able to identify credible definitions of relevant
language.
Understand and be able to explain how a definition of a word in a
promise tends to show or not to show that the promisor has been given
absolute discretion.
Be able to evaluate and select between conflicting interpretations of contract
language.

Again, a few points are worth noting. At the most obvious level, the
analysis reveals how a single prerequisite can necessitate instruction of
many prerequisites. Also, one set of prerequisites requires the learners to
interpret contract language. As discussed earlier in this Article, there are
many issues in Contracts law, like illusory promise, that require the
learner to interpret language. 243 The frequent recurrence of a need to
243.
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perform this particularized form of legal analysis means the instructor
can teach the pattern of analysis for such issues when teaching the first
issue and refer the students back to that prior learning and rehearse it on
each occasion later in the semester that the issue arises.~"' Thus, the
prerequisite analysis reveals patterns that can facilitate greater depth of
learning and understanding. In addition, the prerequisite analysis reveals
a need to at least familiarize students with how courts enforce promises
before or at the time students study illusory promise.:~~ Finally, as noted
above, a designer would identify the type of learning each prerequisite
represents. A quick glance at the above list of prerequisites reveals many
defined concept and declarative knowledge prerequisites, a fe\v principle
prerequisites, and one procedural prerequisite.

e. Writing Learning Objectives
The purpose of the next sub-step in the process, wnung learning
objectives, is to communicate "where we are going.":~~ Learning
objectives describe the observable behaviors that learners must
demonstrate to show they possess the desired cognitive capability.zH
Objectives allow the designer to focus the instruction and the evaluation
of the students and the instruction.:4.s Finally, if communicated to the
learners, objectives can arouse interest in the instruction and enable the
learners to engage in metacognitive self-assessment; students can ask
themselves whether they have learned to do what they were supposed to

244. When he thinks back to his own experience when he was a conlracts student,
the author realizes that his contracts professor, Professor Warren Shattuck of Hastings
College of the Law, recognized this prerequisite skill and made an effon to teach it to his
students. He had all of his students recall and repeat the following phrase numerous times
throughout our year of studying contracts: "The language is ambiguous and needs to be
interpreted."
245. Indeed, without even conducting a prerequisite analysis. many conlracts text
authors appear to have sensed that remedies notions are imponant prerequisites for mo~t
contracts issues and, therefore, have placed remedies materials early in their textbooks.
See, e.g., BARNEIT, supra note 80 (remedies material found in the second chapter after a
short introductory chapter); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 40 trcmedie:,. material in
the first chapter of text); DAWSON ET AL., supra note ::!.6 (remedies material in the fir..t
chapter of text); FARNSWORTII, supra note 80 (introductory material!> include !>l!veral
remedies cases); HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 80 (remedies material in the fir..t chapter
of text).
246. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 84; see also Pirie, supm note 172, at 593-94.
247. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 84.
248. ld.
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learn to do.
Although at least one other model for objectives exists, 250 instructional
251
designers recommend Robert F. Mager's three-component approach to
252
creating objectives.
The three components are: (1) the terminal
behavior, or what the learner must be able to do by the end of the
instruction; (2) the conditions of demonstration, or the circumstances
under which the learner must be able to perform the terminal behavior;
and (3) the standards or criteria, or how well the learner must be able to
perform the objective for the instructor to conclude that the learner has
met it. 253 Many designers delay writing the criteria until they write their
assessment items in the next phase of the design process. 254 The learning
goals set forth above are examples of objectives for which the criteria
have been omitted. They easily could be converted into three-component
goals by adding a reference to the standard by which the designer is to
measure achievement of the objective. Of course, setting a mastery
standard is not easy, particularly for problem-solving goals such as legal
analysis, because the students' responses are not uniform. The criteriasetting step for intellectual skills, therefore, requires creation of
checklists of required features in an acceptable response. 255 The
consideration of criteria for achievement of objectives leads to the next
step, assessing learning from instruction.
4. Assessing Learning from Instruction

Although law teachers usually evaluate students only to assess student
learning and to rank order students, assessment really offers two insights:
one into the students, and one into the instruction. In other words,
instructional designers assess learners for two reasons: "to assess
individual students' performances and to provide information about what
kinds of revisions are needed in the instructional materials." 256 In fact,
because a goal of assessment is to evaluate instruction, Smith and Ragan
emphasize the importance of not only testing the highest level objectives,
249. See id. at I 16.
250. See, e.g., Lisa Schuman, Understanding Objectives, at http://edweb.sdsu.edu/
courses/edtec540/objectives/components.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2000).
251. See DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at I I 7- I9; SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at
84.
252. MAGER, supra note 35, at 1-3.
253. !d. at 21; SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 84-85.
254. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 123-24; SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 85.
255. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 124.
256. DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 142-43; SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 92.
In an excellent, recently-published monograph addressing assessment, Professor Gregory
S. Munro details numerous suggestions for enhancing law school assessment. GREGORY
S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS (2000).
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but also testing the prerequisite objectives. In other words, a Contracts
instructor should test the students' ability to state the declarative
knowledge with respect to the rules and the common fact patterns giving
rise to illusory promise issues, the students' skill in spotting illusory
promise issues, and the students' skill in applying the principle. Testing
both higher level and prerequisite objectives allows the designer to
develop information as to why the students failed to achieve the higher
257
level objective. Very few law schools have used examination results to
evaluate instruction and almost never isolate and test prerequisites;
rather, most exams test only the students' development of problemso1vmg skill s.-'58
Instructional designers also attend to the institutional goals of the
assessment. If the goal is to obtain a spread of scores among all test
takers, designers create "norm-referenced tests." Designers create such
tests by administering trial versions of the test, assessing test-taker
performance on each test item, eliminating items that are either too easy
or too hard, and developing a test that produces a bell curve.:t<J
If the goal is to assess learner competency, designers create "criterionreferenced assessment instruments.":ro
Designers create these
instruments by matching learning objectives with assessment items,
creating items that span the range of difficulty possible, and retaining
items on which most of the learners do well, so long as the item does test
what it was designed to test and is a sound question.:~' If the learners
produce a wide range of scores, designers become concerned; such a
result indicates that the instruction is probably not effective.='·1
0

See Sr.nm & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 95.
Some readers might have concern that designing instrument-. to te'>t
prerequisites would create a risk that the prerequisite questions, particularly tho'>c dir.:cted
at assessing declarative knowledge, will overwhelm the higher-order objective'>. An
instructor can avoid this problem simply by carefully constructing and weighting the
examination questions, assigning much greater weight to the questions testing the higherorder objectives.
259. Sr.nm & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 93-94.
260. ld. at 93.
261. Id. at 94.
262 See id. Criterion-referenced measures do not make the assignment of grades
impossible. Instructors who successfully develop effective, efficient. and app<!aling
instruction, and appropriate assessment mechanisms can assign competency at any grade
value they choose. For example, if the instructor equates competency with a B minu'>
grade, she can assign grades below B minus to those students who fail to demonstrate
competency, assigning specific grades based on how far each such student fell below
competency level. The instructor can assign grades above B minus to tho!>e ~tudent'> \\ ho
exceeded the specified competency level of performance, assigning spccilic grade-. b:l'>l!d
257.
258.
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Law school examinations cannot be easily classified as either normreferenced or criterion-referenced.
Law professors follow neither
approach in creating their exams. Most law school exams produce a bell
curve, yet they purport to test and should be testing competency. In other
words, because the goal of most legal education is to produce graduates
who are competent new lawyers, the goal of legal instruction also should
be competence. In fact, the bell curve result indicates that the instructor
63
probably has fallen far from this goae
Law school exams also fail to meet at least two of the three criteria for
264
Most law
"good" assessment instruments: validity and reliability.
school examinations, however, do meet the third criterion, practicality;
therefore, the practicality criterion is not further addressed in this
265
Article.
266
A measure is valid if it actually assesses what it purports to assess.
First, individual items in a test should be "consistent with the goals or
objectives they claim to assess (congruence)." 267 This simply requires
instruction to test for the skills the instruction was designed to foster.
Second, the test "items for each objective [should be] representative of
the range of items that are possible to develop for that objective ... and
[the] objectives upon which the instrument is based [should be]
adequately sampled (completeness)." 268 This requires examinations to
test students along the range of expected difficulty and to assess for
competency as to all objectives.
Law school examinations are deficient as to both validity criteria.
First, given the instructional time devoted to the skills involved in
reading court opinions and to legal theory, it is evident that law
professors have at least implicit instructional objectives relating to these
subjects. However, law professors almost never test case reading skills
and only sometimes test theory. Second, given the fact that most
substantive law professors only test their students using one midterm and
a final examination, it is impossible for law professors to test students as
to each learning objective even once, much less develop test items along
on how far each student exceeded the competency level.
263. A bell curve means that the learners roughly are equally distributed around the
mean. In other words, the same number of students have demonstrated competence as
have demonstrated a lack of competence. In a criterion-referenced, competency-focused
model, one would expect most students (eighty percent) to demonstrate competence. See
Bloom, supra note 30, at I 0.
264. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 95.
265. See id. at 98. Practicality means examination should not place excessive time
and work demands on the instructor. ld. While law professors often complain about
grading, most are able to grade their final exams in only one or two weeks.
266. /d. at 95.
267. /d.
268. /d. at 95 (emphasis added).
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the range of difficulty possible for each objective.=(·~
A measure is reliable if "we have a high degree of conjitlence in the
scores that it produces."270 In other words, to conclude an instrument is
reliable, a designer must be reasonably sure that those who scored high
on the test did so because they possess the tested skills and knowledge
and that they would score high again if retested.
This goal pulls designers in somewhat conflicting directions. An
instrument that the instructor cannot objectively grade, such as an essay
test, can produce unreliable grades because of problems in inter-rater
reliability (if the designer uses multiple graders) or of changes in the
grader's grading time or mood during the grading process.:n Instructors
can reduce this risk, however, by the use of checklists, rating guides,
model responses, and other explicitly developed and stated criteria.:n In
addition, Smith and Ragan recommend that instructors grade all the
answers to one question before grading students' answers to additional
•
273
questions.
Objective tests, such as multiple-choice tests, on the other hand, often
do not provide realistic assessment of objectives and are vulnerable to
errors caused by student guessing. ~ Instructors can minimize these risks
by using a mix of objective and constructed answer (essay) assessment
tools and by using best practices275 in constructing multiple-choice
questions.
Regardless of testing mode, one great threat to reliability that is of
particular significance for law professors is a failure to create several
7
items and several testing instances for each learning objective.: b Fewer
27

269. Because law school grades tend to correlate so highly with LSAT scores and
with bar examination perfonnance, it is tempting to believe there is nothing wrong with
either law school instruction or testing practices. Feinman and Feldman, however.
explain that this type of thinking is "evil and false" and an "outgrowth of Danvinian
evolutionary theory." Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 896-97. Indeed, the strong
correlation between LSAT scores and first-year grades arguably indicates how little
students learn in law school.
270. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 97.
271. See id. at 97.
272. !d.
273. !d. at 98.
274. !d. at97.
275. Best practices in constructing multiple-choice questions include having multiple
distracters (logical but wrong answers), constructing all possible answers using the same
grammatical structure, writing clear, unambiguous questions, and including "none of the
above" as a choice infrequently. !d. at 92-111.
276. !d. at 97.
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items and testing instances increase the likelihood that the learner's
277
knowledge and skills will not be reflected in their performance. The
student may have understood every aspect of the knowledge or skill
tested, except the specific aspect tested on the exam. The student also
may have been confused by the form of the question or may have been ill
or have encountered a severe personal problem on the day of the exam.
For these reasons and others, instructional designers regard test-retest
reliability as the best measure of reliability for criterion-referenced
278
examinations.
Law school examinations, by and large, are not reliable. The
infrequency of testing, only midterms and finals, makes it extremely
likely that some students deemed competent are not and some students
deemed incompetent actually are competent. Moreover, law professors
almost never test as to all objectives, much less test each objective
multiple times. Many law professors regard checklists and other rating
guides as superficial and reductionistic and therefore instead, apply a
"gestalt" approach to grading examinations, in which they decide upon a
grade based on their overall sense of how the student performed. Finally,
law professors never even attempt to assess test-retest reliability.
In many cases, the sacrifice of validity and reliability does not occur
unconsciously. Many law professors have a sense that their testing
instruments are less than ideal. However, law professors choose not to
address the deficiencies in their exam construction because they have
elevated the practicality criterion above all other considerations. Law
professors believe they cannot construct assessment devices that are
practical, valid, and reliable, all at the same time. This belief is not wellfounded. For each area of study in a Contracts course, for example, a
Contracts professor could construct a twenty or twenty-five question,
multiple-choice quiz and require the students to take the quiz on-line.
On-line testing technology allows a students' work to be immediately
assessed. The technology scores the students' performance and sends the
test-taker an immediate e-mail reporting the score, which questions the
student got wrong, and the correct answer for each erroneous answer. 279
Moreover, law schools could employ graders or teaching assistants to
address a higher grading load. In addition, for practice purposes,
277. !d.
278. /d. at 98. Test-retest reliability refers to whether the measure produces
consistent results over two test administrations. /d.
279. In fact, students who failed to score in the competency range could be required
to restudy and then either take a second version of the test or send an e-mail to the
professor explaining why the correct answers were correct and why the students' answers
were wrong. This latter approach would allow for quick and directed remediation of
deficiencies, a crucial instructional strategy for all types of learning outcomes. See infra
notes 354-55 and accompanying text.
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professors could develop mechanisms, such as spot-checking, grading
checklists, and model answers, to allow peer grading of students.
Finally, law schools could and should reduce class sizes to allow for
more frequent grading and student practice, as discussed below. They
should also reduce faculty course loads and begin to give greater weight
to instructional achievements and less weight to scholarship in making
hiring and tenure decisions. Such institutional changes would reduce
faculty burden in order to accommodate the heavier grading loads.

C. The Design Phase: Selecting Instructional Strategies
This subsection discusses the selection of instructional strategies for
individual lessons.2S0 The discussion above, with respect to the
implications for instruction of each of the learning theories,!5 1
foreshadows some of the ideas and recommendations addressed below.
Learning theory has greatly influenced the development of instructional
282
strategies.
This subsection addresses three key subjects of great
relevance to law school instruction and their implications for law school
instructional design. First, this subsection describes each of the events of
instruction, discusses the extent to which legal instruction addresses each
event, and offers suggestions for integrating those events into law school
instruction. Second, this subsection discusses a crucial instructional
planning issue, the selection of instructional strategies along what
designers refer to as the "supplantive-generative continuum," a
continuum that addresses the level of learning guidance instructors
should be providing, and provides a demonstrative supplantivegenerative analysis. Third, this subsection addresses two additional,
crucial strategy issues: the selection of instructional media and the
grouping of students for instruction. This subsection is followed by a
model lesson plan that integrates not only the principles discussed in this
section but also the principles suggested by learning theory.

I. The Evellts of Instruction
According to Smith and Ragan, there are some general principles to
280. Except where necessary, this discussion does not address cour..c·levcl or
curriculum-level design issues because a discussion of these issues is beyond the scopl! of
this Article.
281. See supra Part ill.
282. Ertmer & Newby, supra note 58, at 51.
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designing instruction applicable to all learning objectives, instructors,
and learners. One such principle is that a lesson should be organized to
include the following: an introduction, a body, a conclusion, and
assessment. 283 Smith and Ragan offer an expanded version of these basic
events, although they also explain that the expanded events may be, and
often are, combined in various ways.284 A second universal principle is
that instruction with respect to all events of instruction should be
285
"learner-centered, active, and meaningful."
While there are universal principles, instructional strategy selection is
not an exact science in which the designer identifies and then selects the
"right" technique for the particular design problem. Rather, designers
make educated, thoughtful predictions of which strategies, from among
the range of possibly appropriate strategies, will work, basing their
decisions on the many learner, learning context, and task factors
discussed throughout the previous subsection of this Article. 286
a. The Instructional Introduction
According to Smith and Ragan, the introduction should accomplish
four goals: get students to attend to the class, establish the instructional
purpose, arouse the students' interest and attention, and preview the
lesson. 287 These expanded events cause learners to attend to the class, as
opposed to other stimuli in her environment, and to know what they are
supposed to learn and how they are going to learn it. 288 Many law
professors have intuited the need for these events and provide them;
however, most do not include an introduction at all, or they assume the
introduction provided by the text they use suffices.
b. The Body of the Lesson
There are five expanded events in the body of a lesson. The events are:
recalling relevant prior knowledge, processing information and examples,
focusing attention, employing learning strategies, practicing, and giving
or getting feedback. Recalling relevant prior knowledge involves the
283. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 114.
284. !d. at 123.
285. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 115.
286. See id. at 113-26.
287. /d. at 115. Smith and Ragan emphasize that each of these "events"-activate
attention, establish purpose, arouse interest and motivation, and previewing the lessoncould be generated by the learner or supplied by the instruction. /d. at 114-15. For a
discussion of how designers make choices along this continuum and a demonstration of
one set of choices made for a law school lesson addressing illusory promise, sec supra
notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
288. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 116-17.
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learner in a process of retrieVIng, from long-tenn memory, the
knowledge and skills necessary and helpful in learning the new
Smith and Ragan also recommend having students
objective.289
restructure their prior knowledge into new structures and helping students
identify and distinguish similar classes of problems.:Xl For example, after
studying general contract interpretation, the parol evidence rule, express
and constructive conditions, all third-party beneficiary law, assignment
law, and delegation law, the contract interpretation aspects of these areas
of contract law can be studied together.:.• In addition, contract
interpretation issues can be analogized to mutual assent issues because
both involve the interpretation of language, and distinguished from
mutual assent issues because of the specialized rule sets that apply.
The review of prior knowledge contemplated by this step is different
from a common practice of law professors in which the professor calls on
a student to review the class discussion from a prior class. Rather, this
event is much more structured; it focuses on having students search their
memories for learning experiences weeks or even years before. The
instruction must cause the student to review all the prerequisite
information that is already possessed, not just what was learned the prior
week.
For example, an instructor teaching promissory estoppel should cause
students to review the general principles they have learned about contract
formation, and more particularly, about consideration. In addition, the
instructor should cause the students to review what they have learned
about the follo\ving principles: the influence of the Restatement of
Contracts; equitable estoppel; interpreting language (so the learner will
be able to assess whether, in a particular fact pattern, the party really
made the requisite "promise'.m); negligence (from Tons class);:'' the
foreseeability standard in connection with negligence and contract
damages claims,294 and the patterns of arguments common to both of
289. /d. at 117.
290. /d. at 137.
291. This approach is also suggested by the cognitivist learning theory. See suprcz
note 145 and accompanying text
292. See REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1981) (requiring a prombc Ob
a prerequisite for relief under that section).
293. Many commentators have drawn the link between ton negligence law and
promissory estoppel. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 18, at 88-89; Neil G. Williams.

What To Do When There's No "/ Do": A Model for All"arding Danwges Under
Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1044 (1995).
294. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (requiring the promisor to
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these areas; 295 the theory for and practice of awarding damages based on
296
the nonbreaching party's reliance interest; and how to perform the skill
of legal analysis.
The "processing information and examples" event begins the
instruction of new material. 297 The instructor may choose to present the
298
information in a discovery sequence or in an expository sequence. In a
discovery sequence, if the learning outcome is a concept or principle, the
instructor provides examples and nonexamples of the concept or
principle to be learned and requires the learners to derive the concept or
principle at play.299 If the objective is a procedure outcome or a problemsolving outcome, such as legal analysis, the instructor has the learners
immediately begin to work multiple problems, with the instructor guiding
their efforts. 300 In an expository sequence, the instructor presents the
principle statements, concept definitions, or the steps of the procedure,
and then presents the examples or nonexamples, and demonstrates the
use and application of the procedure. 301 If the objective is a problemsolving outcome, the instructor models an approach to problem solving
by performing a "think aloud" analysis, a process in which the instructor
states aloud each mental activity involved in mentally processing an
analysis. 302
Because most law texts involve collected cases from which the
students must derive what they need to learn, law texts probably can be
have reasonably anticipated (foreseen) that the promise would induce action or
forbearance as a prerequisite for relief under that section).
295. For example, arguments on behalf of defendants in both areas tend to
emphasize the length of the chain of events and the cost to defendants and society of
anticipating every possible consequence. Arguments on behalf of plaintiffs tend to focus
on the ease with which one could have guessed the plaintiff would suffer the loss and the
choice between placing the cost of the defendant's loss on the wrongdoer or on the
victim. It is also worth having the students note the differences between contract and tort
foreseeability. Contract foreseeability tends to focus on the defendant's ability to
anticipate the quantum of the loss; whereas tort foreseeability focuses on the defendant's
ability to anticipate the fact of loss. R.W. Byrom, Do Damages Depend on the Same
Principles Throughout the Law of Tort and Comract?, 6 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 118, 12228 (1968).
296. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 cmt. a.
297. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 117.
298. !d. at 117-18.
299. See id. at 117-18, 183,200-01.
300. See id. at 137,217-19.
301. See id. at 117-18, 183,200-01,217-19.
302. !d. at 137; see also infra note 320 and accompanying text. The selection
between discovery sequences and expository sequences is an important one because
discovery sequences are theorized to produce a deeper level of processing but tend to
require greater instructional time and carry with them a greater risk of student frustration
and disengagement. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 117-18. This selection is a crucial
part of the decision as to where along the supplantive-generative continuum the
instruction should fall, as explained in Part C.2.
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classified as having adopted a discovery sequence. This approach greatly
limits the number of examples and nonexamples which the instructor can
present to the students, in part because it causes law professors to devote
considerable class time to helping students understand the cases and the
303
If law professors tested students' ability to
doctrine the cases create.
read and understand cases, this approach might be sound, but, as
explained above, most law school exams do not test case reading skills at
all. Law professors, instead, purport to test legal analysis skills. For this
reason, there appears to be a disjunction between the use of the discovery
approach and a law professors' instructional goals.
The third event in the body, focusing attention, involves getting
students to attend to the critical features of the concept or principle, to
what triggers the application of the procedure or of the critical steps of
the procedure, or to the principles, concepts, or procedures necessary to
perform the problem solving, or pattern recognition in order to identify
Because legal principles are
the issues within the problem.?-M
elementized, getting students to focus their attention on the critical details
of the principles or concepts is not difficult and already occurs in legal
instruction. Pattern recognition instruction, however, seldom occurs in
legal instruction. Law professors almost never explicitly identify for
students or require students to identify common factual patterns relevant
to spotting issues305 or to common patterns of legal argumentation.;~ This
omission is striking because instruction designed to help students develop
knowledge of common fact patterns and the skill of deploying common
legal arguments almost certainly would enhance student performance.
The fourth event, employing learning strategies, may involve any or all
of the following:
(1) Supplying, or instructing the students in generating and
then having students generate, alternative ways of
303. SeeSJ.\fiTII&RAGAN, supra note 8, at 117-18.
304. See id. at 118, 138, 183,201,219.
305. See, e.g., supra note 238.
306. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 887-88 (identifying common legal
argument patterns); Susan Etta Keller, The Rhetoric of Marriage, Aclliew!ment. and
Power: An Analysis of Judicial Opinions Considering the Treatment of Professional
Degrees as Marital Property, 21 VT. L. REv. 409, 455 (1996) (identifying common
rhetorical patterns in arguments concerning the issue of treating professional degrees as
marital property); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: .1 Critkal
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518, 534 (1986) (noting that policy arguments often
come in "matched contrary pairs, like certainty vs. flexibility, security vs. freedom of
action").
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(2)

(3)
(4)

representing the information, concept, principle, or
107
problem, such as by creating an outline, a mnemonic, an
308
analogy, ~ gr~hic organizer, or a graphic problem
representatiOn; 3
Supplying students with additional examples, exam or
problem approaches, and additional problems, or requiring
students to "elaborate" on their learning by developing their
own examples, exam or problem approaches, and
problems;
Rehearsing students' recall and application of the learning,
or requiring students to rehearse; and
Monitoring, or teaching students to self-monitor, and
having students self-monitor their efforts by checking their
analysis of concepts, principles, procedures, or their
problem-solving efforts. 310

A few law professors already use graphic organizers, mnemonics, and
outlines in their instruction,311 and law professors have told students for
years that they should develop their own course outlines. Most law
professors, however, never provide their students with instruction in
developing graphic organizers, mnemonics, and outlines; never require
their students to develop their own graphic organizers, mnemonics, and
outlines; and never monitor the accuracy of their students' graphic
organizers, mnemonics, and outlines.312 Moreover, law professors do not
307. For a description of the different types of mnemonic devices, see supra note
141 and accompanying text.
308. A graphic organizer can take the form of a comparison chart, a concept map, a
hierarchy map, or a flow chart. See generally SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 166-68;
Jennifer Blakely Dalrymple, Teaching and Learning Law with Graphic Organizers, at
http://www.loyno.edul-dciolino/Classes/GraphicOrganizers.htm. (last visited Nov. 26,
2000).
309. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 138. For example, a student analyzing a
contract interpretation or a conditions problem could depict the contract graphically,
showing the parties and their duties above an arrow pointing from the performing party to
the party receiving the performance. The author suspects most Contracts professors
already use such graphics in their teaching but seldom, if ever, require their students to
create them, much less give their students feedback on efforts to create such graphics.
310. See id. at 118, 138, 169, 185-86,202,219.
311. Dalrymple, supra note 308.
312. The author's review of student outlines in the past year has revealed that his
students do not all know how to create a good outline. One of the best reasons to create
an outline is to force one's mind to create a schema for the learning-to see the
hierarchical relationships among the concepts and principles being studied. Students,
having never received intensive instruction in creating outlines. tend to create outlines
that just list rules and cases under large headings. such as acceptance, instead of seeing
the hierarchies, and subhierarchies within acceptance doctrine, such as: (I) how offers cun
be accepted, (a) manner issues, (b) manifestation issues; (2) termination of the power to
accept; and (3) mailbox rules.
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provide any instruction in self-monitoring learning strategies, do not
demonstrate self-monitoring learning strategies in class, and do not
require their students to demonstrate self-monitoring strategies. Finally,
while some law professors suggest that their students develop their own
examples and problems, few require students to do so or check students'
examples and problems for accuracy.
Practice and feedback, the last two events of the body of instruction,
are particularly crucial. 313 They are linked together. and represent the
greatest deficiency of the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model. In
fact, for problem-solving objectives, such as legal analysis, experts
believe thousands of hours of practice and feedback are necessary to
make a novice into an expert314 The purpose of practice and feedback is
not to evaluate the students for grading purposes, but rather. to allow the
learners to develop their skills under supervision.m
Practice should be sequenced from easy to hard to allow learners to
develop their skills, and structured to allow students to use not only the
skills being taught, but also the skills and knowledge underlying the
skills being taught.316 The underlying skills and knowledge are
particularly important for problem-solving objectives; studies have
shown that crucial characteristics of experts include an ability to readily
recognize patterns and to recall better organized and more automatically
retrievable knowledge. 317 Smith and Ragan suggest that expert problemsolvers are able to apply principles of application skills "fairly
automatically";318 this point suggests instructors may want to teach
students the underlying principles before the students move into problem
°
319
so1vmg.
For problem-solving objectives, one common way to move the
instruction from processing information and examples to practice is to
use what designers refer to as the "think aloud" technique:=· A professor
demonstrates problem solving during the processing information and
313. See DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 187.
314. William G. Chase & Michelene T.H. Chi, Cogniti1•e Skill: Jmplinllions for
Spatial Skill in Large-Scale Environmellls, in COGNffiON, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, .\."\0 TilE
ENVIRONMENT 111-36 (John H. Harvey ed., 1981).
315. SMITH& RAGAN, supra note 8, at 118-19.
316. ld. at 118, 139, 184,202,219.
317. ld. at 136.
318. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of

automaticity).
319.
320.

SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 136.
ld. at 137.
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examples stage by stating out loud every thought with respect to the
problem being solved, seeking to J?rovide students with a rough
information-processing demonstration. 1 To begin students' attempt at
practice, the professor can provide students with a partial think aloud and
322
requires the students to finish it.
This process could be supplemented
with guiding questions, in which the students work the problem in
chunks, moving from clarifying and articulating the problem to
identifying the principles involved, and only then to analyzing the
323
problem fully. Only after the students have tried a few partial problem324
solving exercises will they begin to practice on their own.
In fact,
students may need to cycle through the "think aloud" process with an
easy set of problems first and slowly move through additional cycles with
increasingly difficult problems.325 Problem-solving practice also should
include opportunities for students to check their work. 326
Feedback is equally important. Feedback should be informational in
nature; that is, students should be told if their analysis is reasonable or
unreasonable and why, told about any patterns in their errors, and given
information about errors in their approach to the practice items.
Feedback should be coupled with additional practice if the learner did not
enjoy sufficient success.327 Particularly for problem-solving objectives,
Smith and Ragan recommend providing students a model answer. 328
Feedback should include information about the efficiency of the student's
approach, whether the learner correctly identified the problem, correctly
applied all relevant principles and procedures, and correctly checked the
work. 329 Finally, hints and guidance, which are a form of feedback,
should be included early on during practice, but should decrease as
learners develop their skills. 330
Law schools fall far short of the goal of providing adequate practice
and feedback. Practice opportunities implicitly exist every time a
professor calls on any student; the other students can attempt to answer
the professor's questions in their minds. Professors do not require
students to do so. Moreover, only the selected student actually receives
321. /d.
322. /d.
323. See id. at 138.
324. /d. at 137-38.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 138, 202, 220. One way to accomplish this crucial goal is to provide
students with model answers or checklists and require them to check their own work or a
peer's work. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing self-correction as a
metacognitive skill).
327. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 118-20, 139, 184,202, 219-21.
328. /d. at 139.
329. !d. at 139,202,220-21.
330. !d. at 139.
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feedback, and the feedback often indicates only that the student has erred
without helping the student discern the nature of the error or how to
correct it. Students, as noted at the outset of this Article, are expected to
learn from that feedback vicariously .331 Of course, even assuming the
watching students are playing along, they may have committed different
errors than the selected students.332 Thus, the only genuine feedback
students receive are their grades and their professors' handwritten
comments on midterm and final examination exam books, if the students
motivate themselves to see the exam books. For this reason, Smith and
Ragan assert that, of all the existing macrostrategies for teaching problem
solving, "Socratic Dialogue" is "the least applicable to ill-structured
problem solving."333
One likely reason for this critical shortcoming in legal instruction is
time (because faculty spend so much time case crunching). The problem
also stems from a false belief that providing feedback to large classes of
students is not feasible. Smith and Ragan suggest that computer
programs can provide much of the necessary feedback."" They also
recommend programs that provide guiding questions to students to allow
the students to self-check their essay examination answers."' Instructors
also can provide guiding questions and model answers to the students in
class to allow for self-, peer-, or group evaluation of the students'
practice.336 Finally, one benefit of increasing the efficiency and
effectiveness of the instruction with respect to lower level intellectual
skills (declarative knowledge, concepts, principles, and procedures) and
moving much of that instruction outside the classroom is to provide more
331. See supra notes 9-31 and accompanying text
332. SMITii & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 141 (noting this flaw with what they ~:all the
Socratic approach).
333. Id. at 141. Dl-structured problems can be understood in contrast to well-defined
problems. Well-defined problems are problems for which there is one right answer or a
definable range of solutions. Id. at 133. lll-structured (or "ill-defined" I problems have
multiple correct solutions "with the appropriateness of the solution dependent upon the
rationale for solution." Id. Given the intersecting factors of client economics, client
relationships, and doctrinal issues, the problems lawyers handle tend to fall in the illstructured category. Law school examinations, however, tend to fall into the category of
well-defined problems because, on most law school examinations, and certainly on bar
examinations, while there is no single "right" answer, there usually is a range of
appropriate analyses.
334. Id. at 288.
335. Id. at 185.
336. A law teacher with concerns about student loafing could ensure enthusiastic
student effort by including in their designs weekly rotating spot-chccb. of !ttullcnu.'
efforts at practice, self-assessment, and peer-assessment
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classroom instruction time, particularly at the end of each semester when
the students possess all the knowledge and skills they will need for legal
problem-solving instruction and practice. 337
Two other ideas from Smith and Ragan seem particularly promising.
First, the "think aloud" technique holds particular promise for teaching
analysis skills to new law students, particularly because the initial "think
aloud" and the first few practice experiences involving partial "think
aloud" exercises need not occur in the classroom. Rather, with computer
prompts or a model provided in class, the students could self- or peerevaluate their completion of the partial "think aloud" exercises."8
Second, law professors should abandon a particularly misleading and
disturbingly common habit, the habit of suggesting to students that
knowledge of the law and memorization are irrelevant on law school
exams. In fact, as the many studies of experts have shown, a critical
characteristic of an expert is the possession and ability to use huge stores
of well-organized, readily-accessible domain knowledge. 339

c. The Conclusion of the Lesson
The overarching goal of the conclusion section is to allow students to
consolidate their new learning. 340 It consists of three events-summarize
and review, transfer learning, and remotivate and close. 34 '
Because new learning takes time to be fully grasped by the learners,
review of the new learning is essential. Smith and Ragan recommend
providing the learners with a partially completed graphic organizer and
requiring them to complete it and having the learners or the instructor
342
They also recommend
paraphrase learned principles and concepts.
periodic cumulative review to ensure recall. 343 For problem-solving
objectives, the summary and review should include efforts to classify, if
possible, the problems studied and to identify which approaches proved
effective in analyzing the class of problems. 344 Some law professors
probably do provide some sort of review as they complete each topic.
Many also encourage students to develop paraphrased understanding of
rules and concepts on their own time; few, if any, however, check
337. The author's plans for developing Contracts instruction in accord with learning
theory and instructional design include an allocation of the last three weeks of the
semester to instruction and practice of legal analysis skills.
338. See infra Part V.
339. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 136.
340. !d. at 120.
341. !d. at 120-21.
342. /d. at 121, 186, 203.
343. /d. at 121.
344. See id. at 139.
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students' paraphrased rule statements for accuracy or use the partially
completed graphic organizer approach.
Transferring learning involves the application of learning to new
contexts.345 Near transfer refers to the application of learning to new
contexts relatively similar to the contexts in which the learner learned the
information. Far transfer involves application of the learning in very
different situations and in very different ways than those in which the
learning was acquired.346 Near transfer requires the learner to recognize
critical similarities between the new context and the old one, a skill
developed only after substantial practice.~ Far transfer, on the other
hand, can be facilitated by having learners develop their own examples
and problems, develop analogies between prior learning and the new
learning, and by requiring learners to paraphrase their learning."'~
Transfer is a critical event for law instruction. Near transfer, which, in
the law context, involves simple application of rules and case holdings to
facts, is considered a basic level skill.349 Far transfer is a mark of
excellence for practicing lawyers. Trial and appellate lawyers who are
able to persuade courts to shift the application of principles beyond their
initially apparent application to a previously unencountered problem are
considered experts. Transactional lawyers demonstrate their expertise by
transferring principles of law from cases and statutes into their drafting
implications.
Because law professors frequently require students to apply rules and
case holdings to new fact patterns, near transfer regularly occurs in legal
education. To facilitate greater near transfer, instructors teaching
contracts principles could encourage students to connect those principles
to the common contexts in which they arise.~~Q Far transfer occurs much
less frequently in legal education. To facilitate far transfer, instructors
can encourage students to brainstorm broader applications of new
contracts learning or to consider the contract drafting implications of that
learning.
Finally, the remotivate and close event is necessary so that students
appreciate the importance of the learning, an appreciation that educators
41

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id. at 121.
ld.
Seeid.
Id. at 121, 139.
See MAcCRA1E REPORT, supra note 4, at 151-55.
See, e.g., supra note 238 (discussing the common

contex~

in which illusory

promise issues arise).
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have determined "greatly influence[s] how well the learning will be
acquired initially and how well that learning will be retained."351 This
event is commonly comb!ned wit? the transfer ev~nt by encour~~ing the
learner to explore how mformatlon can be use m the future. - Law
professors, having not sought to motivate students in an introduction, are
even less likely to strive for motivation in their conclusions. Because
students will need to be able to use the principles they are learning in
connection with other studied principles on their exams and in practice,
having students brainstorm the links to other issues and to the drafting
implications of the doctrine should suffice for either event.
d. Assessment

This Article already has addressed assessment, in large part.m Thus,
here it is only necessary to add a few points. First, Smith and Ragan
suggest including, in this instructional event, remediation instruction for
those students who failed to demonstrate competency on the assessment
instrument. 354 Indeed, Feinman and Feldman included both remediation
and reassessment in their instructional design. 355 This approach is both
exciting and somewhat daunting. One way to implement this goal is to
require those students who did not pass an assessment examination to
restudy the subject matter (providing their own events of instruction) and
then either require the students to send the professor an e-mail explaining
each of their errors or to take a new form of the test. Another possibility,
at the law school level, is to implement remediation into the students'
bluebook review period; those students who performed poorly in a
subject could be required to determine, on their own, what skills and
knowledge they failed to demonstrate on their final examinations.
2. Making Choices Along the Supplantive-Generative Continuum

A crucial consideration in designing instruction that addresses each of
the events of instruction is whether to have the students supply the events
of the instruction or to have the events provided by the instructor.
Designers use the term "generative" to describe instruction in which the
students create the events of instruction, and use the term "supplantive"
to describe instruction in which the instructor supplies the events of
356
instruction.
This choice is evocative of the distinction between
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
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SMITH & RAGAN,

supra note 8, at 121.

!d.
See supra notes 256-79 and accompanying text.
supra note 8, at 122.
Feinman & Feldman, supra note 15, at 911-12.
SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 124.
SMITH & RAGAN,
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constructivism and cognitivism in the sense that constructivists generally
believe learners should be encouraged to construct their own meanings;
most constructivists, however, also believe learners should be placed in
real world, cognitive apprenticeships.m
The choice is not so much a toggle, where instruction must either be
supplantive or generative, but, rather, supplantive and generative are a
continuum along which most instruction falls. m The choice is not
between instruction requiring active learning and passive learning; active
learning is a fundamental principle of all instructional design.·~) The
question really revolves around whether the learners prompt their own
engagement in active learning activities or whether the instruction
"scaffolds" the students' involvement in active learning activities.''-'-' For
example, under either approach, an instructor would want students to use
cognitive strategies, such as mnemonics or graphic organizers, to encode
their learning. The question addressed here is whether the instruction
should prompt or require students to select and demonstrate their use of
cognitive strategies or whether the students should be required to
determine the need for using and selecting among the possible cognitive
strategies on their own.
A few points warrant emphasis. First, under either approach, assuming
it were successful, the students could select and use the strategies.
Second, generative approaches produce deeper processing than
supplantive approaches and, therefore, generative approaches tend to
361
Third, generative approaches require much
produce better learning.
more time because nonexperts make a significant number of errors in
making instructional choices. Fourth, under a generative approach,
students who lacked well-developed and relevant, general or domainspecific cognitive strategies would founder, become frustrated, and
would not learn much.
In deciding where along the supplantive-generative continuum to
locate any particular event of instruction, the information gleaned by the
designer from the learner, context, and task analyses is crucial. Smith
and Ragan maintain that instruction both should tilt as much as possible
toward the generative pole and, generally, should progress toward the

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See supra note 155 and accompanying text
SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 123-26.
!d. at 125.
!d. at 124.
!d.
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generative pole during the course of instruction. Smith and Ragan also
emphasize, however, that a number of learner, context, and task factors
may suggest otherwise. The relevant learner considerations are the
learners' possession of relevant prior knowledge, their possession of "a
large and sophisticated repertoire of cognitive strategies," their aptitude,
6
their motivation, their level of anxiety, and their locus of control.' '
Context factors include the amount of instructional time available,
whether "learning to learn" or domain-specific goals are the objectives of
the instruction, and whether the goal is to have all of the learners develop
a minimum level of competency.364 Learning task factors include the
intellectual level of the objective and the complexity of the problems. ~
The Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model can be seen as a
generative instructional strategy. In the sense that students must teach
themselves under the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model, the
strategy is generative. The Model, however, is only superficially
generative. Law texts and, therefore, law instructors determine the order
in which the students study the material, the amount of classroom time
devoted to the study of each subject, and what subjects will not be
studied. 366 Instructors require students to devote considerable learning
time to discussions of doctrine, case analysis, policy, and theory, leaving
students little time to decide upon and then to engage in learning
strategies, to practice, or to generate other instructional events. A truly
generative strategy would involve giving students a set of problems to
evaluate within a domain, such as contracts law, providing the students
with no doctrine with which to evaluate the problem, and telling the
students they must analyze the problems in small groups. This approach,
therefore, would require the students to research and find the relevant
doctrine. The approach certainly would include only those few aspects
of theory the students found in the course of their research. Finally,
students would need to develop their reasoning skills on their own and
from their groups, or find resources to assist their development of
reasoning skills.
In any event, the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model, to the
extent that it reflects a generative approach, is not the outgrowth of a
careful consideration of learner, context, and learning task factors; rather,
it is a matter of inertia. Law professors continue to use it mostly because
36

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

!d. at 126.
/d.
!d.
/d.

For example, Dawson and Harvey's well-regarded Contracts text relegates
statutes of frauds instruction to an appendix. See DAWSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 92547.
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law professors have done so for generations. What is needed is a
thoughtful consideration of where along the supplantive-generative
continuum each course in every law school should fall. Accordingly, as
a starting point, below is a supplantive-generative analysis with respect to
first-year law students studying illusory promise as part of the author's
Contracts class.

a.

Supplantive-Generati\•e Analysis

The illusory promise lesson plan below"(•' is considerably more
supplantive than generative. All of the learner characteristics weigh in
favor of a more supplantive approach. The students, being tirst-year law
students, possess only minimal relevant prior knowledge, and although
many of the students had successful college experiences, most
nevertheless lack a significant repertoire of cognitive strategies.
Moreover, the students' aptitude for performing legal analysis is average
to below average in comparison to all law students who take the LSAT.
Finally, while the students are highly motivated to become lawyers, they
are less motivated to study law, and the students have high anxiety
(typical of all first-year law students), particularly because they are
second semester students, the semester after which those students who
will be dismissed academically are determined.
Three context factors influenced the choice. First, it is difticult to both
teach skills and cover the entire body of Contracts doctrine in a onesemester, four unit class. Instructional time is quite limited, suggesting
the need for a more supplantive approach. Second, the goal of the
instruction is to have most of the students reach a minimum competence
level; thus, a more supplantive strategy seems necessary. Third, learning
to learn, while an important goal, was not as important a goal as having
the students learn the domain-specific knowledge and skills. This factor
also weighs in favor of a more supplantive approach.
The task factor that influenced the choice to be more supplantive was
the difficulty of learning to perform legal analysis and the students'
relative newness to that skill.

367. See infra Part V (describing the Jesson plan and the rationales for the
instructional strategy choices made).
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3. Selecting Delivery Systems
At the same time a designer is selecting strategies, decisions need to be
168
made about the media of instruction and about grouping strategies. A
medium is "the ghysical means by which the instructional message is
communicated."3 9 Instructional media include: computers, print, video,
interactive multimedia, slides and filmstrips, distance education, people
(teachers), real objects and models, visuals (photographs, drawings,
charts, graphs), display boards (chalkboards, white boards, bulletin
boards), overhead transparencies, audio (for example, audiocassettes,
370
compact discs), and television (live broadcasts).
Grouping strategies
revolve around how the learners will be gathered and organized for
learning. 371 Types of grouping possible include: tutoring, individualized
and adaptive instruction, interactive small groups, recitation groups, 372
373
and lecture groups.
As Smith and Ragan suggest, these selections do
not need to be the same for all instructional events within a lesson. 374 For
example, as demonstrated below in the model illusory promise lesson,
the introduction and review may occur textually; the rest of the body
events and the conclusion may occur in a classroom with various
groupings during the course of the classroom instruction; and the
assessment may be by computer.375

a. Selecting the Media of Instruction
Numerous media comparison studies reveal that, while certain media
are more effective than others in certain contexts, with certain learners
and for certain tasks, no single medium-not computers, texts, or live
76
teachers-has ever been shown to be superior overalC
Thus, the
368. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 286.
369. !d.
370. /d. at 288-91; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 201-02, 228; TIMOTHY
J. NEWBY ET AL., INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING: DESIGNING
INSTRUCTION, INTEGRATING COMPUTERS, AND USING MEDIA 144 (1996).
371. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 292-94.
372. Recitation equates, more or less, with the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching
Model because it involves having the instructor ask individual students questions, having
the students prepare in advance for class to respond, and having the instructor conect the
student's responses. !d. at 293. Interestingly, Smith and Ragan, while noting the
prevalence of the use of recitation, also note that the method is "of little current interest
among scholars in either pedagogy or instructional design." /d.
373. !d. at 293-94; see also ROBERT GAGNE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSTRUCTIONAL
DESIGN 267-87 (3d ed. 1988).
374. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 286.
375. See infra Part V. The footnotes for the lesson indicate the bases for the media
and grouping selections made.
376. See generally SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 286; HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH
ON TEACHING (Merlin C. Wittrock ed., 3d ed. I 986).
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selection of media requires consideration of the learning tasks, the
learners, the learning context, including any practical matters, and the
attributes of each type of media.377
The type of learning involved is the crucial task characteristic. While
declarative knowledge and concepts can easily be learned through
texts,378 the intellectual skills other than concept learning that are so
crucial to law school learning-principles, procedures and problem
solving-require the students to encounter multiple examples, to respond
to questions about the examples as practice, and to get feedback about
379
Only certain types of media-programmed texts,
their performances.
live teachers, computers, and interactive multimedia-can provide these
conditions.380
Most of the learner characteristics relevant to media selection-reading
levels, ability to decode symbols, and familiarity with the operation of
media hardware (computers)-are not an issue for law school instruction;
only learners' attitudes about various types of media, if ascertainable,
381
seem relevant Contextual and practical considerations include the
availability of sufficient media equipment, facilities, scheduling and
funding.382
Each medium of instruction possesses a different set of critical
attributes. The media and the attributes of those media that are most
relevant to the design of law school instruction are detailed below.
Computers and interactive multimedia possess the ability to retain large
amounts of information, manipulate the information rapidly, provide
access to other stores of information (by hyperlinks, for example},
interactively respond to student work and adapt to the learner, and
maintain and analyze student progress records.m Interactive multimedia,
however, is expensive and difficult to produce!~ Print is inexpensive,
supports individualized student use, allows for random access by
learners, can be annotated by learners to reflect their personal

377. Sl\flTII & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 287; see also DICK & CAREY, supm note 32,
226-28. See generally ROBERT A. REISER & ROBERT M. GAGNE, SELECTING MEDIA
FOR INSTRUCTION (1983).
378. See DICK& CAREY, supra note 32, at 201.
379. Sl\flTII & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 287.
380. !d.; see also DICK& CAREY, supra note 32, at 201-02.
381. See Sl\flTII & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 387.
382. /d. at 287-88; see also DICK& CAREY, supra note 32, at 201-02.
383. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 288-90.
384. See id. at 290.
at
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elaborations, and can be made to be fairly interactive with the learner.
People are highly interactive, extremely expensive, highly adaptable and
flexible, possess empathy, can possess and obtain access to large stores
186
of information, and are able to rapidly process multiple sensory inputs.
Law professors seldom consider any of these factors when designing
their instruction. Not only do law professors, who have an economic
incentive not to consider other forms of mediation, almost always select
person-mediated instruction but also, law professors generally have
neither the knowledge base nor the skills to develop instruction by other
media. 387
b. Selecting Grouping Strategies

As noted above, grouping strategies include tutoring; individualized
and adaptive instruction; small group learning; recitation group learning,
which equates, more or less, to the large Socratic groups used in law
school; and lecture. In selecting among grouping strategies, designers
consider the following factors: (1) the demonstrated effectiveness of
cooperative learning methodologies;388 (2) the nature of the learning task,
particularly whether the learners can reach the objective on their own,
89
interacting with other learners, or only from the instructor;' (3) the
relevant learner characteristics, particularly the learners' loci of control,
the variation in their prior learning, and their experience and skill in
191
participating in group exercises;390 and the (4) media selection factors
392
and the instructional strategy selected.
While cooperative learning groups have been very effectively explored
and deployed by academic support faculty and by faculty teaching legal
385. /d. at 289.
386. /d. at 291.
387. CALI exercises, of course, are an exception to this point. The 2000 CALI
catalog lists over 150 exercises covering 27 legal topics. See Center for ComputerAssisted Legal Instruction, CALI Lesson Catalog, at http://www.cali.org/catalog.html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2000). While this Article trumpets the idea of CALI exercises, it
does not unreservedly endorse CALI exercises, which, in the opinion of the author, arc of
mixed quality.
388. See HANDBOOK OF REsEARCH FOR EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND
TECHNOLOGY: A PROJECT OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND
TECHNOLOGY 1017-44 (David H. Jonassen ed., 1996). See generally DAVID W. JOHNSON
& ROGER T. JOHNSON, LEARNING TOGETHER AND ALONE: COOPERATIVE, COMPETITIVE,
AND INDIVIDUALISTIC LEARNING (4th ed. 1994 ).
389. See generally VERNON S. GERLACH & DONALD P. ELY, TEACHING AND MEDIA:
A SYSTEM ATIC APPROACH (2d ed. 1980).
390. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 295. Interestingly, learners' dislike of
particular grouping approaches "are often not highly predictive of a strategy's
effectiveness." /d.
391. /d.
392. /d. at 295-96.
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writing courses,393 this learning has not reached substantive law
classrooms.
Moreover, other fonns of grouping, particularly
individualized and adaptive learning approaches, have hardly been
explored by the law teaching community. The lesson plan below
identifies the bases for the media and grouping strategies selected.-~
V. AN ILLUSTRATIVE LESSON PLAN

A. Introduction

Below is a sample lesson plan for teaching illusory promise doctrine,
issue spotting, and analysis. The events of instruction provide the
organizational principle for the lesson; the lesson integrates learning
theory, instructional design theory, and practice. The lesson is more
supplantive than generative for the reasons stated in the supplantivegenerative analysis above. 395 Explanations for the instructional strategies,
media selections, and grouping approaches used appear in the footnotes
to make the text of the lesson plan easier to follow. The author is
currently in the process of developing a Contracts textbook''~ based on
the principles discussed in this Article. To make the author's proposals
more concrete for readers interested in adapting some or all of the
suggestions contained in this Article to their own instructional effons, the
393. See Steven L Friedland, How We Teach: A Sun·ey of Teaclling Techniques in
American Law Sclwols, 20 SEATILE U. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1996); Marla L. Mitchell,
Beyond a Book Revielv: Using Clinical Scholarship in Our Teaching, 2 CUNICAL L. REv.
251 (1995) (reviewing ETIIICAL PROBLEMS FACING TilE CRIMINAL DEFE."':SE lAWYER:
PRAcnCAL ANSWERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS (Rodney J. Uphoff cd., 1995)}; Clifford S.
Zimmerman, "Thinkil1g Beyond My Own lmerpretation": Reflections on Colltlbomtil'l!
Olld Cooperative Leaming Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 957
(1999).
394. In connection with the Gonzaga University Institute for Law School Teaching·~
1995 conference entitled, "The Science and An of Law Teaching," Prof~sor Vcmcllia
Randall of Dayton University College of Law presented conference materials in which
she offered guidance to law teachers in implementing ideas from the Instructional Design
field. See Vernellia R. Randall, Helping Swdems Leam: A Model for Effectb·e u:gt1/
Teaching, in THE SCIENCE AND ART OF LAW TEACHING (1995) ton file with author).
Randall's materials, which are presented as a manual for designing law school i~truction
rather than as a scholarly work. include several of the ideas explored in the preceding
section. Randall, however, also omits many of the ideas in this section and proposes an
implementation sequence inconsistent with the sequence recommended by Smith ami
Ragan and other experts in the instructional design field.
395. See supra notes 356-67 and accompanying text.
396. Although the text is not complete, the author has already begun using poruo~
of the text in his teaching. The author anticipates completing the text by Fall 2002.
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portion of the text addressing illusory promise, other than the edited court
opinions, appear as an Appendix to this Article. 397
It is worth noting that the author has designed the lesson to ensure that
a large segment of the instruction occurs outside the classroom. This
approach stems from the author's goals of reserving classroom time for
those events of instruction for which an instructor is really necessary and
to make the study of illusory promise as efficient as possible. Efficiency
is an objective because of its intrinsic value398 and because the designer's
goal is to reserve the last two or three weeks of the course time for
practice in analyzing the integrated, complex problems-the overarching
instructional goal for the author's course. 399 Furthermore, given the the
expense and burden of human-mediated instruction, it should be reserved
for learning objectives that require it. 400
B. An Illusory Promise Lesson Plan
1. Introduction
a. Deploy Attention and Arouse Interest and Motivation

First, note that these two events of instruction are combined. 401 The
entire introduction will be provided by the students' text. 402 The illusory
promise textual materials begin by highlighting the subject area label,
"illusory promise," and by presenting an illusory promise issue set in the
context of familial relations. In the hypothetical, a parent promises to let
an older child use the family car if the child washes the car and the parent
397. See infra app. The edited court opinions have not been included in the
Appendix.
398. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
399. This approach derives from the wealth of research showing that experts possess
well-organized, detailed knowledge and skills with which to attack problem analysis. See
supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text. In other words, because the author seeks to
develop students capable of analyzing unique contracts problems by combining contracts
concepts, principles, and analytical procedures in unique ways, the author requires
students to possess a great deal of well-organized, readily accessible domain-specific
knowledge and skills. The author also requires instruction time to allow for instruction
and practice of the skills involved in analyzing previously unseen problems. See SMITH &
RAGAN, supra note 8, at 287. These factors suggest the importance of reserving
significant classroom time for work on problem-solving exercises.
400. As Smith and Ragan suggest, human instructors are one of the few media
effective for instruction in intellectual skills. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 287.
Because the learners have high anxiety and external loci of control, the unique human
capacity for empathy is particularly relevant. See id. at 291.
401. See supra note 284 and accompanying text (noting that Smith and Ragan
recommend and frequently choose to combine instructional events).
402. This choice is justified by the facts that the learners effectively can receive
these events on their own and because of the low cost of delivering these events textually.
See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 289, 294.
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decides not to use it herself. The text notes the likelihood that the
promise will anger the child because the child must wash the car even
though she has no assurance that the parent will decide to let her use the
car.403 The text identifies this promise as illusory and then transitions the
students to the subject of the lesson, illusory promise issues set outside
the familial context. The text then offers the students a matched set of
examples: a simple but prototypical illusory promise and a ~romise that
is not illusory but is similar in all nonrelevant respects.~' The text
explains that the courts would conclude the former is an illusory promise,
and therefore does not constitute consideration for the return promise
described in the example; consequently, the contract is not enforceable.
The text then requires students to answer two questions. The first
question asks students to write down why courts have chosen to intervene
and refuse to enforce promises deemed illusory, and the second question
asks students to write down why the promise in the first example is
illusory and the promise in the second example is not.~c~
b.

Establish Instructional Purpose and Preview Lesson

The text next describes the instructional objectives for the lesson
(learning the doctrine, theory, and analysis of illusory promise problems)
and explicitly details how the students will achieve the objectives. In
other words, the text describes the instructional process set forth below,
explaining what instruction the students will receive in the text, in the
classroom, and by computer, and describing the students' obligations

403. Smith and Ragan recommend both the highlighting of the label and the usc of a
stimulating example. SMllH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 182. The age of the students
justifies the selection of a parent-teenager interaction because they will either relate to the
example because they are parents or because they were recently teenagers themseh·cs.
404. Smith and Ragan suggest offering such a first matched set to pique interest.
SMllH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 182. The students are likely to be curious why the
former promise is illusory and the latter is not illusory.
405. These questions further stimulate interest and also, consistent with cognitive
learning theory, require students to actively engage with the text by dialoging \\ith the
material. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (suggesting the value,
according to cognitive learning theory, of integrating cognitive stmtegics into instruction).
They are also somewhat consistent with constructive theory because the learners must
develop their own theories. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (suggesting the
value, according to constructivist learning theory, of encouraging students to develop
their own hypotheses). To ensure students actually answer the many questions contained
in the workbook and do the workbook exercises, the instructor will need either to
regularly collect the students' assignments or, at least, spot-check the students' efforts.
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with respect to each of these activities.

406

2. Body

Large segments of the body of the instruction will be provided by the
407
text, and a significant portion of the body will occur in the classroom.

a.

Recall Prior Knowledge

Through the use of two previously-explained and used graphic
organizers, the text first situates the subject of illusory promise within the
context of the other recurring consideration issues. It next situates
consideration within the larger body of contract formation law and
403
situates contract formation law within the larger body of contracts law.
The text then guides students through a review of the relevant prior
knowledge. This review includes a discussion of general consideration
concepts, of promise, of good faith and reasonable efforts, and of the
application of those concepts. It also includes an abbreviated review of
the other, recurring doctrinal categories in which courts refuse to enforce
contracts notwithstanding the fact that the parties have bargained for the
alleged consideration. Those areas are past and moral consideration, preexisting duties, and bad faith or unreasonable assertions of invalid
claims. The review concludes by having students revisit ideas about
breach of contract and remedies because, according to traditional illusory
promise doctrine, an illusory promise allows the promisor to choose to
409
perform or withdraw without risk of liability for breach of contract.

406. These represent a supplantive approache to these events, a choice dictated by
the supplantive-generative analysis above.
407. The early events of the body are mediated by the text because students can fully
benefit from these events in this medium. While some practice is also provided textually,
most of the practice and feedback occur in the context of a medium well-suited to
providing such practice and feedback, human mediation. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra
note 8, at 287.
408. The repeated use of graphic organizers helps students develop and structure
their schema to accommodate the new learning to follow. See supra notes 113-22
(explaining the role of schema in cognitive processing theory).
409. Having the students participate in their own review, even if the students must
review prior sections of the text to do so, strengthens the students' mental connections to
the previously learned material as well as their connections of the new learning to the
prior learning. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 20-21 (explaining that cognitive
processing theory involves helping learners make their own connections between the new
learning and their prior knowledge).
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b. Process lnfomzation and Etamp/es, Focus
Attention (Part One), and Practice (Part One)
410

This section begins with straightforward statements of doctrine, both
the general definition of illusory promise and the courts' inclination to
attempt to transform promises that appear to be illusory into enforceable
promises by implying duties of good faith and reasonable efforts.' 11
The text then redirects the students to the matched set of examples with
which the instruction began. The text reprints the two fact patterns, but
this time certain words in the fact patterns are in bold font.m The text
then provides a "think aloud"413 explanation of how the author determined
that the first problem raised an illusory promise issue and why the author
believes a court probably would conclude the promise is illusory. This
demonstration illustrates all the thinking and writing skills the students
will need to analyze illusory promise issues. The text also includes a
similar "think aloud" for the matched nonillusory promise.
The text next invites the students to classify as illusory or nonillusory a
414
41
series of matched sets of illusory and nonillusory promises, • after
which the text provides increasingly truncated "think aloud" analyses for
each problem in each set and requires the students to complete partial
"think aloud" exercises in their workbooks. The examples span the range
of factual patterns that commonly raise illusory promise issues. ~ The
text also sequences the examples so that the earlier problems are
relatively easy and the subsequent problems become increasingly
41

410. Note, again, the combining of events of insnuction.
411. The insnuctional goals for this lesson do not include a goal of developing
students' ability to deduce the illusory promise doctrine from the cases. Accordingly, the
lesson does not require students to figure out the doctrine from cases. Cases arc
important, of course, and are included in the lesson; they simply arc not used as a vehicle
for teaching the skill of deriving doctrine from cases.
412. The visual cue allows students to isolate the key attributes of the prototype
example, a strategy recommended by Smith and Ragan. SMilH & RAGAN. supra note 8,
at 183.
413. See supra notes 320-26 and accompanying texL
414. The sets are matched in the sense that they are similar in all nonrelevant aspects
so that students can begin to isolate and understand the crucial attributes of the prombes
that the courts classify as illusory. See SMilH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 118 lidentif)'ing
attribute isolation as an important cognitive step in understanding concepts I.
415. Because students only have considered two problems at this time, the tc.'<t
requires students to classify the examples, not so much for practice, but as a means of
making sure the students are actively engaging with the text.
416. SMITI:I & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 183,201 (recommending this approach I.
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difficult.
The text then requires the students to read four heavily edited illusory
promise court opinions. The text provides the cases to illustrate the
application of the doctrine, not as a tool for teaching case reading skills.
Thus, rather than requiring the students to brief the cases, the text
requires the students to respond in writing to questions in their
workbooks designed to help students identify what they need to gather
from the opinions. Additionally, the text requires students to identify the
parties' respective promises, to determine which promise allegedly is
illusory, to state the court's conclusion as to whether the promise is
illusory, to relate the court's explanation of its conclusion to the illusory
promise principles they have learned, and to identify any hints given b(s
4 8
the courts as to why courts are concerned about illusory promises.
Because the courts' reasoning in the selected cases is not altogether clear,
the text focuses students' attention on particular points in the opinions by
the use of holding and guiding hints.

c.

Practice (Part Two)

After reading the cases, the text requires students to prepare written
restatements, in the students' own words, of illusory promise doctrine.
Next, they must identify in writing whether each question in a new set of
problems raises an illusory promise issue and then prepare written

417. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the behavioral preference
for easy-to-hard sequencing); see also supra note 316 and accompanying text (discussing
easy-to-hard sequencing as an instructional design principle).
418. The cases used are Strong v. Sheffield, 39 N.E. 330 (N.Y. 1895); Omni Group,
Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank, 645 P.2d 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); and Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945). Although, arguably, cases are unnecessary,
the cases span four major contexts in which illusory promises occur and serve to make the
learning more concrete and realistic, and to provide insight, from courts, as to the courts'
thinking with respect to illusory promise problems. See SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at
201 (explaining the importance of providing students with "the whys of a principle").
The selection of these particular cases is a crucial matter. Strong provides a clear, easyto-understand illustration of a promise that appears illusory and cannot be made nonillusory even had the court implied duties of good faith or reasonable efforts. Omni
Group plays off Strong nicely because the apparently crucial distinction between the
word "want" in Strong and the satisfaction clause in Omni Group allows insight into the
very fine distinctions courts make in this area of law. Wood's lack of any promise from
Mr. Wood shifts the discussion into a new arena, and Sylvan Crest allows the class to
discuss the termination clause line of illusory promise cases. As a result, by the time the
students have completed the ten initial problems and have read these four cases, they have
been introduced to all of the ways in which illusory promise issues have arisen and,
therefore, will be better able to spot illusory promise issues. Also, the cases arc
sequenced by degree of difficulty to allow the students to continue their progression in
understanding illusory promise doctrine.
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analyses of those problems that do raise illusory promise issues:•·' These
problems also move from easier to more difficult and span a wide variety
420
of contractual contexts.

d.

Employ Leamirzg Strategies

The last preclassroom activity first encourages students to reread
materials they previously studied about creating graphic organizers and
mnemonics. Students are then required to select from among the
possible choices and develop a mnemonic or a graphic organizer to assist
them in recalling illusory promise doctrine. ~ Next, students are directed
to self-evaluate their learning and to consider what questions they have
4
regarding the material to prepare for class. n Finally, the text requires the
students to identify in writing the eight recurring fact patterns that raise
illusory promise problems as reflected in the examples, the problems, and
the cases in the text.423
4 1

e.

Process lnfomzation and Euzmples, Focus Atte1Ziion (Part Two),
and Evaluative Feedback (Part One)

The classroom component will begin with a discussion of students'
efforts to paraphrase the doctrine and with several students explaining
their mnemonic devices or graphic organizers to the entire class.
Students will self-correct both their paraphrase of the doctrine and their
mnemonic or graphic organizer in accordance with instructions supplied
424
by the professor. The professor then will lead a short discussion of the
students' written answers to the questions regarding each of the four
cases; this discussion may appear similar to the traditional Vicarious
Learning/Self-Teaching Model in the sense that the instructor will be
selecting a student to read her responses.

419. Smith and Ragan suggest that practice with respect to principle learning
includes practice at "stating the principle", practice at identifying situations to which the
principle applies, and "practice applying the principle". SMmt & RAGAN, supm note 8, at
202.
420. See id. at 201.
421. See id. at 185-86, 202 (recommending this approach); supra notes 138-H and
accompanying text (describing the various types of mnemonic devices and graphic
organizers).
422. See SMrrn & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 118.
423. See id. at 138 (discussing the instructional design basis of this approach).
424. See id. at 202 (suggesting the instructions take the form of a model answer).
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There are, however, three significant differences between this process
and the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model. First, the students will
have already responded to the questions in writing. Second, the goal of
the discussion is to use the cases to process information and as examples,
4
and not to provide students with feedback on their case reading skills. z.\
Third, the students' reading efforts will be aided substantially by the text
questions, decreasing the likelihood of substantial error. Finally, the
professor will assist the selected student to develop a proper response. In
doing so, the professor will ask the other students to indicate if they made
errors similar to or different from the selected student's errors, and will
lead a discussion as to the source of any confusion.
The instructor will then scaffold the students' learning of the most
difficult aspect of illusory promise, the courts' efforts to salvage
promises that appear illusory by implying duties of good faith and
reasonable efforts. To do so, the instructor will show the students a
graphic image depicting a person who is labeled "the allegedly illusory
promise" floating in a body of water next to a ship. Someone on the ship,
labeled "the court" will be seen throwing two floating rings to the person
in the water; one of the rings will be labeled "good faith" and the other
will be labeled "reasonable efforts."426 The professor then will lead the
discussion of why courts strive to salvage allegedly illusory promises.427
The instructor will conclude this section with a discussion of the
students' efforts to identify common fact patterns.

f Practice (Part Three) and Evaluative Feedback
(Parts Two and Three)
Having solidified the students' understanding of the doctrine and its
application, the instructor will give the students a few minutes to review,
in small groups, their responses to the practice problems and reach a
428
The instructor then will lead a
group consensus as to the problems.
short discussion in which the groups compare their analyses and the class
develops a consensus analysis.

425. It is probably true that students may draw inferences about their case reading
skills based on the discussion.
426. Smith and Ragan recommend the use of such imagery, where possible, as a way
of reinforcing knowledge. !d. at 186.
427. See id. at 201 (emphasizing the importance of providing "whys" in the
discussion of principles).
428. The use of small groups is, more or less, a constructivist approach in that
students negotiate the meaning of what they have learned. See id. at 15. The use of
cooperative learning groups, have also been shown to be particularly effective for
learning. See id. at 293.
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g. Practice (Part Four), Evaluative Feedback (Parr Four),
and Transfer (Part One)

The students next will spend fifteen to thirty minutes, again in groups,
brainstorming and creating their own illusory ,gromise problems and
developing their own analyses of those problems. :1 The body event will
conclude with groups reporting their problems to the class. The
professor will lead a classroom discussion as to whether each problem
raises an illusory promise issue and how the students should have
analyzed those problems that do raise the issue.
3. Conclusion
a. Sununarize and Review, Transfer (Part Two), and
Remotivate and Close

The professor will again prompt students to develop paraphrased rule
statements and to recall what they have learned about analyzing illusory
promise problems. Then, the professor will ask students to assess
whether the questions they had about illusory promise have been
answered, and will review the prototype illusory promise problem by
leading students through a discussion of why this problem epitomizes
43
illusory promises. ° Finally, the professor will ask the students how
illusory promise problems might be paired with other issues studied so
far and then ask students how contract drafters can avoid creating illusory
•
431
proffilses.

429. Smith and Ragan recommend having students create their own problems both
as practice and to promote transfer. ld. at 139, 184. Once again, the effectiveness of
cooperative learning groups justifies the use of such groups. !d. at 293.
430. Again, this discussion will reinforce the importance of reflective learning or
metacognition because the professor will require the students to self-assess their
understanding and to be reflective about how the author of their te:~tt structured their
learning materials. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
431. See Sr-nm & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 203 (suggesting paraphrasing as a way to
summarize and review a principle, suggesting that transfer acti\•ities include student
consideration of how the principle could be combined with other principles in a larger
problem-solving activity, and suggesting that students consider the principle's real life
relevance as a way of remotivating the students and dosing).

435

4. Assessment
a. Assessment, Evaluative Feedback, and Remediation
This instructional event will occur entirely on-line. Students will take
412
a twenty-five to thirty problem multiple-choice and short answer quiz.
The quiz will include questions requiring the students to state the
principles of illusory promise, to distinguish illusory promise problems
from those problems that do not raise illusory promise issues, and to
433
apply the illusory promise doctrine.
The on-line quiz software will
send the students an immediate e-mail, informing the students about how
well they performed on the quiz, which questions they answered
correctly, which they answered incorrectly, and what the correct answers
434
were to the questions they answered incorrectly.
For students who
score below competency level on the examination, the e-mail directs the
students to review their texts, class notes, and specific sections of
supplemental materials (hornbooks). The goal of the review is to
remediate the students' learning problems. After completing their selfremediation, students will e-mail their instructor, identifying the
questions they answered incorrectly, their incorrect responses, and
explaining why their responses were incorrect and the correct response
435
was correct.

C. Final Comments Regarding the Sample Plan
The foregoing lesson plan, while undoubtedly imperfect, represents a
dramatic departure from the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model.
Instead of emphasizing instruction on subjects the designer does not
intend to assess (such as case reading skills), the design has
"congruence"-the objectives, strategies, and assessment all match and
make sense together. 436 The design effectively integrates ideas from
432. The multiple-choice or short-answer format for the quizzes, while less than
optimal, reflects a reasonable trade-off among the three goals of assessment (practicality,
validity, and reliability). See id. at 99 (noting the trade-off among these goals). This
approach is less troubling in light of the fact that the overall design for the course includes
the administration of traditional law school essay examination questions during both a
midterm and a final examination. Before the midterm, the design contemplates at least
one week of instruction addressing problem-solving in the context of the materials
assigned up to the date of the midterm. Before the final examination, the design
contemplates two weeks of problem-solving instruction.
433. See id. at 95 (recommending testing students on all three levels so that the
designer can later determine, if necessary, the cause of any performance problems).
434. This feedback should suffice to inform the student and designer whether the
learner achieved the objective. See id. at 204.
435. See id.
436. !d. at 9.
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learning theory and the best practices suggested by instructional design
theory and practice. Finally, the instruction seems likely to be effective,
efficient, appealing, and learner centered.437 It is a model that offers great
hope for producing mastery learning by a large percentage of students in
the class (that is, having eighty percent of the students learn eighty
percent of the material).438

VI. FORMATIVE AND SUMMATIVEEVALUATION
Instructional designers regard assessment as involving three separate,
but related processes. The first process, discussed above, involves
assessing each individual student's learning to determine whether the
student has developed the requisite level of competency.4 n The second
and third processes are "formative evaluation" and "summative
evaluation," respectively.-WJ Both formative and summative evaluation
are processes by which instructional materials are assessed:"' The
differences between the two lie in their goals and their methodologies.
The purpose of formative evaluation is to allow the designer to
determine whether and how the instruction needs to be revised to make it
442
more effective and effi.cient. In fact, Smith and Ragan assert that
instruction that has been tried out with even as few as one or two students
and then revised based on that assessment is "substantially more effective
3
than the original instruction.'~ Smith and Ragan recommend that
instructional materials be evaluated in six ways: (1) during design as the
designer completes each output of the process (context analysis, learner
analysis, task analysis, strategy selection);444 (2) by experts in both
domain and instructional design before learners try the materials;'"~ (3) by
trying "out the instructional materials with two or three members ... of
7
the target audience";.w; (4) by testing the material on small groups;'" (5)
437. See id. at 8-9.
438. See supra note 30 and accompanying texL
439. See supra notes 256-79 and accompanying texL
440. SMITII & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 338.
441. /d.
442 /d.; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 257.
443. SMITII & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 338.
444. /d. at 339.
445. /d. at 340; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 257-58. Smith and Ragan
note that most commercial publishers of texts and computer programs do arrange for
expert review, although, typically, the review is only by experts in the domain and at a
time when the materials are ready for publication. SMilli & RAGAN, supra nole S. at 338.
446. /d. at 340; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 258-60.
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by field trial with actual students; and (6) ongoing evaluation even after
449
the instruction has been adopted.
Nothing even remotely comparable occurs in the assessment of law
school instructional materials. Texts are reviewed by other law teachers,
but none of the other phases of formative evaluation occur. It is of no
surprise that most law school instructional materials are not particularly
effective, efficient, or appealing.
Summative evaluation occurs after the institution has implemented the
instruction. Its purpose is to collect data so that decision makers can
develop their own assessments about the effectiveness, efficiency, and
4 0
appeal of the instruction and determine whether to continue using it. '
The designer of the instruction should not participate in summative
evaluation so as to avoid the appearance of bias. ~ Smith and Ragan
recommend that summative evaluation involve four steps: ( l)
determining the goals of the evaluation, (2) selecting the indicators of
success, (3) selecting the orientation (subjective or objective) of the
evaluation, and (4) selecting the design of the evaluation.452 Law
instruction is never subjected to such evaluation. ~3
4 1

4

VII. CONCLUSION

Three significant barriers exist to adopting an instructional design
approach to teaching law. First, designing the necessary texts, software,
and assessment tools will require substantial resources, including human
effort, time, and economic resources. This Article includes a sample
lesson plan addressing illusory promise, only one of an extremely large
number of topics in contracts law. Moreover, this Article contemplates
447. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 342; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32,
at 263.
448. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 348; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32,
at 265-66. It is interesting to note how much review Smith and Ragan recommend before
the materials are tried with actual classes. Looking at the level of assessment Smith and
Ragan contemplate at each level of assessment, SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 33848, it appears likely that instruction subjected to such careful assessment will not even be
field tested until a year or two after it has been completed.
449. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 351-52.
450. /d. at 352; see also DICK & CAREY, supra note 32, at 323-24.
451. SMITH & RAGAN, supra note 8, at 354-55.
452. /d. at 355-57.
453. Peer and accreditation review of classroom teaching falls far short of the mark.
First, both types of review almost always include only review of classroom teaching.
Second, reviewers seldom consider, much less assess, the instructor's instructional
objectives, selection of media, or testing methodologies. Third, as argued above, the
standard against which classroom instruction is measured-what ABA law schools have
done over the past 100 years-is a very dubious standard. Finally, neither law school
professors nor accreditation committees possess expertise in learning theory or
instructional design.
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the creation and implementation of integrated lessons, crossing over
doctrinal categories to develop the student skills necessary to creatively
analyze complex problems. The lesson plan and the textual material
addressing illusory promise required many hours to create, and the
assessment test is still under construction. ~~~ Second, law school
accreditation teams as well as law schools and their faculty will have to
rethink how they evaluate law schools and law instructors, and, perhaps,
even shift at least some of the priorities from scholarship to instruction.
Finally, law teachers will have to rethink what they do in their
classrooms.
There is a way to make law school instruction effective, eft1cient, and
appealing; that way, however, does not involve continued adherence to
the Vicarious Learning/Self-Teaching Model.

454. Smith and Ragan estimate that each hour of instruction requires on average
forty hours of instructional development time and may even take as much as three to four
hundred hours of development time. See id. at 331.
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APPENDIX

Unit Two-Contract Fonnation, Topic Two-Consideration
Part Six-Illusory Promise
Introduction
We now tum to the last topic in our study of consideration, illusory
promise. Imagine you are a parent. Your seventeen year-old-daughter
comes to you on Thursday and asks to use your car Saturday night. You
know the car needs washing, so you say, "If you wash the car today, I
will let you use it if I determine not to use it." Your seventeen-year-old
does not say a word, leaves the room in a huff, and, after a moment or
two, you hear the door to her room slam, making a sound somewhat
similar to the sound made by a firing gun. Why is she so angry?
Because she feels set up. She has to wash the car for the possibility of
being allowed to drive the car, but you have reserved for later your
decision as to whether you or she will use the car Saturday night. In
other words, while she must wash the car, you have not committed
yourself at all, and you have done so while making it sound like you are
promising something ("I will let you use it ..."). In our study of illusory
promise, we will consider what happens when problems of apparent but
not real promises move from parent-child conflicts to courtroom contract
disputes.
Let's look at an example of an illusory promise. Imagine the following
interaction: Thu owed Juanita $500 and, though the money was due,
lacked sufficient funds at that moment to repay Juanita. Thu, therefore,
begged Juanita for extra time. Juanita said, "If you agree to pay me an
extra $50, I will not demand that you pay me all the money you owe me
until I, using my sole discretion, decide to demand it." Thu replied,
"Thanks, I promise to pay you an extra $50." Assume that Juanita waits
one month before demanding repayment of her money. Thu pays Juanita
$500 but refuses to pay the extra $50. In a suit brought by Juanita
against Thu for the extra $50, all courts would agree that Juanita's
promise is illusory and, therefore, there is no consideration for Thu' s
promise to pay the extra $50. Because there is no consideration for
Thu's promise to pay the extra $50, Thu's promise to pay the extra $50 is
not enforceable. Juanita would lose her lawsuit.
Now imagine the following, slightly different interaction: Once again,
Thu owed Juanita $500 and, though the money was due, lacked sufficient
funds at that moment to repay Juanita. Thu, therefore, begged Juanita for
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extra time. Juanita said, ''If you agree to pay me an extra $100, I will not
demand that you pay me all the money you owe me until one month from
today." Thu replied, "Thanks, I promise to pay you an extra $100."
Assume that Juanita waits the one month before demanding repayment of
her money. Thu pays Juanita $500 but refuses to pay the extra $100. In
a suit brought by Juanita against Thu for the extra $100, all courts would
agree that Juanita's promise is not illusory and, therefore, is good
consideration for Thu's promise to pay $100. Because there is
consideration for Thu's promise to pay the extra $100, Thu's promise to
pay the extra $100 is enforceable. Assuming Juanita's lawsuit did not
raise any other issues, Juanita would win her lawsuit.
It is clear from the previous two paragraphs that courts will intervene
and refuse to enforce promises that the courts conclude are illusory. Why
are courts concerned about illusory promises? (Jot down your answer in
the space provided below before reading on.)
Why are courts concerned about illusory promises? - - - - - - - -

To paraphrase Arthur Corbin, an illusory promise really is not a
promise at all; in other words, the speaker has not bound herself to any
obligation. Refusing to enforce a promise because a court deems it
illusory, of course, is the end result of an analysis of whether the promise
is illusory. Our real questions, then, are: (1) Why is Juanita's promise in
the first interaction illusory? and (2) Why is Juanita's promise in the
second interaction not illusory? (Jot down your answer before reading
on.)
Why is Juanita's promise in the first interaction illusory and why is
Juanita's promise in the second interaction not illusory?_ _ _ _ __

Instructional Objectives
In this lesson, you will learn how to use the rules of law for illusory
promises to determine whether a court would conclude that each item on
a list of promises is illusory or not, explaining for each item why that
example is or is not an illusory promise. Of course, to do so, you will

441

need to be able to state, verbatim, the three rules of law used by the
courts to determine whether promises are illusory.
Overview of Lesson

To develop this skill and the underlying knowledge required to deploy
the skill, we will begin by reviewing the ideas you already know that are
relevant to your understanding of illusory promise. We will then return
to the two Thu-Juanita hypotheticals to learn why Juanita's promise in
the first hypothetical is illusory and her promise in the second
hypothetical is not illusory. In the course of the discussion of these two
hypotheticals, you will be introduced to the rules used by the courts to
determine whether promises are illusory and see how courts use these
rules to analyze illusory promise questions. We will then look at four
more matched sets of examples and nonexamples, using the rules to
identify why promises stated in the hypotheticals are examples or
nonexamples.
To prepare for the classroom portion of the lesson and to see how
courts reason through illusory promise issues, you will read and respond
in writing to specific questions regarding four short court opinions. You
will then paraphrase the rules you have learned and develop either a
flowchart or a mnemonic device (in accordance with our past discussions
of these devices for encoding information) to help you encode the rules.
Finally, you will analyze, in writing, whether a list of nine promises are
illusory or nonillusory. To prepare for a class discussion of the
hypotheticals, consider what questions you have regarding these
materials and the doctrine, and then identify the narrow set of recurring
fact patterns in which illusory promise cases arise.
In class, we will begin by reviewing the illusory promise rules, your
paraphrases of those rules, and your flowcharts and mnemonics. We will
then discuss the four cases, focusing on the courts' reasoning. After we
have finished discussing the cases, students will exchange their answers
to the problem set, and the class will discuss the hypotheticals. You will
then break into small groups for a few minutes to develop your own
examples and nonexamples of illusory promises; each group then will
report one example and one nonexample and explain its analysis as to
each. The class will discuss the groups' examples and nonexamples and
review the critical attributes that make promises illusory. Finally, the
class will consider how practicing lawyers could use what the class has
learned about illusory promises, and we will attempt to rewrite some of
the promises the class has deemed illusory to make the promise
nonillusory.
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After class, on your own time, you will take a quiz. Those who do not
score at least eighty percent will be expected to review these materials,
read the suggested hornbook section and their lecture notes, and then
explain why their incorrect answers were incorrect and why the correct
answers are correct.
Review

Once again, we begin by situating the subject of our study within the
context of this entire course by looking at how consideration fits within
contracts law and how illusory promise fits within consideration law.
Contracts Course Graphic Organizer

The Contracts Course Graphic Organizer below shows how the
consideration unit fits within our larger study of all the topics in this
course. Note that we are still working on issues relating to contract
formation and, more specifically, the rules relating to consideration.
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Consideration Concept Tree
The Consideration Concept Tree shows how illusory promise fits
within our study of consideration. Note that illusory promise, like
forbearance, adequacy, sufficiency, the pre-existing duty rules, and past
and moral consideration, is a special consideration issue. Finally, note
that illusory promise is the last consideration issue we will be studying.
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Recall from our prior study of consideration law that the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and the courts have defined consideration as a
promise, act, or forbearance for which a party has ''bargained." Because
our topic is "illusory promise," we will focus on bargained for promises,
that is, contracts that involve exchanges of promises. Courts have held
that a party has "bargained for" a promise when that party sought the
promise in exchange for her promise and the other party gave his promise
in exchange for the first promisor's promise. To see if you still
understand the general idea of consideration, write an answer to the
question posed below.
After several hours of negotiating, Peggy Sue says to Demetrius: "I will pay you
$50 per week if you clean my house once per week for the next year."
Demetrius replies: "I accept your offer."

Question: Why would a court be likely to hold that there is consideration
to both parties to this transaction?

YourA~er. -------------------------------------------

Correct A~er: In this case, Peggy Sue asked for cleaning services from
Demetrius, thereby seeking them and promised $50 per week as an
inducement, thereby proposing an exchange of her promise of money for
his promise of services, and Demetrius gave his promise of cleaning
services to bind her promise of the $50. Consequently, there is
Likewise,
consideration passing from Demetrius to Peggy Sue.
Demetrius promised his services to induce Peggy Sue's promise of
money, and Peggy Sue promised her money to get Demetrius' promise of
services. Thus, each bargained for each other's promise and, therefore, a
court would conclude both parties received consideration.
Recall that, notwithstanding the fact that a particular promise has been
"bargained for," a court may conclude the promise does not suffice as
consideration. Thus, if Peggy Sue had offered and Demetrius had
accepted an offer for Peggy Sue to pay Demetrius only 1¢ per week, the
court would have deemed her consideration inadequate because it was
nominal, even though courts do not generally inquire into the inadequacy
of consideration. Simi1arly, if Peggy Sue had proposed and Demetrius
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had accepted an offer to exchange Peggy Sue's $50 per week for
Demetrius' $100 per week, the court would have deemed her
consideration inadequate because the exchange would have involved a
like-kind exchange of items known to be of different value and,
therefore, really a gift. Two final examples serve to illustrate the courts'
inclination to find an absence of consideration even if both parties
bargained for the exchange: ( 1) courts will not enforce an exchange of a
promise for actions or forbearances rendered in the past (past
consideration) or a promise based solely on moral grounds (moral
consideration); (2) courts will not enforce an exchange of a promise for a
settlement or release (forbearance) of an invalid claim where either the
payee did not honestly believe the payee's claim had a colorable basis or
where the payee did not reasonably believe the payee's claim had a
colorable basis.
We will see that illusory promises are another basis on which courts
may choose not to enforce bargained-for exchanges.
The rules with respect to illusory promises are particularly similar, in
some respects, to the above rules dealing with the question of when a
forbearance to assert an invalid claim suffices as consideration. Two key
underlying concepts in illusory promise are: (1) the idea of good faith,
which, as we have seen, means honesty-in-fact, and (2) the idea of
reasonable efforts, which, as we have seen in this course and you have
seen in your other law school courses, requires a consideration of what a
hypothetical reasonable person would do.
Finally, recall a few basic ideas about breach of contract. Any party to
a contract can choose to breach the contract and suffer the consequences
of doing so. A breach of contract occurs when a party refuses to perform
the contract at all or where a party's promised performance is defective
in some way. The consequences a breaching party faces, as we have
seen, usually involve paying a sum of money as damages to the victim of
the breach.
What Makes Promises Illusory

Courts and legal commentators have offered a variety of definitions for
what makes a promise illusory: (1) "an expression cloaked in promissory
terms, but which, on closer examination, reveals that the promisor is not
committed to an act or forebearance"; 455 or (2) "[w]ords of promise which
by their terms make performance entirely optional with the
455.
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'promisor"';456 or (3) "[a promise that] leaves a party free to perform or to
withdraw from the agreement at his unrestricted pleasure.'"~
Recall the hypothetical promise made by Juanita to Thu that the above
discussion classifies as illusory:
If you agree to pay me an extra $50, I wi/111ot dema11d that you pay m~: all the
money you owe me wllill, usi11g my sole discretio11, dedde to demand it.

Note that the words "will not demand" are in italics. As we learned
previously, the courts uniformly have concluded that the word "\vill," if
linked to an action or forbearance (here a forbearance from demanding),
expresses the commitment requisite to be a promise. The word "until"
also is in italics; the word "until" suggests that what is to follow is a time
restriction on the speaker, that is, the period of time before the speaker
can demand repayment. What follows in the sentence, however, are the
words ''I, using my sole discretion, decide." As I explain below, these
are the words that make the promise illusory.
A person can decide according to their "sole discretion" to demand the
money immediately or at some later date. In other words, the speaker has
not actually agreed to delay collection at all. She has the right to decide
when to demand the money. Moreover, a court cannot make this promise
nonillusory by implying either good faith or reasonable efforts. Implying
a duty of reasonable efforts would make no sense because deciding
according to one's sole discretion does not involve taking any kind of
action; it is an internal, mental process. Likewise, if we were to assume
the speaker must "decide" in good faith, the promise would nevertheless
be illusory. Because a person can honestly (the definition of good faith)
decide to demand the money right away (because he is greedy or wants to
buy a new toy), an implied duty of good faith would not eliminate the
speaker's absolute discretion. In other words, the speaker can either
demand the money immediately or wait any period of time and not
breach this promise. Accordingly, the promise is illusory. Note that, if a
court deems a promise illusory, the contract will not be enforced because
one of the two parties, Thu, received no consideration for her promise.
Note also that Thu's promise, to pay money (an extra S50) is not even
colorably illusory because Thu has no discretion whether to pay the extra
$50 or not.
456.
457.

77 cmt. a (1979).
Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625,626 (Cal. 1958).
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Note the three critical attributes of illusory promise used in the above
discussion to conclude the promise was illusory:
(1) An illusory promise includes language ofpromise.
(2) An illusory promise does not restrict the promisor's discretion to
choose, in her sole discretion and without consequence, to act or to
refrain from acting.
(3) An illusory promise cannot be made to restrict the promisor's
discretion by implying a duty of good faith or a duty of reasonable

efforts.
Now recall the other example, which the materials above indicate does
not contain an illusory promise. That promise stated:
If you agree to pay me an extra $100, !will not demand that you pay me all the
money you owe me until one month from today.

Note again that the words "I will" are in italics and are words of promise.
Also note the use of the word "until," which, as noted above, suggests the
speaker is agreeing to postpone collection. The stated time for
postponement, "one month from today," is what distinguishes the
nonexample from the example. The speaker has no discretion to demand
the money before one month from today because the statement places no
limit whatsoever on the term "one month from today." If the speaker
does demand the money sooner than one month from today, she will have
breached her promise. The promise, therefore, is not illusory. Note
again that Thu's return promise, to pay money (an extra $50), is not even
colorably illusory because Thu has no discretion whether to pay the extra
$50 or not.
Consider the following additional examples. As we learned during the
first week of class, you should strive to actively dialogue with the text.
Therefore, try to classify each as illusory or as nonillusory by marking an
"I" or an "NI" in the space provided before you read the answers below:
(1) I will buy your car for $5000 cash if I feel like it. __
(2) I will buy your car for $5000 cash. __

(3) If I wake up in a good mood tomorrow, I will clean your house in exchange
for$100. __
(4) Unless I win the lottery tonight, I will clean your house in exchange for

$100._
(5) (From a baseball league to a baseball manufacturer) We will buy at $1 per
ball all of the baseballs we require. __
(6) (From a baseball league to a baseball manufacturer) We will buy at $1 per
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ball as many baseballs as we choose to buy._
(7) I covenant to pay you $4000 for this washing machine if 1 am satisfied with
it
(8) I covenant to pay you $4000 for this washing machine if I desin: to do

!tO.

1. I will buy your car for $5000 cash if I feel/ike it.

Answer: This statement does contain language of promise (will). The
phrase, "feel like it," does not restrict the speaker's discretion, however.
A person could choose to "feel like" buying the car or choose not to "feel
like" buying the car and yet not breach this alleged promise. Implying a
duty to "feel like it" in good faith would not make this promise nonillusory because a person can, with equal ease, honestly feel either like
doing something or honestly feel not like doing something. Likewise,
implying a duty to make a reasonable effort to "feel like it" would not
make this promise nonillusory; because the standard is "feel like it," the
only relevant efforts would occur in the speaker's head. The promise is
illusory.
2. I will buy your car for $5000 cash.

Answer: Once again, this statement contains language of promise (will).
In this case, however, there is no contingency to the speaker's
willingness that even gives rise to a possibility the promise might be
illusory. The speaker cannot choose not to pay $5000 without breaching
this contract. The promise is not illusory.
3. If I wake up in a good mood tomorrow, I will clean your house in
exchange for $100.

Answer: This statement does contain language of promise {will). The
phrase, "if I wake up in a good mood tomorrow," does not restrict the
speaker's discretion, however. A person could choose to be "in a good
mood" or choose not to be "in a good mood" and yet not breach this
alleged promise. On the one hand, implying a duty to evaluate one's
mood in good faith, may seem to restrict the speaker's discretion because
some people believe they have no control over their moods. More likely,
on the other hand, implying a duty to "be in a good mood" in good faith
would not make this promise nonillusory because a person can, with
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equal ease, honestly be in a good mood or honestly not be in a good
mood. Likewise, implying a duty to make a reasonable effort to be in a
"good mood" may seem to make this promise nonillusory because it
suggests the speaker must try to be happy. However, because the
standard is "in a good mood," the only relevant efforts would occur in the
speaker's head. The promise is illusory.
4. Unless I win the lottery tonight, I will clean your house in exchange
for $100.
Answer: This statement does contain language of promise (will). The
fact that the promise is contingent on the speaker not winning the lottery
raises a question as to whether the speaker's discretion has been
restricted. On the one hand, the speaker seems able to avoid liability
simply by not buying a lottery ticket and has full control over whether
that purchase occurs, and the speaker can avoid liability altogether if the
speaker wins the lottery. The courts, however, would imply a duty on the
speaker to make a reasonable effort to buy the ticket and, therefore, that
event is virtually certain to occur and, in any event, the speaker has no
discretion not to try to buy. Moreover, because the speaker has no
control over whether he or she wins the lottery, the speakers has no
discretion. The promise is not illusory.

5. (From a baseball league to a baseball manufacturer) We will buy at $1
per ball all of the baseballs we require.
Answer: This statement does contain language of promise (will). On the
one hand, the use of the word "require" suggests the speaker has
complete control over whether the league orders the baseballs or not. On
the other hand, courts imply a duty of good faith so that the baseball
league must require or not require baseballs in good faith. Thus, if the
league's orders were much lower or much higher than in previous years,
a court would analyze closely whether the league breached its duty to
require baseballs in honesty. Because a court could assess objectively
whether any such deviation from the league's normal requirements was
honest, the promise, therefore, is not illusory.

6. (From a baseball league to a baseball manufacturer) We will buy at $1
per ball as many baseballs as we choose to buy.
Answer: This statement does contain language of promise (will). Here,
however, because the use of the words "we choose to buy" have the same
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connotation as the phrase "feel like it," the analysis above with respect to
No. 1 above applies. The promise is illusory.
7. I covenant to pay you $4000 for this washing machine if I am satisfied
with it.
Answer: This statement does contain language of promise (covenant).
The use of the word "satisfied," however, suggests the promisor may
choose to perform or withdraw based simply on whether she feels
satisfied with it, a feeling over which the speaker would seem to have
complete control. Courts, however, imply a duty of good faith
satisfaction if the matter is one of fancy, taste, or judgment, or of
reasonable satisfaction if the matter is one of utility. Because the
effectiveness of a washing machine is a matter of utility (whether the
machine works properly), a court would imply a duty of reasonable
satisfaction and, therefore, only allow the speaker to avoid liability if the
speaker has a reasonable basis for claiming dissatisfaction. Accordingly,
the promise is not illusory.

8. I covenant to pay you $4000 for this washing machine if I desire to do
so.
Answer: Because the word "desire" is a synonym for the phrase "feel like
it," the analysis above with respect to No. 1 applies here also. The
promise is illusory.
Preparation for Classroom Discussion

Follow the instructions below. Read Strong v. Sheffield, 39 N.E. 330
(N.Y. 1895); Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank, 645 P.2d
727 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E.
214 (N.Y. 1917); and Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,
150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945). Answer the questions regarding the cases
in the spaces provided below.
After you finish answering the questions for each of the four cases,
read and analyze in writing each problem in the Illusory Promise
Problem Set. Then, paraphrase the rules of law you have learned in this
part, review the explanations in this text as to how to develop flow charts
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and how to create your own mnemonic devices, and then develop a flow
chart or write out a mnemonic in the space provided to help you
remember the critical features of illusory promises. Keeping in mind our
previous reading about the importance of being a reflective learner,
review all the hypotheticals and explanations, the four cases and the
materials in this part and write out, in the space provided, any questions
you have about illusory promise. Finally, identify the eight recurring
illusory promise fact patterns.
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Case Analysis Fomz
Strong v. Sheffield, 39 N.E. 330 (N.Y. 1895)

Write answers to the following questions.
Whatdidplaintiffpromise? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

What did defendant p r o m i s e ? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Whose promise was allegedly illusory?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What did the court conclude as to whether the promise was illusory or
not (circle one)?
Not illusory
illusory
Why did the court conclude the promise was or was not illusory?
(Identify each step of the court's stated reasoning. If you believe the
court did not state any part of its reasoning, determine what the court
must have reasoned.)

Would the result have changed had the court implied a duty of good faith
or a duty of reasonable efforts? Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Case Analysis Form
Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank,
645 P.2d 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)

Write answers to the following questions.
What did the plaintiff/buyer promise?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What did the defendant/seller promise? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Whose promise was allegedly illusory?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Why was the promise allegedly illusory?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

What did the court conclude as to whether the promise was illusory or
not (circle one)?
Illusory
Not Illusory
Why did the court conclude the promise was or was not illusory?
(Identify each step of the court's stated reasoning. If you believe the
court did not state any part of its reasoning, determine what the court
must have reasoned.)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Case Analysis Form
Woodv. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917)
Write answers to the following questions.
What did the defendant/employer promise?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What did the plaintiff/employee promise?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Whose promise was allegedly illusory?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Why, allegedly, was there an illusory promise problem here'? _ _ __

What did the court conclude as to whether the promise was illusory or
not (circle one)?
illusory
Not illusory
Why did the court conclude the promise was or was not illusory'?
(Identify each step of the court's stated reasoning. If you believe the
court did not state any part of its reasoning, determine what the court
must have reasoned.)
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Case Analysis Farm
Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,
150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945)

Write answers to the following questions.
What did the defendant promise?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What did the plaintiff promise?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Whose promise was allegedly illusory?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What did the court conclude as to whether the promise was illusory or
not (circle one)?
Not Illusory
Illusory
Why did the court conclude the promise was or was not illusory?
(Identify each step of the court's stated reasoning. If you believe the
court did not state any part of its reasoning, determine what the court
must have reasoned.) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Illusory Promise Problem Set
1. Pay me $25 per month as premiums. If you keep current with your
premium payments and become physically or mentally unable to
work at your current employ, I will pay you each month one-half of
your monthly salary as of the time you became disabled.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __

2. We will pay you $5 per brick for all of the bricks we want.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not? _ _ _ _ _ _ __

3. (From a widget manufacturer to a widget retailer) We will sell you at
$.50 per widget all the widgets we produce.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __

4. If you give me $1 and if I draw your name from this fishbowl from
among all the names of the other persons from whom I have
collected a dollar, I will give you all the money I have collected.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __
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5. Unless I accept the job offer I received to be a law clerk with the Law
Offices of Schwartz & Schwartz, I promise to tutor you in Contracts.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __

6. I covenant to pay you $25 per hour to tutor me in Contracts, but I
may terminate this contract at any time.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __

7. I will buy your home if I get a 30-year, $200,000 loan from the Bank
of Schwartz at an 8% interest rate.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __

8. We will pay you $5 per brick for all of the bricks we need for our
construction project. Cancellation of this contract may be effected
by us at any time without notice.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __
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9. We will pay you $5 per brick for all of the bricks we need for our
construction project. Cancellation of this contract may be effected
by us at any time.
Is this promise illusory? _ _ _ Why or why not?_ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Paraphrase of Doctrine and
Creation of Flow Chart or Mnemonic Device

Please paraphrase the rules of law you have learned regarding illusory
promises in the space provided below.

Please reread the materials regarding creating flow charts and mnemonic
devices. Attach a flow chart for illusory promise to this page or describe
a mnemonic device you have created to help you remember illusory
promise doctrine.
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Questions Regarding Illusory Promise
In the space provided below, write down the questions you have about
illusory promises.
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The Eight Recurring Illusory Promise Fact Patterns
Reread all of the illusory promise hypotheticals and cases in this part.
In the spaces provided below, list the recurring illusory promise fact
patterns you have observed.
(!) ___________________________________

(2) ____________________________________

(3) __________________________________

(4) ___________________________________

(5) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

(6) ___________________________________
(?) ___________________________________

(8) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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